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P￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿e causes and consequences of inequality in income, wealth and opportunities
have long been studied by economists, philosophers and social scientists alike (e.g.
Aristoteles ￿￿￿￿; Rawls ￿￿￿￿; Rousseau ￿￿￿￿). ￿e eruption of the Global Financial
Crisis in ￿￿￿￿/￿￿ has sparked a renewed interest in inequality, both in the public
and academic debate. In fact, inequality has grown in almost every industrialized
country over the last three decades according to data from the OECD (￿￿￿￿b).
￿omas Piketty’s (￿￿￿￿) seminal book “Capital in the ￿￿st Century”, Raghuram
Rajan’s (￿￿￿￿) “Fault Lines” or the global “Occupy” movements and their slogan
“We are the ￿￿%” are just three prominent examples that illustrate this revived
interest in and concern about rising inequality around the world.
Economists have long and controversially debated about the e￿ect of inequality
on economic growth without reaching a clear consensus (Ostry et al. ￿￿￿￿). On the
one hand, inequality may encourage investment, innovation and entrepreneurship
and provide incentives to invest in education (Kaldor ￿￿￿￿; Lazear and Rosen ￿￿￿￿;
Barro ￿￿￿￿). On the other hand, high levels of inequality may impede the accumu-
lation of human capital by exacerbating adverse e￿ects of credit constraints (Galor
and Moav ￿￿￿￿) or deter investments due to socio-political instability (Alesina
and Perotti ￿￿￿￿). ￿e consequences of inequality, however, might go beyond the
economic sphere. In most cases, a concentration of income and wealth leads to a
concentration of political power that prevents a fair representation of the population
and may ultimately give those at the top an unacceptable degree of control over the
lives of others (Robinson and Acemoglu ￿￿￿￿; Scalon ￿￿￿￿).
Irrespective of the normative position taken, providing answers to these im-
portant topics requires a sound, evidence-based analysis of the underlying factors.
￿e aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of the causes
and consequences of inequality by studying three aspects of the German labor
market. Germany lends itself to an empirical analysis for at least two reasons. First,
researchers can draw on high quality, large scale data derived from administra-
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tive labor market records – the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies
(SIAB) – that by now have become one of the most prominent data sets used by
labor economists around the world. All of my three chapters base their empirical
analysis primarily on these data. Second, Germany, as Europe’s largest economy,
has undergone two major economic transformations that have generated consider-
able international interest. Firstly, the reuni￿cation of East and West Germany in
￿￿￿￿/￿￿ with its concurrent large in￿ux of migrants from East Germany and ethnic
Germans from Eastern Europe into West Germany and, secondly, the so-called
“Hartz reforms”, a series of labormarket reforms implemented between ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿.
Evenmore than a decade later, the weals and woes of these reforms are still intensely
debated. Critics blame the reforms for anything ranging from increased inequality
and the expansion of precarious employment to the shrinking of the middle class.
Proponents point out the positive e￿ects of the reforms on the German labormarket
in the form of lower unemployment and an employment boom that made them a
role model for labor market reforms in countries such as France, Greece or Spain.
My dissertation is composed of three chapters. ￿e ￿rst two chapters relate
directly to these topics. In my ￿rst chapter, I provide an empirical analysis of recent
trends in income inequality, the wage structure, and labor force participation in
Germany. I ￿nd that – contrary to common thinking – inequality among full-time
employees has been decreasing since ￿￿￿￿. ￿e second chapter starts out from a
￿nding of the ￿rst chapter which documents an increase in inequality at the lower
end of the distribution. A decomposition of this increase reveals that, in particular,
the change in the return to education has contributed to this increase.
￿e second chapter builds and empirically tests a model that links the supply of
di￿erently educated workers to their returns to education and thus helps to explain
how inequality, in particular, at the lower end of the wage distribution has changed
due to changes in the educational attainment and the migration in￿ux a￿er the
German reuni￿cation. It shows that contrary to what was previously hypothesized,
the widening gap between medium- and low-skilled workers over the ￿￿￿￿s was
not primarily driven by the in￿ow of low-skilled workers from outside of West
Germany, but rather by a polarization in the long-run educational attainment of
the native West German population.
P￿￿￿￿￿￿ ix
My third chapter has a more indirect, but nevertheless interesting connection
to inequality. It starts with the observation that focusing on inequality in wages
might overstate inequality in utility terms due to compensating di￿erentials. A
compensating di￿erential is the extra pay required to attract a worker to do a job
that is more unpleasant in a certain respect compared to an otherwise similar job.
In fact, Sorkin (￿￿￿￿) ￿nds indirect evidence that implies that about ￿￿% of the
inequality in US wages can be explained by compensating di￿erentials. ￿e setting I
study in the third chapter aims at uncovering direct evidence of such compensating
di￿erentials, which, until now, has been proven di￿cult to establish empirically. ￿e
setting I study is related to the compensating di￿erential that is expected to accrue
to waiters in bars and restaurants that allow their customers to smoke indoors
which is associated with considerable health risks for these employees. Using
the introduction of smoking bans in the German hospitality sector as a natural
experiment, I estimate this compensating di￿erential to amount to some ￿.￿% of
waiters’ wages. Taken literally, this ￿nding implies that although inequality among
all workers has increased ceteris paribus as a result of hospitality workers’ lower
wages, inequality in utility terms has remained constant as these workers now enjoy
healthier working environments.
￿e following overview provides a more detailed summary of the three chapters
of my dissertation. Each chapter is self-contained and can be read independently
from the others.
C￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ provides an empirical analysis of recent trends in inequality and the
wage structure in Germany. I ￿nd that wage inequality among full-time workers in
Germany increased continuously up to ￿￿￿￿. Since then, however, wage inequality
has been decreasing again and is now at a level similar to the early ￿￿￿￿s. ￿is
evolution holds true in both East and West Germany and within men and women.
Furthermore, I ￿nd that the decrease since ￿￿￿￿ was driven primarily by a compres-
sion of wages at the lower tail of the distribution. A detailed decomposition exercise
based on recentered in￿uence functions show that some part of the increase in
inequality is mechanically related to the aging and educational upgrading of the
workforce. ￿e majority of the change, however, is explained by changes in the
return to certain labor market characteristics, in particular the return to working
in a speci￿c sector and – at the lower end – education and – at the upper end –
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experience (proxied by age). Comparing the changes in employment and wages
over ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿, I subsequently ￿nd strong evidence in favor of task-biased tech-
nological progress favoring non-routine occupations. ￿is leads to a pronounced
polarization of the labor market as these occupations are mainly concentrated at
the lower and upper tail but not at the middle of the wage distribution. Turning to
the evolution of the labor force participation since the early ￿￿￿￿s, I ￿nd a dramatic
increase in the share of the working age population in part-time employment. In
contrast to widespread conjecture, this increase in part-time employment seems
not to have evolved at the expense of full-time employment but was rather fed by a
corresponding pronounced decrease in the share of the inactive or unemployed
population. Finally, based on microcensus data, I ￿nd – in accordance with the
strong increase in the employment rate a￿er ￿￿￿￿ – that net income inequality also
decreased starting in ￿￿￿￿ and has since then remained at lower level until ￿￿￿￿.
In C￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, which is joint work with Albrecht Glitz, we study the devel-
opment and underlying drivers of skill premiums in Germany between ￿￿￿￿ and
￿￿￿￿. We show that the signi￿cant increase in the medium to low skill wage pre-
miums since the late ￿￿￿￿s was almost exclusively concentrated among the group
of workers aged ￿￿ or below. Using a nested CES production function framework
which allows for imperfect substitutability between young and old workers, we
investigate whether changes in relative labor supplies could explain these patterns.
Our model predicts the observed di￿erential evolution of skill premiums very well.
￿e estimates imply an elasticity of substitution between young and old workers of
about ￿, between medium- and low-skilled workers of ￿ and between high-skilled
and medium/low-skilled workers of ￿.￿. Using a cohort level analysis based on
Microcensus data, we ￿nd that long-term demographic changes in the educational
attainment of the native (West-)German population – in particular of the post baby
boomer cohorts born a￿er ￿￿￿￿ – are responsible for the surprising decline in the
relative supply of medium-skilled workers which caused wage inequality at the
lower part of the distribution to increase in recent decades. We further show that
the role of (low-skilled) migration is limited in explaining the long-term changes
in relative labor supplies.
C￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ starts from the observation that although compensating wage
di￿erentials are a classic concept in economics, their empirical con￿rmation has
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proven surprisingly di￿cult. To make progress on this front, I use the staggered
introduction of smoking bans in the hospitality industry in the German states in
￿￿￿￿/￿￿ as a natural experiment that led to a substantial and lasting improvement
of working conditions of workers in bars and restaurants. Using administrative
labor market data and employing either a simple di￿erence-in-di￿erences or a triple
di￿erence-in-di￿erences approach, I ￿nd a ￿.￿% wage decline associated with the
most comprehensive smoking ban. ￿is e￿ect is robust to a battery of robustness
and placebo checks and does not seem to be driven by a decline in hospitality
revenues or hours worked. I furthermore present evidence that smoking bans
changed the selection of workers partly on observable but mostly on unobservable
characteristics and that smoking bans increased employment and turnover. All in all,
I ￿nd that the observed patterns are consistent with a simplemodel of compensating
wage di￿erentials.

C￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿e State of the German Labor Market∗
￿.￿ Introduction
￿e perception of Germany’s economic performance has changed markedly over
the past decade. From the “Sick man of the Euro” (￿e Economist ￿￿￿￿) Germany
has become an “Economic Superstar” (Dustmann et al. ￿￿￿￿). Figure ￿.￿ illustrates
this success story by comparing four macroeconomic indicators over ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿
of Germany to those of the US, the world’s largest economy, and France, Europe’s
second largest economy. Up until ￿￿￿￿, the unemployment rate in Germany had
increased to ￿￿.￿%￿, income per capita had fallen to ￿￿% of the US’s, and the em-
ployment to population ratio was at ￿￿%, a striking ￿￿ percentage points lower
compared to the US. Since ￿￿￿￿, however, Germany started an unprecedented
economic recovery. Until ￿￿￿￿, unemployment more than halved reaching ￿.￿%,
income per capita increased to ￿￿% relative to the US and the employment share of
the adult population increased to ￿￿% being nearly en par with the corresponding
share in the US.￿is development seems all the more impressive when compared
to the development of the same indicators in France which saw a deterioration of
its economic position since ￿￿￿￿.
One explanation for Germany’s new economic “miracle” (￿e Economist ￿￿￿￿)
proposed by Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿) was the restrained evolution in unit labor cost
illustrated in panel d of Figure ￿.￿. While labor cost have increased continuously
in France and the US since the ￿￿￿￿s and are now some ￿￿% higher than in ￿￿￿￿,
unit labor cost in Germany decreased during the ￿￿￿￿s and only started to grow
at a similar pace as in the US and France since the late ￿￿￿￿ such that unit labor
∗I am grateful to Raphael Guber for providing the sample counts for the GSOEP. All errors remain
mine.
￿According to internationally comparable data from the International Labor Organization (ILO).
￿ E￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿, W￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿
cost in ￿￿￿￿ are only about ￿￿% higher than in ￿￿￿￿. Although falling unit labor
cost signi￿cantly improved Germany’s international competitiveness, many critics
have argued that Germany’s stellar macroeconomic development was not primarily
driven by increased productivity but came at the price of poor wage growth, precar-
ious employment, and increased inequality (see, for instance Bäcker and Schmitz
￿￿￿￿; Fratzscher ￿￿￿￿; Grabka and Goebel ￿￿￿￿).
￿e goal of this paper is to provide a set of evidence-based insights that I hope
can inform an important debate. For this purpose, I review and update a series
of facts on inequality and labor market participation. Furthermore, I o￿er some
potential explanations for the observed patterns using the most recent versions
of two large-sample, representative micro data sets, namely administrative labor
market records provided by the Federal Employment Agency and data from the
Microcensus, an o￿cial, compulsory population survey. A sober focus on the
facts seems necessary when considering the results of Niehues (￿￿￿￿) who shows
that there is almost no connection between how people think that incomes in
their country are distributed and the actual distribution. In Germany, the perceived
incomedistribution is farmore unequal than it actually is. A corresponding puzzling
￿nding is that – as of ￿￿￿￿ – ￿￿%ofGerman think that their personal and the general
economic conditions are good or very good, but at the same time ￿￿% think that
the distribution of incomes in Germany is unfair (Kramer and Bürckholdt ￿￿￿￿). In
light of these results, my two most important ￿ndings may o￿er a more optimistic
perspective. First, I ￿nd that inequality in gross wages among full-time workers
has decreased since ￿￿￿￿ for men and women and in East and West Germany
alike and second that the strong increase in part-time employment was largely fed
by a decrease (at the aggregate level) in the inactive and unemployed population.
Undoubtedly, empirical analyses cannot, by themselves, give an answer to normative
questions such as what constitutes a “fair” level of inequality or redistribution.
However, a description of the facts that is based on the best data available is crucial
when discussing potential policy prescriptions.
Di￿erent data sets may lead to di￿erent conclusions about the same phenomena.
When it comes to measuring inequality, relative poverty rates, the size of the middle
class or related issues, the majority of studies are based on the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP). It is the most comprehensive panel survey in Germany
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Figure ￿.￿:Macro Indicators of Germany in International Comparison
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Notes: ￿e unemployment rate refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available
for and seeking employment (modeled ILO estimate). ￿e GDP per capita relative to the US is
constructed as each country’s GDP per capita in purchasing power parity ￿￿￿￿ international dollars
divided by the corresponding value for the US in each year. ￿e employment to population ratio is
the proportion of a country’s population that is employed (modeled ILO estimate). Employment is
de￿ned as persons of working age who, during a short reference period, were engaged in any activity
to produce goods or provide services for pay or pro￿t, whether at work during the reference period
(i.e. who worked in a job for at least one hour) or not at work due to temporary absence from a
job, or to working-time arrangements. Ages ￿￿ and older are generally considered the working-age
population. Annual unit labor cost are expressed as the ratio of total labor compensation per hour
worked to output per hour worked. Sources: World Development Indicators (unemployment, GDP
per capita, and employment to population) and OECD (unit labor cost).
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in terms of the set of covariates and includes, for instance, a detailed breakdown of
(self reported) gross and net individual and household earnings, labormarket status,
hours worked, or the composition of household members.￿ Despite its many merits
and widespread use in the scienti￿c and policy community, in this paper I rely on
two other data sets – the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿
(SIAB￿￿￿￿) and the Microcensus – for a number of reasons. First, compared to
the GSOEP both the SIAB￿￿￿￿ and the Microcensus feature large sample sizes. For
instance, in ￿￿￿￿, in the SIAB there are about ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ full-time working individuals
aged ￿￿-￿￿ (in East and West Germany, women and men), about ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ in the
Microcensus, and about ￿,￿￿￿ in the GSOEP. Analyses of subgroups such as men
and women or employees in East and West Germany or detailed wage structure
decompositions require that the respective cells are ￿lled with a su￿cient number of
observations. Second, inclusion or participation is compulsory by law in the SIAB
and Microcensus assuring their representativeness. In contrast, participation in the
GSOEP is voluntary and sample attrition is considerable (Kroh et al. ￿￿￿￿) which
may put the GSOEP’s overall representativeness into question. Finally, wages are
expected to be very precisely measured in the SIAB where wages are automatically
reported by employers and used to determine legal claims against the social security
system. Misreporting can be severely punished. In contrast, income in the GSOEP
(as well as in the Microcensus) are self-reported and thus more likely prone to
(systematic) measurement error. In a detailed comparison of the GSOEP and the
SIAB, Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿) conclude that “measures of inequality are very
noisily estimated in the GSOEP”.
￿roughout the main text, I will perform my main analyses jointly for men
and women as well as workers in East and West Germany starting in ￿￿￿￿ when
records in the SIAB from East Germany are assumed to be complete (vom Berge
et al. ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿). Many previous studies perform their analyses separately for men
￿Recent studies using GSOEP data to calculate wage inequality and other related measures of
the wage structure in Germany include the latest report of the scienti￿c advisory board of the
Federal Ministry of Finance on income inequality and social mobility (Bundesministerium der
Finanzen ￿￿￿￿), the Federal Government’s o￿cial report on poverty and wealth (Bundesregierung
￿￿￿￿), the Federal Ministry for Family A￿airs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth’s family report
(Bundesminsterium für Familie, Senioren ￿￿￿￿), data for Germany in the OECD Income and
Distribution Database (OECD ￿￿￿￿), and many other frequently cited studies and books such as
Fratzscher (￿￿￿￿) and Grabka and Goebel (￿￿￿￿)
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and women or o￿en exclude females – who make up nearly half of all full-time
workers - altogether. I prefer to group men and women as well as East and West
German workers together not only to provide a full picture of the labor market but
also because – as I will show –many of the most important patterns in the evolution
of the wage structure are surprisingly similar across men and women and in both
East and West Germany.
My analysis focuses on three main indicators: inequality in gross wages, labor
force participation among theworking age population and inequality in net incomes.
Starting with inequality of gross wages among full-time workers based on the
SIAB￿￿￿￿, I ￿nd that a￿er it had continuously increased over the ￿￿￿￿s and the
￿￿￿￿s, since ￿￿￿￿ inequality has decreased considerably reaching a level comparable
to the beginning of the ￿￿￿￿s. ￿us – at least in terms of market wages earned
by full-time workers – the commonly expressed concern about an ever widening
gap between the rich and the poor is not supported by the data. A closer analysis
reveals that the decrease in the dispersion of wages is related, in particular, to a
compression of wages at the lower end of the distribution. Between ￿￿￿￿ and
￿￿￿￿, wages below the ￿￿th percentile have seen considerable gains and strongly
outperformedwage growth at higher percentiles. A decomposition of the longer run
change in wage inequality over ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿ using a recentered in￿uence function
approach following Firpo et al. (￿￿￿￿) shows that some part of the increase in
inequality is mechanically related to the fact that the workforce becomes older
and better educated. Another considerable part of the increase is explained by
changes in the return to working in a certain sector and an increase in the return to
education and experience (proxied by age). ￿e analysis also yields some evidence
for a decrease in the gender pay gap. I also ￿nd clear evidence – once also including
part-time workers – in favor of a polarization in employment and wages over
the period ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿ along the occupational skill distribution. ￿e observed
patterns are strongly in line with task-biased technological change that – due to
the decreasing cost in the automation of routine tasks – favors jobs with a higher
content of non-routine tasks such as manual, lower-skilled service jobs at the lower
end and analytical and interactive jobs at the upper end of the wage distribution.
In a second part of the paper based on data derived from the microcensus, I
review changes in the labor market participation. Compared to ￿￿￿￿, the share of
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the working age population aged ￿￿ to ￿￿ years in part-time employment – mostly
a female phenomenon – increased more than twofold. However, contrary to com-
mon stereotypes, this growth seems mostly fed by a decrease in the inactive and
unemployed population and not by a corresponding decrease in regular full-time
employment. While in ￿￿￿￿ about ￿￿% of the population either did not participate
in the labor market or was unemployed, this share dropped to ￿￿% by ￿￿￿￿ – a
decrease of about ￿.￿million individuals. ￿e years ￿￿￿￿/￿￿ seem to constitute a
watershed in this context. Since then, the share of full-time employed in the total
working age population increased by ￿ percentage points while the share of the
inactive and unemployed dropped by ￿ and ￿.￿ percentage points, respectively.
Finally, I ￿nd that the importance of so called “mini jobs” – a form of part-time
employment with reduced tax- and social security contributions – reduced in total
part-time employment has decreased over the last decade while the share of long
term unemployed in all unemployed individuals remained roughly constant since
￿￿￿￿. In a last part, based on Microcensus data, I compute inequality among the
entire working age population and ￿nd that the strong increases in labor force
participation led to a decrease in overall inequality in post-transfer net incomes
since ￿￿￿￿. Since then, net income inequality has remained roughly constant.
￿is paper is not the ￿rst to study wage and income inequality in Germany.
As mentioned before, most existing studies are based on the GSOEP (for instance
Goebel et al. ￿￿￿￿; Fratzscher ￿￿￿￿; Bundesministerium der Finanzen ￿￿￿￿; Bun-
desminsterium für Familie, Senioren ￿￿￿￿; Bundesregierung ￿￿￿￿; Grabka and
Goebel ￿￿￿￿). Compared to these studies, I use two di￿erent data sets that – as I
argue above – may be better suited to study questions related to wage and income
inequality in terms of sample size and representativeness. ￿e paper by Dustmann
et al. (￿￿￿￿) was one of the ￿rst and most prominent papers to use IAB data to
analyze the German wage structure.￿ As their data extends up to ￿￿￿￿, my paper
can also be understood as an update and extension of their work. Di￿erently from
them, my analysis extends up to ￿￿￿￿ and I do not restrict attention to West Ger-
man men only, but include women as well as workers in East Germany. Other
papers have used IAB data reaching up until ￿￿￿￿ to study, for instance, plant-level
heterogeneity and rising assortativeness between workers and ￿rms (Card et al.
￿Fitzenberger (￿￿￿￿) is an important, earlier study using IAB data.
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￿￿￿￿), the role of exporting establishments (Baumgarten ￿￿￿￿), collective bargaining,
technology, and worker characteristics (Antonczyk et al. ￿￿￿￿b; Battisti et al. ￿￿￿￿;
Baumgarten et al. ￿￿￿￿), and domestic outsourcing (Goldschmidt and Schmieder
￿￿￿￿) in explaining wage inequality as well as to study the changing situation of
labor market entrants (Reinhold and￿omsen ￿￿￿￿). One di￿erence compared to
these studies is that I use the most recent version of the SIAB reaching up to ￿￿￿￿.
Crucially, the last four years since ￿￿￿￿ are particularly interesting as they yield a
turnaround in the tale of inequality in Germany that up to ￿￿￿￿ was a story about
ever increase inequality. To the best of my knowledge, the only other study using the
most recent IAB data up to ￿￿￿￿ is Möller (￿￿￿￿), who also ￿nds a trend break in the
evolution of wage inequality around ￿￿￿￿. Finally, other studies have also analyzed
wage and/ or employment polarization (Dustmann et al. ￿￿￿￿; Antonczyk et al.
￿￿￿￿a; Sen￿leben and Wielandt ￿￿￿￿) but did not include part-time and/or female
workers. As I will show, including these two groups yields much more pronounced
polarization patterns than when these groups remain excluded.
￿e remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section ￿.￿ studies inequality
in gross wages among full-time workers looking at overall inequality, as well as
di￿erences at the lower and upper tail of the distribution. Section ￿.￿ then asks
how much of the observed change in inequality is due to composition versus wage
structure e￿ects. Section ￿.￿ studies the polarization of wages and employment
providing evidence that is in linewith technological progress that favors non-routine
tasks. Section ￿.￿ extents the view to the entire population studying the overall labor
force participation, while Section ￿.￿ looks at inequality in net incomes. Section ￿.￿
concludes.
￿.￿ Inequality in Market Wages of Full-TimeWorkers
In this section, I present an overview of the evolution of inequality in gross wages
based on various measures. ￿e data is derived from administrative labor market
records contained in the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB)
provided by the by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and covers all
individuals subject to social security between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿. ￿us, it does not
include civil servants, self employed, while mini job workers were only included
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starting from April ￿￿￿￿ onwards. For my analysis, I include male and female
workers aged ￿￿-￿￿ living in East and West Germany.￿ Wages are censored above
the upper social security income threshold which was at ￿￿,￿￿￿ euros in ￿￿￿￿
a￿ecting about ￿-￿% of full-time workers across the years since ￿￿￿￿. I impute
these censored wages assuming that wages are log normally distributed. Dustmann
et al. (￿￿￿￿) and Glitz and Wissmann (￿￿￿￿) show that the upper tail of the wage
distribution is well approximated by this imputation approach. More details on the
sample preparation and imputation of censored wages are given in section A.￿ in
the Appendix.
For most of the analyses, I will focus on full-time workers as the wage structure
of these individuals best represents “market inequality”, i.e. inequality that results
from the market renumeration of (scarce) skills such as education or experience,
the ability to perform certain tasks, or is related to secular forces such as tech-
nological progress or international trade. Any redistribution via the tax system,
unemployment insurance, or joint household consumption has to start from these
market incomes. Another reason to focus on full-time wages is that – since the
hours worked are not directly observed in the SIAB – inequality measures are far
less confounded by variation in hours worked than compared to when including
spells of part-time and mini jobs workers as well.￿.
Figure ￿.￿ plots the evolution of the standard deviation of log wages of all full-
time workers in Germany, including workers from both East and West Germany as
well as men and women between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿.￿ Inequality has risen substantially
since the beginning of the ￿￿￿￿s until ￿￿￿￿. Since ￿￿￿￿, however, inequality has
been decreasing and is now at about the same level as in ￿￿￿￿. Figure ￿.￿ shows
￿Workers in the SUF SIAB￿￿￿￿ are only observed until the age of ￿￿.
￿Wanger et al. (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿, Figure ￿) show the hours worked by full-time employees have remained
basically constant over ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ and Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿), based on GSOEP data, ￿nd that
“using hourly as opposed to monthly wages does not have a large impact on measured inequality”.
￿us, inequality calculated using full-time wages as observed in the SIAB is likely to be a good
proxy for inequality based on hourly wages.
￿In my baseline calculations, I use the duration of a spell measured in days as weights. In Figure A.￿,
I present a number of alternative methods to compute inequality including the Gini coe￿cient,
the standard deviation of log wages not weighted by spell duration and the standard deviation of
log wages weighted by spell duration but based on imputed wages that – unlike in the baseline –
assume a di￿erent variance for each education and age group. All of these alternative measures
show a very similar evolution of inequality compared to my baseline speci￿cation.
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Figure ￿.￿: Evolution of the Standard Deviation of Log Earnings
(Full-Time Workers, Germany)
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the evolution of the standard deviation of log real gross wages of all full-time
workers in Germany (East and West, men and women) based on the SIAB￿￿￿￿. Censored wages are
imputed using a fully saturated speci￿cation of age and education indicators separately for each year,
East and West Germany, and men and women assuming log-normally distributed error terms with a
constant variance across education and age groups. All calculations are weighted by spell duration.
More details on sample restrictions and the imputation of censored wages are given in subsection A.￿
in the Appendix.
that – maybe surprisingly – the main patterns of the evolution of inequality do not
di￿er much for men and women in East or West Germany. For men, inequality is at
lower levels in East Germany but the evolution of inequality among men in the east
follows that of men in the west very closely (Figure ￿.￿a). For women, the evolution
of inequality is practically the same in East and West Germany apart from some
initial di￿erences and a much smaller level di￿erence than in the case of men. ￿e
decrease in inequality since ￿￿￿￿ is more pronounced for women but still apparent
across all groups. Looking at the longer run (West Germany only), inequality has
￿￿ E￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿, W￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿
Figure ￿.￿: Standard Deviation of Log Full-Time Wages
(Separately for Men and Women in East and West Germany)
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the evolution of the standard deviation of log gross wages of full-time workers
aged ￿￿-￿￿ years in East and West Germany separately for men (panel a) and women (panel b) based
on SIAB￿￿￿￿. For more details see notes for Figure ￿.￿.
C￿. ￿: T￿￿ S￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿ L￿￿￿￿M￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
been steadily rising since ￿￿￿￿ with the increase being more pronounced for men
than for women until the mid ￿￿￿￿s. ￿e longer run also reveals that the decrease
in inequality since ￿￿￿￿ is remarkable as it is the only sustained decrease a￿er a
monotonous increase inequality over the last three decades.
Overall inequality may rise when incomes at the lower end of the distribution
grow slower than those in the middle and the top or when incomes at the top grow
faster than the rest. To better understand which parts of the distribution were
driving the change in overall inequality, Figure ￿.￿a plots the evolution of the ￿￿th,
￿￿th, and the ￿￿th percentile of the wage distribution (based on real wages) of all
full-time workers in Germany between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿.￿ ￿e reason to focus on the
￿￿th percentile is that it is uncensored throughout the sample period and is thus
independent from the speci￿c imputations method used (similar to Dustmann et al.
￿￿￿￿; Card et al. ￿￿￿￿). Wages at the ￿￿th percentile have been steadily rising and,
compared to their level in ￿￿￿￿, were about ￿￿% higher in ￿￿￿￿. In contrast, real
wages at the middle were barely higher in ￿￿￿￿ than in ￿￿￿￿ and have only started
to grow in recent years resulting in an overall growth of ￿% since ￿￿￿￿. Wages at
the bottom grew even slower until ￿￿￿￿, plummeting to a level that was ￿% lower
than in ￿￿￿￿. Since then, however, they have been growing faster than wages in the
middle leading to a compression of the wage distribution at the lower half in recent
years. Still, compared to their level in ￿￿￿￿, real wages at the ￿￿th percentile were only
some ￿% higher in ￿￿￿￿. Figure ￿.￿b depicts these developments in an alternative
way by showing the ￿￿th to ￿￿th (￿￿th to ￿￿th) percentile ratio representing the
lower (upper) tail of the wage distribution. ￿e ￿gure shows that inequality was
growing at the same rate at the lower and upper tail of the distribution until about
￿￿￿￿. Since then the growth of the ￿￿/￿￿ gap has ￿attened while a￿er ￿￿￿￿ the ￿￿/￿￿
gap has been shrinking again.
Figure ￿.￿ shows that these conclusions also hold when looking at the growth
rates along the entire (uncensored) distribution between the periods ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿
and ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿. Wage growth between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ was virtually linearly
related to the initial percentile in the wage distribution with real wages at the lowest
￿Figure A.￿ plots the evolution of the ￿￿th, ￿￿th, and ￿￿th separately for West Germany (since
￿￿￿￿) and East Germany (since ￿￿￿￿). Again, the general patterns for entire Germany are closely
resembled in both East and West Germany.
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Figure ￿.￿: Inequality at the Lower, Middle and Upper Part of the Distribution
(a) Evolution of the ￿￿th, ￿￿th, and ￿￿th Percentile (Index ￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿)
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the evolution of the ￿￿th, ￿￿th, and ￿￿th percentiles of the distribution of
real gross wages of all full-time workers in Germany aged ￿￿-￿￿ years based on the SIAB￿￿￿￿ in two
di￿erent ways. Panel (a) plots the index growth of the three percentiles (￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿) while panel (b)
plots the evolution of the ￿￿/￿￿ and ￿￿/￿￿ percentile ratios. All calculations are weighted by spell
duration.
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Figure ￿.￿: Change in Log Real Wages Along the Distribution
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the growth between ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (solid black line) and ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (gray line) for
each uncensored percentile of the distribution of real gross wages of all full-time workers in Germany
aged ￿￿-￿￿ years based on the SIAB￿￿￿￿. Plots are smoothed using a locally weighted regression with
a bandwidth of ￿.￿. All calculations weighted by spell duration.
percentiles decreasing (in real terms) by up to ￿￿% while wages at top percentiles
grew by nearly ￿￿%. Between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿, however, wages at the lowest percentiles
grew fastest by up to ￿￿%, while the growth rate fell exponentially until the ￿￿th
percentile from where it remained basically constant at ￿%. Taken together, the
decrease in overall inequality starting a￿er ￿￿￿￿ shown in Figure ￿.￿ was driven
partly by a slowdown of the divergence at the upper tail but mainly by a convergence
of wages at the lower tail. ￿is already point to some form of polarization of the
wage structure which I will study in more detail in section ￿.￿.
When studying the evolution of di￿erent percentiles of the wages distribution
over time as in Figure ￿.￿a, it is important to bear in mind that these percentiles do
not refer to a ￿xed group of individuals but are computed over a changing set of
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Figure ￿.￿: Evolution of Percentiles for Fixed Groups of Full-Time Workers
(a) Ranked by Position in Population Distribution in ￿￿￿￿
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(b) Ranked by Position in Peer Distribution in ￿￿￿￿
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the indexed evolution of real gross wages for full-time workers aged ￿￿-￿￿
years in ￿￿￿￿ based on the SIAB￿￿￿￿ (￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿). In panel a) workers are grouped by their position in
the distribution of all full-time workers aged ￿￿-￿￿ years in ￿￿￿￿. In panel b), workers are grouped
by their position in the distribution of all full-time workers aged ￿￿-￿￿ years in ￿￿￿￿. A bandwidth
of ￿ percentage point around each given percentile is chosen to group workers. All calculations are
weighted by spell duration.
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workers. For instance, younger workers will typically start their careers at lower
percentiles and will move up along the wage distribution when increasing their
experience and skills. Furthermore, workers who have previously been unemployed
or inactive might join the labor force earning below average wages which will also
drive down wages at the lower end of the distribution. Finally, due to transitory
one-time-payments such as bonuses or extra hours, some individuals might ￿nd
themselves at top percentiles of the wage distribution in one year and return to a
lower percentile in another. ￿us, a decline in the ￿￿th percentile by ￿% between
￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ does not mean that an actual group of workers saw their real wages
decline by this amount. To illustrate this point, I plot the evolution of real wages for
a ￿xed group of full-time workers who were between ￿￿ and ￿￿ years old in ￿￿￿￿ in
Figure ￿.￿. In panel a, I divide these workers into three groups according to their
position in the overall wage distribution of all full-time workers in ￿￿￿￿.￿ In panel b,
I group these workers according to their position in the wage distribution of their
￿￿ to ￿￿ year old peers instead. Independent of the grouping, both panels show
that real wages have grown for all groups. What maybe surprising at ￿rst glance is
that real wages for the group of ￿￿ to ￿￿ year olds who found themselves at the ￿￿th
percentile in ￿￿￿￿ grew the fastest (by up to ￿￿% depending on the grouping), while
wages for workers at the median grew the slowest with wage growth of workers
initially at the ￿￿th percentile in between. Althoughmore research is needed on this
point, this may suggest a kind of mean reversion and considerable wage mobility at
lower percentiles while steeper age earnings pro￿les for high-skilled workers may
explain the accelerated wage growth at the top compared to the middle.￿
￿To increase sample sizes, I include in the ￿￿th percentile workers from the ￿￿th and ￿￿th percentile
and accordingly for the ￿￿th and ￿￿th percentile. Increasing or decreasing this bandwidth has
little in￿uence on the results.
￿Another explanation for the observed pattern might be selection, i.e. “survival” of the best workers
while less productive workers leave the full-time labor force along the way. Figure A.￿ shows
a version of Figure ￿.￿a for a strictly balanced panel of workers who are observed in each year
between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿. Wage growth is more pronounced for every percentile group but the
ordering regarding their growth rates remains the same as in the panels of Figure ￿.￿.
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￿.￿ Decomposing Inequality in Full-TimeWages
A further step in understanding inequality relates to the question of howmuch of the
change in inequality across two periods can be explained by compositional changes
in the workforce. Table ￿.￿ summarizes the workforce along its demographic and
main sectoral composition in ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿, and ￿￿￿￿ along with the respective changes.
￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿mark the beginning and end of my data while ￿￿￿￿ – according to
Figure ￿.￿ – represents a break in the wage evolution in particular of the ￿￿th
percentile that resulted in a subsequent decrease in overall inequality. Between ￿￿￿￿
and ￿￿￿￿, workers have become older (by about ￿.￿ years on average) and much
more educated with the share of high-skilled workers doubling. ￿e share of females
and East Germans decreased somewhat while the share of workers with German
nationality remained basically constant.￿￿ As shown before, the overall variance in
wages in ￿￿￿￿ is higher than it was in ￿￿￿￿ but lower than in ￿￿￿￿ and wage growth
at the ￿￿th, ￿￿th, and ￿￿th percentile follows the patterns depicted in Figure ￿.￿a.
Regarding the sectoral composition, the employment share of the service sector has
grown from ￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿while the employment shares of the primary
and manufacturing sector remained constant at ￿% and decreased from ￿￿% to
￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿, respectively, although the decrease in manufacturing in Germany has
been lower than in other OECD countries.￿￿ Amore detailed sectoral breakdown is
presented in Table A.￿.
Given that the dispersion of wages is higher within the group of older, high-
skilled workers than within young, low-skilled workers, an aging and better edu-
cated workforce will mechanically be associated with higher inequality.￿￿ To analyze
such e￿ects more carefully, I use a recentered in￿uence function (RIF) regression
approach proposed by Firpo et al. (￿￿￿￿) to perform a detailed decomposition of
the change in the variance and the ￿￿th, ￿￿th, and the ￿￿th percentiles between
￿￿When including part-time employment (excluding mini jobs), the share of women increased from
￿.￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿ to ￿.￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿According to data from the OECD (￿￿￿￿a), in ￿￿￿￿ the share of manufacturing employment in
total employment (including part-time employment with a much higher share of services) was
￿.￿￿ for Germany, ￿.￿￿ France, and ￿.￿￿ for the US.
￿￿For instance, among full-time workers in ￿￿￿￿, the standard deviation of log real wages was ￿.￿￿ for
low-skilled workers between ￿￿ and ￿￿ years while it was ￿.￿￿ for high-skilled workers between
￿￿ and ￿￿ years.
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Table ￿.￿: Summary Statistics of Demographic Characteristics (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿)
Means ∆
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿
-￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿
-￿￿￿￿
Demographics
Age (in years) ￿￿.￿￿ ￿￿.￿￿ ￿￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
￿￿-￿￿ years ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿
￿￿-￿￿ years ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿
￿￿-￿￿ years ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿
￿￿-￿￿ years ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿
￿￿-￿￿ years ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
￿￿-￿￿ years ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
￿￿-￿￿ years ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Female ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿
Germana ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿
East Germany ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿
Education Shares
Low-Skilled ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿
Medium-Skilled ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿
High-Skilled ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Log Real Wages
Variance ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
￿￿th Percentile ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
￿￿th Percentile ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
￿￿th Percentile ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Main Sectors
Agricultureb , Mining, Quarrying ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿
Manufacturingc ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿ -￿.￿￿
Services ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Notes: ￿is table presents summary statistics of full-time working individuals aged ￿￿-￿￿ years as
observed in the SIAB￿￿￿￿. Statistics are weighted by spell duration. arefers to West Germany
only. b includes forestry and ￿shing. cde￿ned as NACE section D.
￿￿ E￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿, W￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ into a part explained by changes along the demographic, sectoral and
regional composition of the workforce (compositional e￿ects) and a part that re￿ects
the changes in how these characteristics are priced (wage structure e￿ects). ￿e
main advantage of a RIF approach over a re-weighting approach such as DiNardo
et al. (￿￿￿￿) or a conditional quantile regression approach such as Machado and
Mata (￿￿￿￿) is that is allows for a detailed decomposition of both the compositional
and the wage structure e￿ect and that it is computationally less demanding (see
Fortin et al. ￿￿￿￿, for a detailed review of decomposition methods).
Table ￿.￿ shows the results of this decomposition exercise.￿￿ ￿e overall variance
of log real wages between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ increased by ￿.￿ log points (the estimated
increase reported in the table is virtually identical to the actual increase). Composi-
tional e￿ects alone, i.e. changes in the observable characteristics of the workforce,
would have led to an increase of ￿.￿ or some ￿￿% of the overall e￿ect. ￿is is sizable.
￿e detailed decomposition in panel B reveals that changes in the education of
workers as observed in Table ￿.￿ are the most important driver behind this e￿ect.
￿us, had the educational composition of workers in Germany remained at its ￿￿￿￿
level, the increase in inequality would have been lower by ￿.￿ log points or about
one third of the overall increase. Both, the contributions of changes in the age
structure and sectoral composition are also sizable but smaller while changes in
the share of women, German workers or the regional allocation had virtually no
e￿ect. Panel C shows that changes in the return to education also contributed to
increased inequality. Glitz andWissmann (￿￿￿￿) show that this is, in particular, due
to a rise in the medium- to low-skilled premium of young workers explained by
their increasing relative scarcity (also compare results in column ￿). Note that an
important drawback of a decomposition approach such as the one presented here
is that it cannot account for general equilibrium e￿ects, for instance a change in the
return to education resulting from a change in the relative supplies of di￿erently
skilled workers. Furthermore, the change in the return to working in a speci￿c
sector and being female both had a compressing e￿ect on overall inequality though.
￿￿Coe￿cients are reported in log points, i.e. coe￿cients are multiplied by ￿￿￿. In the interest of
space, I do not report standard errors, but signi￿cance levels only. Table A.￿ shows the same table
including bootstrapped standard errors.
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￿is is an interesting point. In the case of the female coe￿cient it suggests that the
(conditional) gender pay gap has decreased between the two periods.
￿e decomposition of overall inequality measured as the ￿￿th to ￿￿th percentile
di￿erence (￿￿-￿￿ di￿erence in the following) yields somewhat di￿erent conclusions.
Here, only ￿￿% of the overall e￿ect is explained by compositional changes while
the majority or ￿￿% is attributable to wage structure e￿ects.￿￿ ￿e most important
e￿ects are changes in the return to sectors (-￿￿% of the overall e￿ect) exerting
a compressing e￿ect, while the return to education (￿￿%), and the sectoral com-
position (￿￿%) contributed to increasing inequality. As the controversy between
Autor et al. (￿￿￿￿) and Lemieux (￿￿￿￿) highlights, the focus on overall inequality
can, however, mask considerable heterogeneity within the lower and upper tail of
the distribution.￿￿ At the lower tail (measured as the ￿￿-￿￿ di￿erence), ￿￿% of the
overall change is estimated to be due to compositional e￿ects. Here, the biggest
signi￿cant e￿ects stem from changes in the return to working in a speci￿c sector
(￿￿￿% of the overall e￿ect), the return to education (￿￿%), and the return to being
female (-￿￿%) while compositional changes are mainly driven by changes in the
sector (￿￿%) and age (￿￿%) composition. At the upper tail, only ￿￿% of the increase
in the ￿￿-￿￿ di￿erence is related to compositional changes. Changes in the return to
speci￿c sectors exert a strong compressing e￿ect on upper tail inequality (-￿￿￿%)￿￿
while changes in the return to age (￿￿%) and changes in the education structure
(￿￿%) had a smaller but increasing e￿ect on inequality.
My ￿ndings are in line with a number of other studies that have also analyzed
the determinants of inequality. For instance, Autor et al. (￿￿￿￿) decompose wage
￿￿One reason for this might be technical, i.e. the decomposition of the variance relies in part on the
imputation of top coded wages where education and age are used in the imputation. Another
reason might be that wage structure e￿ects go in di￿erent directions at di￿erent parts of the
distribution and thus are setting each other o￿ to some extent.
￿￿Lemieux (￿￿￿￿) focusing on the overall change in inequality in the US concluded that most of the
growth in US residual wage inequality between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ is due to spurious composition
e￿ects. In contrast, Autor et al. (￿￿￿￿) studying the same period ￿nd that compositional e￿ects
only played a major role at explaining changes in lower tail inequality masking considerable
countervailing price compressions. In addition, according to their results, changes in the inequality
at the upper tail are almost exclusively driven by price changes.
￿￿Since some factors have a positive, and some a negative e￿ect on the overall change, the esti-
mated e￿ects of some factors can be larger than the overall e￿ect. At the end, the impact of all
compositional and wage structure e￿ects sum up to ￿￿￿%.
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Table ￿.￿:Decomposition of the Change in Inequality over ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
Variance ￿￿-￿￿ ￿￿-￿￿ ￿￿-￿￿
Panel A: Overall E￿ect
∆ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿￿.￿￿∗∗∗
Compositional
E￿ects ￿.￿￿
∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗
Wage Structure
E￿ects ￿.￿￿
∗∗∗ ￿￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗
Panel B: Composition E￿ects Attributable to
Education ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗
Age ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗
Female −￿.￿￿∗∗∗ −￿.￿￿∗∗∗ −￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗
German ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿
Region −￿.￿￿∗∗∗ −￿.￿￿∗∗∗ −￿.￿￿∗∗∗ −￿.￿￿∗∗∗
Sector ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗
Panel C: Wage Structure E￿ects Attributable to
Education ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ −￿.￿￿
Age −￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗
Female −￿.￿￿∗∗∗ −￿.￿￿∗∗∗ −￿.￿￿∗∗∗ −￿.￿￿
German ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗
Region ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿￿.￿￿ −￿￿.￿￿
Sector −￿.￿￿∗∗∗ −￿.￿￿∗∗∗ ￿.￿￿∗∗∗ −￿￿.￿￿∗∗∗
Constant ￿.￿￿ ￿￿.￿￿ −￿￿.￿￿ ￿￿.￿￿∗∗∗
Notes: ￿is table presents decomposition results using RIF regressions (Firpo
et al. ￿￿￿￿). Calculations are based on full-time working individuals aged
￿￿-￿￿ years in the SIAB￿￿￿￿. Regressions are weighted by spell duration.
Coe￿cients multiplied by ￿￿￿ for better readability. Coe￿cients in ￿￿￿￿ are
used as the reference category. ***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿%
level. Empirical p-values based on bootstrapped standard errors with ￿￿￿
replications used.
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inequality in the US over the period ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ and ￿nd that compositional e￿ects
play a more important role at the lower end while wage structure e￿ects are the
main driver of the increase in upper tail inequality which is in line with the ￿ndings
presented in Table ￿.￿. Baumgarten et al. (￿￿￿￿) study the changes in wage inequality
of full-time employed men in the manufacturing sector in West Germany (about
￿￿% of the overall full-time employed German labor force) between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿.
￿ey ￿nd that changes in the return to education and the decline in collective
bargaining coverage are the two most important drivers of increased inequality
among these manufacturing workers.
Despite the heterogeneous patterns at the lower and upper tail, two insights
emerge from Table ￿.￿. First, the aging and higher educational attainment of the
workforce in Germany has led to a mechanical in increase in inequality. Second,
wage structure e￿ects play an important role, in particular changes to the return
to working in a speci￿c sector. Studying the reasons behind these price change is
an important step forward in understanding the ultimate drivers of inequality. For
instance, technological progress and the automation of routine tasks might have a
heterogeneous e￿ect on the wages earned in di￿erent sectors or occupations. ￿e
next section will present evidence related to this reasoning.
￿.￿ Polarization
￿e previous analyses showed that inequality has decreased in recent years and
that this was, in particular, due to a compression of wages at the lower end while
inequality at the upper end has continued to increase although more moderately
in recent years. I also presented evidence that changes in the return to working in
a speci￿c sector had a signi￿cant e￿ect on inequality. A prominent explanation
for such a polarization – i.e. an improvement of the two ends of the distribution
for instance in terms of wages and employment relative to the middle – stipulates
that the decrease in the cost of automating routine, codi￿able tasks over the last
years coupled with the fact that these tasks are concentrated in jobs in the middle of
the wage distribution leads to a polarization of wages and employment at the tails
(Goos and Manning ￿￿￿￿; Autor et al. ￿￿￿￿; Autor and Dorn ￿￿￿￿). In Figure ￿.￿
I assess the polarization hypothesis based on full-time workers. ￿e panels of
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Figure ￿.￿: Polarization Patterns for Full-Time Workers (￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿)
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots two illustrations of the polarization of the labor market in Germany based on
the SIAB￿￿￿￿. ￿e x-axis of both panels is obtained by ￿rst computing the mean log real gross wage
for each of ￿￿￿ occupation groups in ￿￿￿￿. Occupations are then ranked by their percentile in the
mean wages of all occupations ("skill percentile"). Panel a) plots the routine task (non-routine) share
against skill percentile as the sum of the cognitive and manual routine tasks (analytical, interactive,
and manual non-routine tasks), each smoothed using a locally weighted regression with a bandwidth
of ￿.￿. Task data is taken from Dengler and Matthes (￿￿￿￿). For more details see Section A.￿. Panel b)
plots the change in the share in total employment scaled by ￿￿￿ and the log wage di￿erence between
￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ each smoothed as in panel a). Calculations are based on all full-time spells in Germany
between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ weighted by spell duration.
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Figure ￿.￿: Polarization Patterns for Full- and Part-Time Workers (￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿)
(a) Routine and Non-Routine Task Share
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Notes: See notes for Figure ￿.￿. Calculations are based on all full-time and part-time spells in Germany
between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ weighted by spell duration.
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Figure ￿.￿ are based on individual wage spells that are aggregated at the level of the
￿￿￿ occupations observed in the SIAB. All occupation cells are sorted according
to their mean log real wage in ￿￿￿￿ approximating the average skill level in each
occupation.￿￿ Typical occupation at the lower end include hair dressers, waiters,
cleaning and housekeeping occupations, or cooks. In the middle, masons, road
workers, mechanics, or audio equipment mechanics are common occupations, and
at the top one￿nds economists, doctors, managers, data and IT specialists, architects,
scientists, and engineers. Using the classi￿cation by Dengler and Matthes (￿￿￿￿), I
calculate the share of routine and non-routine tasks for each occupation (see section
A.￿ in the Appendix for more details).￿￿ Figure ￿.￿a shows quite strikingly that the
share of routine tasks is highest for jobs in the middle of the skill distribution and
much lower at either extreme while the picture is reversed for the share of non-
routine tasks.￿￿ Figure ￿.￿b shows somemoderate polarization inwages. However, in
terms of employment, the picture is less clear. While there is a dramatic employment
increase at the top of the initial occupational wage distribution starting above the
￿￿th percentile, there is a moderate decrease in the middle (with the exception
around the ￿￿th percentile) and a strong decrease at the bottom percentiles. ￿us,
it seems that polarization in wages and in particular in employment is not borne
out for th case of Germany.
￿e focus on full-time workers, however, might be incomplete. As I will show
in more detail in section ￿.￿, there was a dramatic increase in part-time employ-
ment over the last two decades. Furthermore, as Figure ￿.￿a suggests, part-time
employment is particularly widespread in low-skilled service jobs at the lower end
of the occupational wage distribution. For instance, in ￿￿￿￿, nearly ￿￿% of all
workers (not including mini job workers) worked part-time at the bottom of the
initial occupational wage distribution while at the top, the corresponding ￿gure was
more ￿￿%. ￿erefore in Figure ￿.￿, I replicate the calculations from Figure ￿.￿ but
￿￿Sorting occupations according to median wages instead leaves the results virtually unchanged.
￿￿￿e classi￿cation by Dengler andMatthes (￿￿￿￿) has been used by other papers before, for instance
by Reinhold and￿omsen (￿￿￿￿). Like the O*NET classi￿cation for the US used by, for instance,
Autor et al. (￿￿￿￿), this classi￿cation is based on expert knowledge about the speci￿c tasks that
are usually performed in a given occupation. Another classi￿cation used in earlier work is based
on the German Quali￿cation and Career Survey (BIBB) which classi￿es task to occupations based
on answers from employees instead of experts (see Spitz-Oener ￿￿￿￿, for more details).
￿￿￿is is mechanic as the non-routine share is ￿minus the routine share.
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Figure ￿.￿: Share of Full-Time Employment and Females along the Occupational
Wage Distribution (￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿)
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Notes:￿is ￿gure plots the share of full-timeworkers (panel a) and females (panel b) in all employment
(full- and part-time) of a given occupation. ￿e x-axis refers to the percentiles in the occupational
wage distribution in ￿￿￿￿ constructed in the same way as in Figures ￿.￿ and ￿.￿. Each plot is smoothed
using a locally weighted regression with a bandwidth of ￿.￿.
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also include regular part-time workers.￿￿ Figure ￿.￿a is very similar to Figure ￿.￿a
showing the same patterns regarding the concentration of routine task intensive
jobs in the middle of the distribution. Figure ￿.￿b, however, is clearly di￿erent from
Figure ￿.￿b. When also including part-time workers, a striking polarization pattern
emerges. Jobs with a higher share of routine tasks, i.e. those in the middle, show the
weakest employment and wage growth while non-routine intensive jobs, i.e. those
at the two extremes of the distribution, show strong employment and (somewhat
weaker) wage growth.
￿e evidence in favor of strong employment and wage polarization in Germany
presented in Figure ￿.￿ is in line with ￿ndings for the US by Autor and Dorn
(￿￿￿￿) who also ￿nd a pronounced U-shaped pattern in employment and wage
growth along the occupational skill distribution between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿. Dustmann
et al. (￿￿￿￿) look at West-German full-time working men over the periods ￿￿￿￿,
￿￿￿￿, and ￿￿￿￿ and ￿nd more of an L-shaped pattern similar to Figure ￿.￿b with
substantial employment growth at top percentiles, a decline for the middle and
no strong gains or losses at the bottom￿￿ One reason for not ￿nding stronger
employment and wage growth at the lower end is likely the exclusion of part-
time employment as demonstrated above. Another related point is the exclusion
of women as also Sen￿leben and Wielandt (￿￿￿￿) point out. Based on a sample
including male and female worker (but still restricted to full-time employment) in
West Germany, they ￿nd stronger polarization in employment growth for di￿erent
sub-periods between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ highlighting that the employment growth
at lower-skilled occupations is almost exclusively driven by female employees in
service jobs. Figure ￿.￿b con￿rms that the share of women is considerably (up to
four times) higher at the lower tail of the initial occupational wage distribution.
Taken together, this shows that when studying polarization – at least in Germany
– it is crucial to include both women and part-time workers in the analysis for a
comprehensive view.
￿￿Regular part-time jobs are scaled to full-time equivalents using a weight of ￿/￿ following Dustmann
et al. (￿￿￿￿). Ideally, I would also like to include so called “mini jobs”, i.e. jobs below the marginal
part-time income thresholds that are exempted from most taxes and social security contributions,
but these are only recorded since ￿￿￿￿ in the IAB data.
￿￿Di￿erent from the approach followed here, they de￿ne skill percentiles according to the mean
years of education.
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￿.￿ Labor Market Participation
￿e discussion so far has mainly focused on full-time employees, a common sample
restriction of papers studying wage inequality and other labor market issues based
on social security data in Germany (for instance Dustmann et al. ￿￿￿￿; Card et al.
￿￿￿￿; Baumgarten et al. ￿￿￿￿; Goldschmidt and Schmieder ￿￿￿￿). As outlined above,
this best allows isolating wage changes from changes in the hours worked when
using the SIAB. However, one of the most remarkable developments of the German
labor market is related to changes in the participation of the population. Figures ￿.￿￿
and ￿.￿￿ illustrate this point in two di￿erentways. Both￿gures are based on data from
the microcensus, a ￿% compulsory survey of the population (employment status),
data from the Federal employment agency, and o￿cial population ￿gures from
the Federal Statistical O￿ce. Figure ￿.￿￿ depicts the composition of the workforce
with respect to the extent and type of labor market participation (Table ￿.￿ lists
these shares for selected years). In ￿￿￿￿, the majority of the working-age population
(￿￿-￿￿ years)￿￿ are full-time employees (￿￿%) followed by the group of inactive
individuals (￿￿%) such as students, stay-at-home parents, the retired or disabled
individuals, part-time employees (￿￿%), self-employed (￿.￿%), unemployed (￿.￿%),
and civil servants (￿.￿%).
￿e remarkable point is how this composition has evolved since the early ￿￿￿￿s.
￿is is better seen in Figure ￿.￿￿ which shows the growth rates of the di￿erent shares
indexed to ￿￿￿￿. ￿e share of part-time employees saw a dramatic increase. Com-
pared to its level in ￿￿￿￿ it has more than doubled and this rise was rather linear
since the beginning of the ￿￿￿￿s with the exception of a more rapid increase in
￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿. No other components has experienced such a pronounced change.
A frequently voiced concern is that part-time employment has crowded out full-
time employment. Although the time series data presented here does not allow
for a casual analysis, the data also suggest a di￿erent interpretation: ￿e growth
in part-time employment was largely fed by a decrease in the share of the inactive
and unemployed. ￿e main demographics groups responsible for this decrease
were – according to Burda and Seele (￿￿￿￿) – previously inactive West-German
￿￿￿e population between ￿￿ and ￿￿ years is generally considered the working-age population by
institutions such as the World Band, the OCED and also the Federal Statistical O￿ce (“Kerner-
werbstätige”).
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Figure ￿.￿￿: Composition of the Population Aged ￿￿-￿￿ (￿￿￿￿ - ￿￿￿￿)
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the composition of the working age population (￿￿-￿￿ years) in Germany as
cumulated shares. ￿e total number of persons in employment by occupational status (employees,
self-employed, and civil servants) and the shares of part- and full-time employees are calculated
based on data from Statistisches Bundesamt (￿￿￿￿a,b) and is based on microcensus data. ￿e total
number of unemployed is taken from Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (￿￿￿￿c). ￿e population
aged ￿￿-￿￿ is taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (￿￿￿￿c).
women and older West Germans, and previously unemployed male and older East-
Germans.￿￿ ￿e share of full-time employees has decreased only slightly from ￿￿%
in ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿ with a low of ￿￿% around ￿￿￿￿ a￿er which it increased (in
terms of percentage points of the total population) nearly as much as the share of
part-time employment. An important point is to compare the di￿erent forms of
labor market participation as a percentage of the total working-age population so
￿￿Burda and Seele (￿￿￿￿) also ￿nd that despite the large increase in the number of employed indi-
viduals, the total number of hours worked in Germany has only increased by ￿.￿% between ￿￿￿￿
and ￿￿￿￿, i.e. there was a large redistribution of working hours between full-time and part-time
workers up until about ￿￿￿￿ since when full-time employment is also growing again.
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Figure ￿.￿￿: Indexed Growth of the Composition of the Working Age Population
(￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿)
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the growth in the elements of the composition of the working age population
(￿￿-￿￿ years) indexed to ￿￿￿￿. See notes for Figure ￿.￿￿ for details on the variable construction and
data sources.
as to include the inactive and unemployed as well. Other studies compare shares
and growth rates among the employed only which – given the strong increase in
part-time employment – will mechanically drive down the share of full-time in
overall employment (for instance Bäcker and Schmitz ￿￿￿￿; WSI ￿￿￿￿). Further-
more, comparing the absolute number of hours worked or individuals in full-time
employment over time (such as Odendahl ￿￿￿￿) without taking the demographic
changes in the working-age population into account might be misleading. As panel
A of Figure ￿.￿￿ shows, the total working age population in ￿￿￿￿ was more than two
million people (or ￿%) smaller than in ￿￿￿￿.
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Table ￿.￿: Participation Shares of the Working Age Population
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Panel A: Working Age Population (in ￿,￿￿￿s)
Population ￿￿-￿￿ years ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
Index (￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿) ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
Panel B: Composition of Working Age Population
Full-Time Employeda ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Civil Servantsb ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Self Employed ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Part-Timec ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Unemployed ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Inactive ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Panel C: Composition of Part-Time Employment
Share Women ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Share Exclusive Mini Jobsd – ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Panel D: Composition of Unemployed
Share Long Term Unemployede ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Share Receiving ALG II f – – – ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Notes: ￿is table lists the shares in the total working age population (￿￿-￿￿ years) by occu-
pational status. For details on the data and variable construction see notes for Figure ￿.￿￿.
a includes those in vocational training. b includes part-time employed civil servants. c includes
marginally employed (i.e. mini job) employees. dsums to one with regular part-time em-
ployment. esums to ￿ with short term unemployed. Long term unemployed de￿ned as being
unemployed for one year and longer. f sums to ￿ with those receiving ALG I.
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Figure ￿.￿￿: Composition of Unemployed and Part-Time Employment
(a) Share of Exclusive Mini Jobs and Women in Total Part-Time Employment
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(b) Share of Long Term Unemployed and Share Receiving ALG II in Total Unemployment
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots in panel a) the share of exclusive mini jobs (i.e. mini jobs that are not held as
secondary jobs along with a regular part or full-time job; it is based on o￿cial data from Statistik der
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (￿￿￿￿a,b) and crossed check with data fromWSI (￿￿￿￿).) and the share
of women in total part-time employment. Panel b) plots the share of long term unemployed (solid
black line) and the share of unemployed receiving ALG II (dashed gray line). ￿e share of long-term
unemployed is computed as the share of individuals unemployed for more than one year divided by
the total number of all o￿cially registered unemployed individuals. Data is taken from Statistik der
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (￿￿￿￿a).
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Figure ￿.￿￿a suggests that the growth in part-time employment was not mainly
driven by females (solid black line). Although part-time employment is predomi-
nantly female, the share of women in total part-time employment has decreased
from ￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿. Another point regarding the composition of part-
time employment is related to the extent in the hours worked or income earned of
di￿erent part-time jobs. In Germany, part-time employment can take two di￿erent
legal forms: part-time employment with regular earnings of more than ￿￿￿ euros
per month and so called “mini jobs” with regular earnings below ￿￿￿ euros and
subject to reduced tax payments and social security contributions.￿￿ Figure ￿.￿￿a
shows that the recent growth in part-time employment was not mainly driven by
mini jobs (dashed gray line). ￿e share of exclusive mini jobs, i.e. mini jobs not
held as secondary jobs, in total part-time employment has in fact decreased since
￿￿￿￿meaning that regular part-time employment has grown more rapidly than
mini jobs employment since then.
￿e share of self-employed has also increased considerably and a large share
of this change was driven by a rise in the number of self-employed individuals
who do not employ any other workers, the so called “solo self-employed” (Mai
and Marder-Puch ￿￿￿￿). Many of these solo self-employed are suspected to be
in fact employees of a single company misclassi￿ed as independent contractors
(Scheinselbständigkeit, see Dietrich et al. ￿￿￿￿ for an empirical assessment). Finally,
the share of civil servants has also decreased considerably since ￿￿￿￿which is largely
due to the privatization of former state-owned companies such as the national
railways (Deutsche Bundesbahn) and the mail and telecommunication company
(Deutsche Bundespost).
Anther issue that comes up regularly in discussions about the German labor
market is related to the share of unemployed that are out of work for more than one
￿￿Speci￿cally, mini jobs are part-time jobs that either regularly do not pay more than ￿￿￿ euros
per month (threshold since ￿￿￿￿) or that last less than two months (short term employent/
kurzfristige Beschä￿igung). Non short term mini jobs make up the majority of all marginal part-
time employment (the general term for low-pay employment, geringfügige Beschä￿igung). ￿e
term “mini job” was introduced in ￿￿￿￿ as part of the Hartz reforms. ￿e regulations and earnings
thresholds governing mini jobs have been subject to changes and were recorded in the IAB data
since April ￿￿￿￿. ￿ere are also so called “midi jobs”, part-time jobs that regularly pay between
￿￿￿.￿￿ and ￿￿￿.￿￿ euros per month that are subject to reduced social security contributions for
the employer. ￿eir share in total part-time employment, however, is marginal.
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year. Figure ￿.￿￿b plots the share of these long-term unemployed in all unemployed
individuals. About ￿/￿ of all unemployed are long-term unemployed. ￿is share was
lower at the beginning of ￿￿￿￿s, spiked in ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿, and has been increasing
slightly since. In general, however, there is no change in levels since the end of the
￿￿￿￿s.￿￿ A related issue concerns the share of unemployed workers who receive
“ALG II“ or o￿en called “Hartz IV”, a transfer at the household level for those who
exhausted their regular unemployment bene￿ts.￿￿ A￿er a phase-in period since its
introduction in ￿￿￿￿, the share of the unemployed receiving ALG II has ￿uctuated
around ￿￿% without a clear trend.￿￿
Summarizing, the most important trend in labor market participation since
Germany’s reuni￿cation was a pronounced increase in part-time employment
whereas the shares of the inactive and unemployed have decreased considerably
and the share of full-time employment remained practically constant. ￿e year
￿￿￿￿ seems to constitute a particular turning point. ￿e share of unemployed and
inactive individuals started to decrease strongly while the growth in part-time
employment accelerated. ￿is is also the point stressed by Burda and Seele (￿￿￿￿)
who document a strong increase in total hours worked a￿er the implementation of
the Hartz reforms in ￿￿￿￿ which they show was mainly driven by an increase in
part-time employment and not by demand factors.
￿.￿ Inequality in Equivalized Net Incomes
￿e activation of formerly inactive or unemployed individuals can be expected –
ceteris paribus – to decrease inequality between individuals when also including the
inactive and unemployed in the calculations. Since in the SIAB data only employed
individuals are included and part-time employed as well as unemployed workers are
not consistently recorded over the years￿￿, I use (self-reported) household income
￿￿A regression of the share of the long-term unemployed on a linear time trend for the years since
￿￿￿￿ yields a coe￿cient very close and insigni￿cantly di￿erent from zero.
￿￿As of ￿￿￿￿, a recipient living in a one-person household received ￿￿￿ euros per month plus a rent
payment of up to about ￿￿￿ euros including heating (in Munich).
￿￿Again, a regression of the ALG II share on a linear time trend for the years since ￿￿￿￿ does not
yield a coe￿cient signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero.
￿￿Some of the problem are: (i) Mini job employment is only recorded since April ￿￿￿￿; (ii) due to a
change in the reporting standards, starting in ￿￿￿￿ there is an increase in the number of part-time
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data from the microcensus to study this question. In the microcensus, household
income is recorded as net income accruing from all sources including interest
payments, rents, transfers and bene￿ts. A caveat of this data is that it is recorded in
discrete brackets and that the number and range of these brackets changes across
years. ￿erefore, I impute continuous household incomes by running a series of
generalized Tobit regressions assuming that incomes are approximately normally
distributed. Note that due to the varying brackets, the share of right censored
incomes also changes considerably across years. It is ￿-￿% in ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿, around
￿.￿% between ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿, and less than ￿.￿% over ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿. ￿us, for the years
starting in ￿￿￿￿, the extent of censoring is much less of an issue in the microcensus
than in the SIAB. Finally, to account for economies of scale when living in the same
household, I divide household incomes by the OECD-modi￿ed scale (OECD ￿￿￿￿)
to obtain individual equivalized net incomes (See Section A.￿ for more details on
the data preparation). Microcensus data has not been used frequently for analyses of
income inequality.￿￿ ￿e GSOEP is still the most widely used data set for inequality
analyses in Germany. ￿is may be surprising as the large sample sizes and the
high representativeness of the microcensus make it at least as suitable.￿￿ Also,
as Stauder and Hüning (￿￿￿￿) point out based on a comparison of continuously
measured incomes from the income- and consumer survey (Einkommens- und
Verbraucherstichprobe, EVS), the recording in brackets in the microcensus has
virtually no e￿ect on estimated means or measures such as the Gini coe￿cient or
the standard deviation of log wages. ￿ey conclude that it is not only valid to use
microcensus data to measure income inequality, but – due to its large sample sizes
and non-existent survey selection bias – also sensible to do so.
Figure ￿.￿￿ plots the evolution of the standard deviation of log equivalized real
net incomes across time. To highlight that comparability between two adjacent
spells that is to some part a statistical artifact, in ￿￿￿￿/￿￿ there is an increased number of missing
values regarding part-time status. (iii) in ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ unemployed individuals not receiving
ALG I are not recorded, see vom Berge et al. (￿￿￿￿).
￿￿A few exceptions are Beznoska et al. (￿￿￿￿) and Statistisches Bundesamt (￿￿￿￿d).
￿￿One disadvantage of the microcensus is that incomes are available only in aggregated form and no
detailed breakdown of its subcomponents are available. Also, the framing of the income question
might lead respondents to focus on regular and larger income components while smaller and
transitory incomes might be le￿ unreported. Still, the income concept is consistent across years
and thus should allow for a valid comparison over time.
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Figure ￿.￿￿: Evolution of the Standard Deviation of Equivalized Household Net
Incomes (￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿) and Individual Gross Earnings (￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿)
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the evolution of the standard deviation in imputed log equivalized household
real net incomes for the population aged ￿￿-￿￿ years (solid black line). OECD-modi￿ed equivalence
scales used OECD (￿￿￿￿). Calculations based on microcensus waves ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ using survey
weights. For details on the sample restrictions and imputation of incomes see section A.￿. ￿e dashed
gray line replicates the standard deviation in log individual gross real wages based on the SIAB￿￿￿￿
shown in Figure ￿.￿.
years with di￿erent income brackets might not be fully warranted, such years are
connected with a dashed instead of a solid line. In the same ￿gure, I also plot the
evolution of the standard deviation of log full-time gross wages based on SIAB
data presented in Figure ￿.￿. ￿is serves as a reference for how market incomes
before taxes and transfers have developed.￿￿ Figure ￿.￿￿ shows that inequality in
equivalized net incomes has increased since the beginning of the ￿￿￿￿s until it
￿￿Ideally, I would plot individual gross market earnings to compare redistribution of the tax and
transfer system and redistribution among household member, but unfortunately, these data are
not observed in the microcensus.
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reached its peak in ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿. Since ￿￿￿￿, however, inequality has decreased again
and since ￿￿￿￿ has stabilized at a lower level. ￿e evolution of the equivalized net
income inequality based on microcensus data shown in Figure ￿.￿￿ is by and large
in line with comparable calculations based on GSOEP data. For instance, both
Grabka and Goebel (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿, Figure ￿) and Bundesregierung (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿, Figure ￿)
￿nd a strong increase in the Gini coe￿cient up until ￿￿￿￿, a decrease up until ￿￿￿￿
and an increase again up until ￿￿￿￿. Given the relatively small sample sizes of the
GSOEP, most of the changes a￿er ￿￿￿￿ are, however, within the ￿￿% con￿dence
bands.￿￿ ￿is is why Beznoska et al. (￿￿￿￿), also based on GSOEP data, conclude
that inequality in equivalized net incomes has not increased signi￿cantly since
￿￿￿￿. ￿ey note that this holds even more when taking into account that – due
to the need of regularly including refreshments samples given the relatively high
attrition rates of the GSOEP – since ￿￿￿￿ a migrants subsample was included in
the GSOEP. Once excluding this subgroup, they show that the increase in the Gini
coe￿cient starting in ￿￿￿￿ is much less pronounced. It will be interesting to see how
inequality measured in the microcensus has evolved a￿er ￿￿￿￿ once these data will
be available. Overall, the evolution of net income inequality shown in Figure ￿.￿￿ is
consistent with the strong increase in the labor market participation since ￿￿￿￿. It
also highlights that inequality among the entire population might decrease even
when inequality in (full-time) market incomes is increasing.
￿.￿ Conclusion
￿is paper used highly reliablewage data fromadministrative records – the SIAB￿￿￿￿
– to study inequality in gross wages among full-time workers and data from a com-
pulsory population survey – the microcensus – to study inequality in net incomes
among the population. Inequality in gross wages has increased substantially since
the early ￿￿￿￿s until ￿￿￿￿/￿￿. Since then, wage inequality has been decreasing again.
￿is is mostly driven by a compression of wages at the lower tail of the distribution.
Decomposing the longer run increase in inequality between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ shows
￿￿Due to its large samples size, con￿dence bands are extremely tight in the microcensus which is
why I do not report them here. For instance, the standard deviation of log equivalized household
net incomes as shows in Figure ￿.￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿ is ￿.￿￿￿ with corresponding bootstrapped standard
errors (￿￿￿ replications) of ￿.￿￿￿￿.
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that the majority of this increase is due to wage structure e￿ects, i.e. changes in the
return to certain characteristics. In particular, changes in the return to working
in a speci￿c sector are important at both ends of the distribution while changes
in the return to education (age) plays a more important role at the lower (upper)
tail. Furthermore, I show that there is a clear negative relationship between the
routine-task content of an occupation and its subsequent employment and wage
growth indicating a strong polarization of the labor market in Germany over ￿￿￿￿
to ￿￿￿￿.
Apart from a trend break in full-time wage inequality since ￿￿￿￿, a second
remarkable fact about the German labor market is the strong increase in labor
market participation and the corresponding growth in part-time employment.
While the share of inactive or unemployed individuals in the total working-age
population decreased from ￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿, the share of part-time
employment increased from ￿% to ￿￿% over the same period. ￿e share of full-time
employees today, in contrast, is only slightly lower than some two decades ago. ￿e
large scale activation of previously inactive or unemployed individuals – in absolute
terms some ￿million individuals - that took place in particular since ￿￿￿￿ is also
re￿ected in a decrease in overall net income inequality in the population.
Many important questions related to the inequality of incomes remain unan-
swered. For instance, it is common practice to use a common de￿ator to compute
real wages. However, the cost of living can vary signi￿cantly across regions or
worker types. Moretti (￿￿￿￿) shows that the wage di￿erences between college and
high school graduates in the US are much less pronounced once accounting for
city-speci￿c consumer price indices. Another highly relevant issue is the mobility
of individuals in the income distribution. ￿e same level of inequality measured
in one year might be perceived di￿erently depending on how easy or di￿cult it is
for individuals at the bottom of the distribution to improve their position in the
following years. Based on GSOEP data, Peichl and Ungerer (￿￿￿￿) calculate the so
called “equality of opportunity”, i.e. the chances to gain a higher income based on
personal e￿ort, and ￿nd that this index increased hand in hand with overall inequal-
ity since ￿￿￿￿ such that the equality of opportunity remained basically constant
over this period. In a series of in￿uential papers, Raj Chetty and coauthors using
large scale administrative records ￿nd that in the US, intergenerational mobility, i.e.
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the chances of children to move up in the income distribution (compared to their
parents’ position), has remained fairly stable for cohorts born ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (Chetty
et al. ￿￿￿￿b) but that it varies substantially across areas within the US Chetty et al.
(￿￿￿￿a). In contrast, absolute income mobility, i.e. the chances of children to earn
more than their parents, has fallen sharply from about ￿￿% for the ￿￿￿￿ cohort to
￿￿% for children born in the ￿￿￿￿s (Chetty et al. ￿￿￿￿). Studies of similar scope are
so far lacking for Germany.
A crucial point in all empirical analyses of income inequality is the availability
of representative, large scale and promptly available data. Many controversies and
speculations about such important topics as income inequality, mobility, or equality
of opportunities are – apart from di￿erent methodologies – related to the fact that
di￿erent researchers use di￿erent, o￿en incomplete data sets or that appropriate
data is missing altogether. For instance, as mentioned before, comparable studies
regarding intergenerational mobility are mostly lacking for Germany due to the
absence of appropriate, long run panel data sets. Researchers and policy makers
should make a joint e￿ort to improve data quality and availability. In particular,
the access to administrative, large scale data sets should be expanded and data
provision should be made easier and faster (see the open letter by Card et al. ￿￿￿￿,
referring to the situation in the US).￿￿ Many records are already collected by the
authorities, but access to these data for research purposes remains limited and
fragmentary. A step even further would be – for instance by means of a clearing
house and state-of-the-art anonymization techniques – to match and harmonize
data from di￿erent administrative sources.￿￿ An integration, for instance, of tax
payer data, social security records and Microcensus data on a continuous basis
would signi￿cantly improve data quality and thus also help to derive better and
more reliable policy conclusions.
￿￿For instance, there is a delay of up to six years between the reporting year of the latest available
data set and the current calendar year for data sets such as the microcensus or the SIAB.
￿￿A proposal along these lines concerning the measurement of high incomes and wealth in Germany
was recently made by Bonin et al. (￿￿￿￿).
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A.￿ Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A.￿: Comparison of Di￿erent Methods to Measure Inequality
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the evolution of the standard deviation of log gross wages of full-time workers
aged ￿￿-￿￿ years based on imputed wages assuming no heterogeneity in the variance of the error term
across age and education groups weighted by spell duration (solid black line), not weighted by spell
duration (gray short-dashed line), assuming heterogeneity in the variance of the error term across
age and education groups weighted by spell duration (dark gray dashed line), and the Gini coe￿cient
based on unweighted real earnings (gray dot-dashed line). Also see notes for Figure ￿.￿.
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Figure A.￿: Evolution of the ￿￿, ￿￿, ￿￿ Percentiles of the Full-Time Wage
Distribution
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the evolution of the ￿￿th, ￿￿th, and ￿￿th percentiles of the distribution of real
gross wages of all full-time workers in Germany aged ￿￿-￿￿ years based on the SIAB￿￿￿￿ in panel a)
for West Germany indexed to ￿￿￿￿ and in panel b) for East Germany indexed to ￿￿￿￿.
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Figure A.￿: Evolution of Real Wages for Fixed Panel of Full-Time Workers Aged
￿￿-￿￿ Years in ￿￿￿￿ and Observed without Gap through ￿￿￿￿ (Index ￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿)
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the evolution of real gross wages for full-time workers aged ￿￿-￿￿ years in
￿￿￿￿ who were observed in the SIAB￿￿￿￿ in each year between ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿ without interruption.
Workers are grouped by their position in the distribution of all full-time workers aged ￿￿-￿￿ years in
￿￿￿￿. A bandwidth of ￿ percentage point around each given percentile chosen to group workers. All
calculations are weighted by spell duration.
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Table A.￿:Decomposition of the Change in Inequality over ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿
(incl. Standard Errors)
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
Variance ￿￿-￿￿ ￿￿-￿￿ ￿￿-￿￿
β̂ SE β̂ SE β̂ SE β̂ SE
Panel A: Overall E￿ect
∆ ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿)
Compositional
E￿ects ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿)
Wage Structure
E￿ects ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿)
Panel B: Composition E￿ects Attributable to
Education ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿)
Age ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿)
Female -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿)
German ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿ (￿.￿￿￿)
Region -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿)
Sector ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿)
Panel C: Wage Structure E￿ects Attributable to
Education ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿** (￿.￿￿￿)
Age -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿ (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿)
Female -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿* (￿.￿￿￿)
German ￿.￿￿￿ (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿)
Region ￿.￿￿￿ (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿ (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿ (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿ (￿.￿￿￿)
Sector -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿)
Constant ￿.￿￿￿ (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿ (￿.￿￿￿) -￿.￿￿￿* (￿.￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿*** (￿.￿￿￿)
Notes: ￿is table presents decomposition results using RIF regressions (Firpo et al. ￿￿￿￿). Calculations are based on
full-time working individuals aged ￿￿-￿￿ years in the SIAB￿￿￿￿. Regressions are weighted by spell duration. Coe￿cients
in ￿￿￿￿ are used as the reference category. Bootstrapped standard errors with ￿￿￿ replications in parentheses. ***/**/*
indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level. Empirical p-values used.
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A.￿ Sample Restrictions and Data Preparation (SIAB)
• Sample Restrictions: Starting from the universe of spells in the scienti￿c
use ￿le of the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB-R ￿￿￿￿)
which contains ￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ records of ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ di￿erent individuals, I ￿rst
apply some general sample restrictions following common practice when
working with the SIAB data. Speci￿cally, I drop spells with missing location
information (a￿er imputation, see below), spells of doctors and pharmacists
(due to corrupted and missing records, see vom Berge et al. ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿),
spells that last only one day, spells with statuses "seeking for employment
but not registered unemployed", "without status", and "seeking advice", zero
wage employment spells, full-time spells with earnings below the marginal
earnings threshold, and spells in East Germany before ￿￿￿￿, individuals
younger than ￿￿ years. In case of (exactly) overlapping spells, I keep only one
of multiple overlapping unemployment spells, one of multiple overlapping
full-time spells, and drop unemployment spells that overlap with full-time or
regular part-time spells. My baseline sample comprises spells of individuals
aged ￿￿-￿￿ years inWest Germany since ￿￿￿￿ and spells in East Germany from
￿￿￿￿ and includes full-time and regular part-time spells, as well as ALG I and
ALH (until ￿￿￿￿) spells, mini job spells (since April ￿￿￿￿), and ALG II spells
(since ￿￿￿￿) contains ￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ spells of ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ di￿erent individuals. My
full-time sample excludes vocational trainings spells and contains ￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿
spells of ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ individuals.
• Daily Wages: I impute censored wages above the upper earnings threshold
for compulsory social insurance (￿￿,￿￿￿ Euros per year in ￿￿￿￿) using the “no
heteroskedasticity” approach by Gartner (￿￿￿￿) and Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿).
Speci￿cally, I consider wages as censored that were up to two Euros below
the maximum wage value observed in each year and then estimate for each
year and for males and females separately a censored regression of log wages
on indicators of eight age groups, three skill groups and all their possible
interactions, assuming that the error term is normally distributed and has
the same variance across age and skill groups.
• Education: I imputemissing education information following Fitzenberger et
al. (￿￿￿￿) and group individuals in three categories (low, medium, and high).
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Low comprises those with at most a Realschul degree, missing education, and
those who have not completed any vocational training,Abitur (advanced high
school degree), or a tertiary degree. Medium contains those with vocational
training or Abitur. High refers to all those with a completed tertiary degree
(Fachhochschule or university).
• Location andOccupation: Following Glitz (￿￿￿￿), I imputemissing location
and occupation information with the last non-missing value of each variable.
• Task Shares: ￿e task shares are taken from Dengler and Matthes (￿￿￿￿) and
comprise the following tasks: ￿. non-routine analytical, ￿. non-routine inter-
active, ￿. routine cognitive, ￿. routine manual, ￿. non-routine manual. For
more details on the construction and a description of each task see Dengler
and Matthes (￿￿￿￿). Task shares are available for each of ￿￿￿ occupations
(Klassi￿kation der Berufe ￿￿￿￿ at the ￿ digit level) in ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿, and ￿￿￿￿. I
average over these three years and use employment shares of each of the ￿￿￿
occupations as of ￿￿￿￿ taken from the publicly available frequency counts of
the weakly anonymous version of the SIAB￿￿￿￿ to aggregate from the level of
￿￿￿ occupations in Dengler and Matthes (￿￿￿￿) to the ￿￿￿ occupation groups
available in the SUF of the SIAB￿￿￿￿.
• Part-Time Spells Weights Employment per occupation is computed as the
sum of all weights per occupation where full-time spells are assigned a weight
of ￿ and part-time spells a weight of ￿/￿ and real wages of part-time spells
are multiplied by ￿/￿ before averaging over occupations. All calculations are
additionally weighted by spell duration.
A.￿ Sample Restrictions and Data Preparation (Microcensus)
• Sample Restriction: I use the SUF of the Microcensus waves ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿
to ￿￿￿￿ and restrict the sample to individuals in private households (i.e. ex-
cluding those in community housing, hospitals, and prisons) at their main
place of residence aged ￿￿-￿￿ years.
• Imputation of Equivalence Household Net Incomes: Household income
in the Microcensus is recorded in discrete income brackets and refers to net
income from all sources including incomes from interest payments, rents,
and all transfers and bene￿ts. Since the number and range of these income
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brackets is not constant across waves￿￿, I ￿rst convert each bracket’s lower
and upper bound to nominal euros and then divide these bounds for each
individual by the OECD-modi￿ed equivalence scale, i.e. the ￿rst adults
is assigned a weight of ￿, each additional adult (>￿￿ years) a weight of ￿.￿
and children (≤ ￿￿ years)a weight of ￿.￿. I then impute continuous incomes
using generalized Tobit regressions assuming that incomes are approximately
log normally distributed (similar to the approach followed when imputing
censored wages in the SIAB data) and assuming a constant variance across
groups. Imputations are performed separately for men and women each
in East and West Germany using all possible indicators for each of seven
age categories, three education categories, all of their possible interactions,
and indicators for having a partner, having children aged ￿￿ or less in the
household, and working full-time. Using indicators for education and age
only or usingmore covariates has a negligible in￿uence on resulting inequality
measures.
A.￿ Participation Shares
• Employment Types: ￿e total number of the working population aged ￿￿-￿￿
by type of activity is taken from destatis (table ￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿) and is based on
Microcensus data. I aggregate groups as follows:
– self employed = self employed + family workers
– civil servants
– employees = white collar workers + blue collar workers + apprentices
• Full- and Part-Time Shares: ￿e total number of full- and part-time de-
pendently employed persons is taken from destatis (table ￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿) and is
based on Microcensus data. It refers to the entire population of dependently
employed including white collar workers, blue collar workers, those in voca-
tional training and civil servants and includes workers in marginal part-time
(denoted “mini jobs” starting from ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿With constant income brackets or within a given year, a midpoint approach, i.e. assigning each
individual the midpoint of her respective income bracket and thus implicitly assuming a uniform
distribution of incomes within each bracket generally leads to very similar results.
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Skill Premiums and the Supply of YoungWorkers in
Germany∗
￿.￿ Introduction
Income inequality has increased in most OECD countries almost uninterruptedly
since the mid ￿￿￿￿s (OECD ￿￿￿￿).￿ With his seminal book, Piketty (￿￿￿￿) returned
inequality to the agenda of economists and policymakers alike. As opposed to
capital incomes, which were the main driver of inequality at the beginning of the
￿￿th century in the US and Europe, Piketty and Saez (￿￿￿￿) show that the recent
increase is mainly driven by inequality in labor incomes.￿ But while there seems to
be a consensus on the descriptive facts, there still remains a vigorous debate over
the drivers of increasing inequality.
In this paper, we study how shi￿s in the supply of skills can help to understand
the evolution of wage di￿erentials between di￿erent demographic groups de￿ned
∗￿is chapter is joined work with Albrecht Glitz. We thank Martin Biewen, Davide Cantoni, Chris-
tian Dustmann, Bernd Fitzenberger, Christina Gathmann, Boris Hirsch, Iourii Manovskii, Kjell
Salvanes, Uwe Sunde, Andreas Steinmeyer, participants of the ￿￿th BGPE Research Workshop
in Passau, the ZEW Conference “Occupations, Skills, and the Labor Market” in Mannheim, the
SOLE Conference ￿￿￿￿ in Seattle, WA, and the ESPE Conference ￿￿￿￿ in Berlin for valuable
comments and helpful suggestions. We are also indebted to Uta Schönberg for kindly sharing
programming code with us. We further thank Javier Rodriguez and Simon Bensnes for their
support during project’s initial phase at the Barcelona GSE. Albrecht Glitz acknowledges the
support of the Barcelona GSE Research Network and the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y
Competitividad (Project No. ECO￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿-R).
￿Kopczuk et al. (￿￿￿￿) using social security records ￿nd an increase in earnings inequality in the US
since the ￿￿￿￿s which accelerated in the ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿s and reached its highest level in the ￿￿￿￿s
since the start of the records in ￿￿￿￿. Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿) show that wage inequality has also
increased considerable in (West-)Germany over the last three decades.
￿In line with this, Biewen and Juhasz (￿￿￿￿) ￿nd that the largest part of the increase in overall income
inequality in Germany between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ was due to rising inequality of labor incomes.
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by skill-level and age. ￿ese skill premiums are an important aspect of inequality.￿
Figure ￿.￿ plots the evolution of two skill premiums important in the context of
Germany’s skill structure which, besides college and university education, is char-
acterized by a strong pillar of vocational training. ￿e wage di￿erential between
medium (those with vocational training and/or a high school degree) and low-
skilled workers (those without a post-secondary degree) decreased slightly over
the ￿￿￿￿s and then increased by a third from ￿￿% to ￿￿% since the late ￿￿￿￿s. ￿e
high skill premium, i.e. the wage di￿erential between those holding a college or
university degree and those with vocational training followed a U-shape pattern
over the same period reaching ￿￿% in the early ￿￿￿￿s and late ￿￿￿￿s and about ￿￿%
in the mid ￿￿￿￿s.
Our core hypothesis is that di￿erential changes in the supply of skills are re-
sponsible for the observed patterns in skill premiums. In particular, we emphasize
the role played by imperfect substitutability across age groups and changes in ed-
ucational attainment across di￿erent cohorts. Our framework is a variant of a
Tinbergen (￿￿￿￿) education race model where increases in the relative supply of
more skilled workers and skill-biased technological change work in opposite direc-
tions in determining wage premiums. We distinguish between three skill groups
(low, medium, and high) and between young (less than ￿￿ years) and old workers,
building on previous frameworks by Card and Lemieux (￿￿￿￿), Dustmann et al.
(￿￿￿￿), and Goldin and Katz (￿￿￿￿). To illustrate the model’s core idea, in Figure
￿.￿ we plot the skill premiums of both young and old medium-skilled (relative to
low-skilled) and high-skilled (relative to medium-skilled) workers against their
corresponding relative supplies (both linearly detrended to absorb, for instance,
secular skill-biased technological progress). Except for the young high-skilled￿,
there is a clear negative relationship – despite many potential rigidities governing
the German labor market.
￿For instance, Goldin and Katz (￿￿￿￿) estimate that the increased return to schooling accounts for
about ￿/￿ of the overall increase in the variance of log hourly wages between ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ in the US.
￿￿e relationship within the group of young high-skilled workers is attenuated due to the pre-
uni￿cation boom ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ and in particular by the dot-com/New Economy boom and bust
during ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿. Once we exclude these years or allow for separate intercepts for these two
periods, the relationship becomes clearly negative as expected, see the discussion in section ￿.￿.
C￿. ￿: S￿￿￿￿ P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ Y￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
Figure ￿.￿: Skill Premiums, Germany (￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿)
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots skill premiums de￿ned as log wage di￿erentials between medium and low and
high and medium-skilled workers who work full-time, live in West-Germany and have not moved
from East to West-Germany between ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ holding the age- and gender composition constant.
For more details on the construction of skill premiums see sections ￿.￿.￿.
Using high quality administrative data for Germany over the period ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿,
we ￿rst systematically document the evolution of skill premiums along various skill
levels and age groups. We show that almost the entire increase in the medium to
low skill premium visible in Figure ￿.￿ is attributable to a pronounced increase in
the medium skill premium of young workers (aged ￿￿ and below) which increased
from about ￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿ – a ￿nding that has not been documented so
far in the existing literature.￿ In contrast, wage premiums of older medium-skilled
workers and of both younger and older workers holding a university degree have
￿￿e only exception is Fitzenberger and Kohn (￿￿￿￿) who apply the CES production framework
of Card and Lemieux (￿￿￿￿) to estimate the magnitude of wage changes that would have been
necessary to halve unemployment rates in Germany in the mid ￿￿￿￿s.
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Figure ￿.￿: Scatter Plots Premiums vs. Relative Supplies (￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿)
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots skill premiums against their relative e￿ciency supplies separately for young
and old workers. All variables are linearly detrended over ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿. See section ￿.￿ for a description
of skill premiums and e￿ciency supplies.
stayed remarkably stable. Second, our proposedmodel which relates skill premiums
to shi￿s in relative skill supplies is able to account well for these di￿erential patterns
in observed skill premiums. ￿is is especially true for the medium to low skill
premium. ￿ird, we try to be more careful about standard errors than most existing
studies. We account for the uncertainty induced by generated regressors as well as
serial and contemporaneous correlation of all variables in adjacent years by means
of a moving block bootstrap approach (Kunsch ￿￿￿￿). As it turns out, standard
errors computed with this method are up to ￿ve times larger than those based on
conventional methods.
A￿er having established a close link between the supply and the price of skill,
we ask in the second part of the paper why these shi￿s in skill supplies occurred.
Using data from the German microcensus, we trace out the long-term trends in
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educational attainment for each cohort born between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿. We show that
a￿er the fertility decline starting in ￿￿￿￿, there was a pronounced trend break in
the educational attainment of the native (West-)German population: relative to
their previous trends, the shares of both high- and low-skilled individuals increased
while the share of medium-skilled individuals declined markedly. ￿is observation,
again, has gained little attention in the literature studying the evolution of skill
premiums and wage inequality in Germany.
Our modeling approach is closely linked to a literature which started with the
seminal paper by Katz and Murphy (￿￿￿￿) who use a CES-production function
framework to systematically link supply and demand factors to wage premiums.
Goldin and Katz (￿￿￿￿) extend their analysis by including historical U.S. wage
data from ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ to understand the evolution of the high school and college
premium in the long-term. Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿) apply the Goldin and Katz
(￿￿￿￿) framework to study the role of supply and demand factors using the same
German administrative data as we do. However, they do not allow for imperfect
substitutability between young and old workers and ￿nd that the two-level CES
approachmight be “misspeci￿ed” (Dustmann et al. ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿). Card and Lemieux
(￿￿￿￿) introduce imperfect substitutability between young and old workers using
data from the US, Canada and the UK. In contrast to these papers, our setting
includes three skill groups (such as Dustmann et al. ￿￿￿￿; Goldin and Katz ￿￿￿￿)
and (at least) two age groups (such as Card and Lemieux ￿￿￿￿) and we estimate
the associated substitution elasticities – key parameters in many theoretical and
empirical applications in the context of, for instance, immigration or long-run
growth models – consistently in one framework while adjusting standard errors
appropriately to the various forms of uncertainty.￿
￿In a recent study, Jeong et al. (￿￿￿￿) have proposed an alternative unifying framework to explain
key empirical regularities in the US labor market. Based on a model in which workers supply
two complimentary inputs, labor and experience, they show that changes in the total supply of
experience due to demographic changes can fully explain the strong movements in the price
of experience over the last four decades in the US. Moreover, those movements in the price of
experience can account for the di￿erential dynamics in the age premiums across education groups
and the college premiums across age groups as well as the observed changes in cross-sectional
and cohort-based life-cycle pro￿les. Contrary to the previous literature, they do not ￿nd evidence
for demand shi￿s due to skill-biased technological change.
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Our paper also relates to a range of studies that have used German administra-
tive labor market data to study the rise in German wage inequality. Antonczyk et al.
(￿￿￿￿a) emphasize the role of cohort e￿ects in Germany as an important driver of
lower end wage inequality. Card et al. (￿￿￿￿) identify an increasing dispersion in
both person- and establishment-speci￿c wage premiums as well as an increasing as-
sortativeness in the matching of workers and establishments as main factors behind
rising wage inequality, while Goldschmidt and Schmieder (￿￿￿￿) emphasize the role
of domestic outsourcing, calculating that it contributed some ￿￿% to the increase in
German wage inequality since the ￿￿￿￿s. Burda and Seele (￿￿￿￿) apply the Katz and
Murphy (￿￿￿￿) framework and show that the Hartz reforms implemented in ￿￿￿￿
boosted labor supply and contributed to the recent German employment miracle
at the cost of decreasing real wages and increasing wage dispersion. Of particular
relevance in the context of our work is the study by Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿) who
document the recent trends in German wage inequality and perform an extensive
analysis of competing explanations, identifying compositional changes (as DiNardo
et al. ￿￿￿￿), a decline in unionization (see also Antonczyk et al. ￿￿￿￿b), skill-biased
demand shi￿s favoring in particular the high-skilled, polarization (as proposed by
Goos and Manning ￿￿￿￿; Autor et al. ￿￿￿￿; Autor and Dorn ￿￿￿￿) and changes in
the supply of skills (similar to Goldin and Katz ￿￿￿￿) as key contributors to German
wage inequality. In particular, Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿) emphasize that changes in
the relative supply of medium-skilled workers are responsible for the signi￿cant
increase in wage inequality at the lower tail of the wage distribution, attributing
this to a deceleration in the rate of decline of low-skilled employment shares in the
￿￿￿￿s. ￿ey hypothesize that this deceleration might be due to the “large in￿ow of
[mainly low-skilled] East Germans, Eastern Europeans, and ethnic Germans [...]
into the West German labor market” (Dustmann et al. ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿). Our ￿ndings,
however, show that the decline in the relative supply of medium-skilled workers
is primarily due to a pronounced and so far undocumented decrease in the share
of native medium-skilled workers. Our paper thus ￿lls an important gap when it
comes to understanding the main drivers of recent changes in wage inequality in
Germany.
￿e rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our
model framework relating relative labor supplies to skill premiums. In section ￿.￿,
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we describe our data set and the construction of our key variables (skill premiums
and e￿ciency labor supplies) and present graphical evidence on the evolution
of skill premiums and e￿ciency supplies separately for young and old workers.
￿ese are the patterns we aim to explain in section ￿.￿, where we estimate the key
structural parameters of our model. In section ￿.￿, we present our cohort analysis
studying the long-term trends in skill attainment. Section ￿.￿ concludes the paper.
￿.￿ Analytical Framework
Our modelling approach closely follows previous work by Card and Lemieux
(￿￿￿￿), Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿) and Goldin and Katz (￿￿￿￿). Suppose aggregate
output at each time t is generated by a CES production function depending on
college/university (or high-skilled) labor Ht and non-college (or non-high) labor
Ut :
Yt = At ￿λtHγt +Uγt ￿ ￿γ ,
where At denotes total factor productivity and λt is a time-varying technology or
demand shi￿er that re￿ects both the importance of each input and factor augment-
ing (skill-biased) technological progress. ￿e elasticity of substitution between
non-college and college labor is given by σhu = ￿￿−γ ∈ [￿,∞]. If ￿ ≤ σhu < ￿ the
two factors are gross complements. If σhu ≥ ￿ the two factors are gross substitutes
and (high-) skill-biased technological progress will increase the wage di￿erential in
favor of better skilled workers.￿
We choose this nesting structure to allow for a di￿erent elasticity of substitution
between high and non-high and medium and low-skilled workers as do Dustmann
et al. (￿￿￿￿). In contrast, Fitzenberger et al. (￿￿￿￿) and D’Amuri et al. (￿￿￿￿) assume
the same mutual substitution elasticities between all skill groups, i.e. they assume,
for instance, that high- and medium-skilled workers are as substitutable as high-
and low-skilled workers which is less ￿exible than the approach we follow here.
￿See Acemoglu and Autor (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿) for a more careful distinction between demand shi￿ers and
factor-augmenting technology terms and on how the e￿ect of skill-biased technological progress
on skill premiums depends on σ .
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Non-college labor is itself a CES-subaggregate of low- and medium-skilled
labor inputs
Ut = ￿θ tMρt + Lρt ￿ ￿ρ , (￿.￿)
where θ t represents a demand shi￿er as above. ￿e elasticity of substitution between
medium- and low-skilled labor is given by σml = ￿￿−ρ de￿ned analogously as before.
Each type of labor in turn is composed of the corresponding supply in di￿erent age
groups
Lt =
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿j (αl jL
η l
jt )
￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
η l
Mt =
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿j (αmjM
ηm
jt )
￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
ηm
Ht =
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿j (αh jH
ηh
jt )
￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
ηh
,
which implies that the elasticity of substitution across the di￿erent age groups j
in skill group s is given by σas = ￿￿−ηs . ￿is nesting structure is supposed to re￿ect
the fact that workers within the same skill group but of di￿erent ages and thus
experience levels are likely to be imperfect substitutes.
Imposing the standard assumption that each labor input is paid its marginal
product yields the following wage equations for each skill-age labor type:
wLjt = ∂Yt∂Ljt = Y
￿−γ
t (￿ − λt)Uγ−ρt (￿ − θ t)Lρ−η lt αl jLη l−￿jt (￿.￿)
wMjt = ∂Yt∂Mjt = Y
￿−γ
t (￿ − λt)Uγ−ρt θ tMρ−ηmt αmjMηm−￿jt (￿.￿)
wHjt = ∂Yt∂Hjt = Y
￿−γ
t λtH
γ−ηh
t αh jH
ηh−￿
jt (￿.￿)
Assuming that σa is the same in each of the three skill groups, i.e. σal = σam = σah
(we will relax this assumption later) we ￿nally get the following expressions for the
medium to low skill premium
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and the high to medium skill premium
ωHjt ≡ ln￿￿
wHjt
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Given all σ ’s > ￿, the model predicts that over time the premium of medium-
skilled workers in age group j, ωMjt , increases with θ t , the rate of skill-biased tech-
nological change (or shi￿s in relative demand in favor of workers with vocational
training) and decreases with the aggregate and age-group speci￿c relative supply of
medium-skilled workers given by MtLt and
Mjt
L jt
, respectively. Similarly, the age group
speci￿c high to medium skill premium ωHjt depends positively on technological
progress favoring the high-skilled relative to the medium-skilled, λtθ t , and negatively
on the aggregate relative supply of high to non-high, non-high to medium-skilled
labor, and the age group speci￿c relative supply of high-skilled workers denoted by
Ht
Ut ,
Ut
Mt and
Hjt
Mjt
, respectively. ￿ese equilibrium equations will guide our empirical
analysis in section ￿.￿.
￿.￿ Data and Descriptive Evidence
￿.￿.￿ Data Set and Construction of Baseline Sample
To take themodel to the data, we need to construct skill premiums and labor supplies
for each of the distinct skill-age-groups. We use administrative labor market data
provided by the Institute for Employment Research in the Sample of Integrated
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Labour Market Biographies (SIAB).￿ ￿e SIAB is a ￿% random sample of the o￿cial
records of all employees subject to social security in Germany between ￿￿￿￿ and
￿￿￿￿. It contains the labor market history of about ￿.￿ million individuals and
includes information on daily wages and employment status (full-time, part-time,
unemployed, in vocational training) as well as a number of individual characteristics
such as age, gender, skill, German nationality, region, occupation, and industry. We
restrict the analysis to men and women between ￿￿ and ￿￿ years of age living in
West Germany with earnings above the o￿cial marginal earnings threshold (￿￿￿
euros per month in ￿￿￿￿￿) as marginal part-time spells were only o￿cially recorded
from ￿￿￿￿ onwards. In addition, we exclude the years ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ due to the very high
incidence of censoring among the high-skilled and the crisis years ￿￿￿￿/￿￿ such that
our ￿nal sample covers the years ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿. We also conduct three imputations
that are by now common practice when working with IAB data: the imputation of
missing education information following Fitzenberger et al. (￿￿￿￿), the correction
for the structural break in ￿￿￿￿ according to Fitzenberger (￿￿￿￿) andDustmann et al.
(￿￿￿￿) and the imputation of censored wages above the upper earnings threshold
for compulsory social insurance (￿￿,￿￿￿ euros per year in ￿￿￿￿) applying the “no
heterogeneity” approach suggested by Gartner (￿￿￿￿).￿￿
￿.￿.￿ De￿nition of Skill and Age Groups
For our subsequent analysis, we divide workers into low-, medium- and high-skilled.
Following Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿), we de￿ne the low-skilled as those with missing
or at most lower secondary education (Realschule or less), medium as those with
apprenticeships, vocational training, and/or a high school degree (Abitur), and
high-skilled as those with a tertiary degree (Fachhochschule or Universität). ￿is
grouping di￿ers from many US studies where a distinction is only made between
college and non-college labor to study the college premium (Card and Lemieux ￿￿￿￿;
Autor ￿￿￿￿). ￿e division into three skill groups in Germany re￿ects Germany’s
￿Speci￿cally, we use the scienti￿c use ￿le of the SIAB Regional-File ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿, see vom Berge et al.
(￿￿￿￿) for a detailed description of this data set.
￿We convert all monetary values into ￿￿￿￿ euros using the consumer price index of the German
Bundesbank.
￿￿See Appendix B.￿ for a more detailed description of the derivation of our sub-sample and the
imputation of censored wages.
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strong pillar of vocational training and is also clearly suggested by comparing the
wage levels of these groups (see Figure B.￿). Along the age dimension, we consider
eight di￿erent age groups spanning ￿ve year intervals for ages between ￿￿-￿￿ years.
For most of the graphical evidence and the empirical estimations, however, we
just distinguish in each skill group between young (≤ ￿￿ years) and old workers
(> ￿￿ years) as these two groups capture well the underlying trends of more ￿nely
disaggregate age groups (see section ￿.￿.￿ for more details).
￿.￿.￿ Skill Premiums and E￿ciency Labor Supplies
Our objective is to calculate the pure price for di￿erent skill levels net of any com-
positional changes due to, for instance, migration or changes in the gender or age
group composition of the working population.￿￿ To keep our premium sample as
homogeneous as possible, we restrict the attention to men and women working
full-time and are “West German natives”, i.e. we exclude those who started their
labor market biography in East Germany and then moved to West Germany as well
as those with missing or non-German nationality information.￿￿ We then calculate
age and gender composition constant skill premiums similar to Katz and Murphy
(￿￿￿￿).￿￿ Skill premiums can be interpreted as the (approximate) percentage di￿er-
ence in wages between two skill groups. Section B.￿ in the Appendix describes the
computation of skill premiums in more detail.
Our labor supply measures are based on a broad set of individuals and are
expressed in e￿ciency units which can be understood as productivity adjusted
full-time equivalents. To compute e￿ciency labor supplies, we include full-time,
￿￿For instance, Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿) show that it is important to account for compositional changes
in the workforce but that neither lower or upper tail inequality can be fully accounted for by these
compositional changes. Carneiro and Lee (￿￿￿￿) compute skill premiums that are also adjusted
for the quality of college graduates.
￿￿Ideally, we would also like to exclude ethnic Germans and those East Germans who came to work
in West-Germany during ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ or who started their employment history in West-Germany
right away, however, we cannot identify these individuals in the SIAB data. We will identify these
groups as aggregates using additional data sets when we assess the impact of migration on skill
premiums in section ￿.￿.
￿￿Figure B.￿ in the Appendix compares “raw”, i.e. unadjusted, and composition-adjusted skill
premiums for young and old workers. ￿e comparison shows that compositional e￿ects play
some role, but in general raw and adjusted premiums follow the same overall patterns.
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part-time (but no marginal part-time spells as noted above), vocational training,
and unemployment spells of all workers registered inWest Germany, i.e. we include
West German natives as well as foreigners and those who were ￿rst registered in
East Germany andmigrated toWest Germany (we will refer to the latter two groups
as “migrants” in what follows). In contrast to our premium data set, we choose
such a broad set of workers and work types to mitigate concerns regarding the
endogeneity of labor supplies. If we computed labor supplies based on full-time
spells only, we would fail to incorporate transitions to and from part-time work or
unemployment induced by changes in skill premiums, or any di￿erential e￿ects of
the business cycle on the labor supply of di￿erent skill or age groups.
Labor supplies need to be measured in e￿ciency units because the framework
outlined in section ￿.￿ assumes that workers in the same skill-age cell are perfect
substitutes. ￿erefore, we allow productivities (re￿ected in wages) to di￿er by age
and skill group as well as gender and West German nativity.￿￿ Note that these
productivity measures are time-invariant, i.e. we average wage di￿erences over all
sample years to approximate the underlying productivity di￿erences (see Section
B.￿ in the Appendix for more details). Accounting for productivity di￿erences
between natives and migrants is also important to mitigate issues related to po-
tential downgrading of migrants’ education and experience, i.e. the fact that the
human capital of migrants is not fully transferable (see for instance Friedberg ￿￿￿￿;
Dustmann et al. ￿￿￿￿; Basilio and Bauer ￿￿￿￿).
Finally, we translate spells into full-time equivalents. Since working hours
are not readily observable in the IAB data, we approximate them by assigning
long part-time spells (i.e. part-time spells with more than half of the hours of a
comparable full-time work schedule) a weight of ￿/￿ and short part-time spells
a weight of ￿/￿ (less than half of a full-time work schedule) following Dustmann
et al. (￿￿￿￿). Vocational training and unemployment spells are assigned a weight
of ￿/￿. In our robustness checks, we show that our results are not sensitive to the
speci￿c weighting scheme. For instance, it would also be sensible to assign a weight
￿￿One reason to allow for di￿erent e￿ciency weights for women is that women – on average – work
less hours than men in the same age × skill group, even if both are recorded as working full-time
or part-time in the IAB-data. Our results, however, do not depend on allowing for di￿erent
e￿ciency weights by gender, i.e. when we assign the same e￿ciency weight to men and women
alike, our estimation results presented in Table ￿.￿ remain virtually unchanged.
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of ￿ to those unemployed who worked full-time before. Applying this alternative
weighting scheme leaves our estimates basically unchanged. Section B.￿ in the
Appendix contains more details on the construction of our e￿ciency supplies.
￿.￿.￿ Summary Statistics
In panel A of Table ￿.￿, we summarize some characteristics of our wage sample
based on which we construct the di￿erent wage premiums. Between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿,
the West German native full-time workforce became older with the share of young
workers below ￿￿ years dropping from around ￿￿% in the ￿￿￿￿s to ￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿.
￿is is the consequence of declining cohorts sizes a￿er the baby boomer generation
in the mid ￿￿￿￿s. ￿e share of women working full-time remained remarkably
stable over the sample period at around ￿￿%. In contrast, the skill composition of
full-time workers changed dramatically: ￿e share of low-skilled workers dropped
from ￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿ to ￿% in ￿￿￿￿ with the largest decline occurring in the ￿￿￿￿s.
￿e share of medium-skilled workers followed a reversed U-shape reaching ￿￿%
in the ￿￿￿￿s and then declined to ￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿. ￿e share of high-skilled workers
increased more than threefold since ￿￿￿￿ in a virtually linear fashion reaching ￿￿%
in ￿￿￿￿. Wages in all three skill groups grew during the ￿￿￿￿s and the ￿￿￿￿s but
then declined in the ￿￿￿￿s. Wage inequality measured as the standard deviation of
log real wages remained relatively stable up to the end of the ￿￿￿￿s but increased
considerably since then.￿￿
Panel B summarizes our supply data. ￿e workforce including part-time, voca-
tional training and unemployment spells is younger and more female. ￿e share
of females increased much more than in the sample of full-time workers as the
increased participation of women was concentrated mainly in part-time jobs (see
also Burda and Seele ￿￿￿￿). ￿e broader set of workers represented in the supply
data set is also less well educated. While the share of individuals receiving unem-
￿￿￿is is in line with Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿, Figure I, p.￿￿￿) and Card et al. (￿￿￿￿, Table I, p. ￿￿￿)
who also ￿nd an acceleration in the dispersion of log wages in the ￿￿￿￿s for the sample of all
full-time West-German workers (including East movers and foreigners) using IAB data. It is also
in line with Biewen and Juhasz (￿￿￿￿) who, using SOEP data, ￿nd an unprecedented rise in net
equivalized income inequality since ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿.
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Table ￿.￿: Summary Statistics of Wage and Supply Sample
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Panel A. Wage Sample (Full-Time Natives)
Age ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
Young (≤ ￿￿ years) ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Female ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Shares:
Low-skilled ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Medium-skilled ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
High-skilled ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Real monthly wage (￿￿￿￿ Euros):
Low-skilled ￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿
Medium-skilled ￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿
High-skilled ￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿
Std. Dev. log real wages ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Person × spells in year ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Unique individuals ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Panel B. Supply Sample (All)
Age ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
Young (≤ ￿￿ years) ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Female ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
German ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Shares:
Low-skilled ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Medium-skilled ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
High-skilled ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Full-time ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Long part-time ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Short part-time ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Vocational/other ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Unemployed ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Person × spells in year ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Unique individuals ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Notes: ￿is table presents summary statistics for the premium and supply data sets. ￿e
wage sample consists of full-time employed German individuals aged ￿￿-￿￿ living in West-
Germany. Individuals working in West-German who are non-German and/or were ￿rst
registered in East Germany are excluded. ￿e supply sample consists of full-time, part-time,
vocational training, and unemployment spells of all individuals including non Germans
and East-West movers. All summary statistics are weighted by spell length.
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ployment insurance bene￿ts was just ￿% in the ￿￿￿￿s, it more than doubled by the
end of the sample period.
￿.￿.￿ Graphical Analysis
Figure ￿.￿ plots the evolution of our key variables separately for young and old
workers using comparable scales.￿￿ In the top le￿ part, we plot the medium to low
skill premiums of young and old workers. While the premium for old medium-
skilled workers changed only little over the ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ period (from ￿.￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿ to
￿.￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿), the premium of young medium-skilled workers more than doubled
over the same period (from ￿.￿￿ in the mid ￿￿￿￿s to ￿.￿￿ in the ￿￿￿￿s).￿￿ To put
these numbers in perspective, according to Goldin and Katz (￿￿￿￿, Figure I, p. ￿￿)
the combined premium of young and old high school graduates in the US (relative
to those who only stayed in school until ￿th grade) increased from ￿.￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿ to
￿.￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿. ￿us, our medium skill premium is similar in magnitude to the US
high school premium.￿￿
￿e development of the high-skilled or college premium is depicted in the
bottom le￿ part of Figure ￿.￿. ￿e young high-skilled saw their premium ￿uctuating
around ￿.￿￿ with considerable variation while the college premium of old workers
followed a so￿ U-shape pattern starting from ￿.￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿, reaching a low of ￿.￿￿
during the ￿￿￿￿s to eventually increase to ￿.￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿. Since skills premiums are
partly based on imputed wages (in particular the high to medium premium of
old workers), one might be worried about how accurately they really represent
the actual high-skilled premiums. In Appendix B.￿, we show that there is no
systematic divergence over time between the ￿￿th-percentile in our data (which
is always uncensored) and various top income fractiles taken from the from the
World Top Incomes Database (WTID, Alvaredo et al. ￿￿￿￿). ￿eses comparisons
￿￿Figure B.￿ shows the evolution of the medium and high skill premium separately for eight di￿erent
age groups. It shows that those aged above ￿￿ (or ￿￿) and below follow a similar pattern.
￿￿￿ese patterns in the skill premiums are also prevalent when looking at men and women separately
(see Figures B.￿ and B.￿). ￿ey are somewhat less pronounced for women and more pronounced
for men. In both series, the medium premium of young workers has more than doubled over
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ and has increased much faster than that of old workers. Out main ￿ndings also hold
when we only use skill premiums of men (see Table ￿.￿, model ￿).
￿￿￿e combined medium premium of young and old workers in Germany increased from ￿.￿￿ in
￿￿￿￿ to ￿.￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿, see Figure ￿.￿.
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Figure ￿.￿: Skill Premiums and Relative Supplies
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots on the le￿ hand side the di￿erence in composition constant mean log earnings
between medium- and low-skilled workers (upper le￿) and high- and medium-skilled workers
(bottom le￿) who work full-time, live in West-Germany and have not moved from East to West-
Germany, separately for the young (￿￿ years or below) and old (above ￿￿ years) between ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿.
￿e right hand side depicts the corresponding di￿erence in log supplies in e￿ciency units of all
workers in West-Germany including full-time, part-time, unemployment and vocational training
spells but excluding marginal part-time spells. For more details see sections ￿.￿.￿.
make us con￿dent that the skill premiums derived from right-censored SIAB data
are indeed representative for the true evolution of the earnings gap between high-
and medium-skilled workers.
Our core hypothesis is that di￿erential changes in the supplies of di￿erent skill
groups are responsible for the observed patterns in skill premiums. To illustrate this,
in the right column of Figure ￿.￿, we plot the relative supplies of medium-skilled
(to low-skilled) and high-skilled (to medium-skilled) labor separately for young
and old workers. Starting with the top right panel, we see that the relative supply of
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old medium-skilled workers increased by a factor of ￿.￿ in an almost linear fashion.
In contrast, the relative supply of young medium-skilled increased by some ￿.￿
log points up to the ￿￿￿￿s, stayed constant and then decreased by ￿.￿ log points
in the ￿￿￿￿s. ￿e relative supply of old high-skilled workers – similar to the old
medium-skilled – increased linearly from ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ while the relative supply of
young high-skilled workers increased exponentially.
￿ese ￿gures in combination with the scatter plots presented in Figure ￿.￿
suggest that wage di￿erentials between di￿erent skill groups are systematically
related to their relative supplies. In the next section, we will use our analytical
framework detailed above to investigate this relationship more rigorously.
￿.￿ Empirical Estimation
￿.￿.￿ General Estimation Approach and Standard Errors
We now turn to the estimation of the model outlined in section ￿.￿ using the skill
premiums and e￿ciency labor supplies introduced in section ￿.￿. We will estimate
the model’s parameters from bottom to top in three steps: First, using the premium
equations ￿.￿ and ￿.￿, we will estimate σa (the elasticity of substitution between
young and old workers) and the e￿ciency parameters between theses two groups,
αs. With these parameters at hand, we construct the aggregate amounts of Lt , Mt
and Ht . Second, using Lt and Mt , we estimate σml (the elasticity of substitution
between medium- and low-skilled workers) and θ t (the technology parameter
shi￿ing the demand for medium- relative to low-skilled workers) which are needed
to construct Ut (the aggregate amount of non-high skilled labor). Finally, in the
third step, using the aggregate amounts of the various skill types, we estimate σhu
(the elasticity of substitution between college and non-college labor). ￿is ￿nal step
yields estimates for the parameters estimated in the previous steps and can thus
serve as a consistency check.
Identi￿cation of our parameters of interest relies on labor supplies to be predeter-
mined, i.e. that labor supplies must not be correlated with any other unobservables
that also determine skill premiums and that premiums and supplies are not deter-
mined simultaneously. For two reasons we think this assumption is tenable. First,
labor supplies are inelastic in the short run and are the result of past human capital
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investments. ￿us, although an individual might invest in vocational training or
college education when observing a high premium, skill supplies will only increase
with a substantial lag. Second, our labor supplymeasures are very broad, i.e. they do
not only include full-time workers, but also those who work part-time, complete vo-
cational training, or are unemployed. ￿us, our supplies capture virtually the entire
labor force subject to social security and are considerably less sensitive to changes
along the intensive margin (e.g. people might be more likely to work full-time
when premiums are high).￿￿ Still, if labor supplies reacted contemporaneously to
skill premiums, this would lead to an underestimation of the negative relationship
between premiums and supplies. In that case, di￿erent groups of workers would
appearmore substitutable than they really are, i.e. our substitution elasticities would
represent upper bounds.
To compute standard errors, we rely on a moving block bootstrap approach.￿￿
Bootstrapping standard errors is necessary for at least three reasons. First, the three-
step estimation procedure implies that we rely on generated regressors in steps ￿
and ￿, so we need to take into account the estimation uncertainty induced by the
previous step(s). Second, the theoretical model implies that skill premiums at one
point in time depend on both, the supply of young and old workers of two adjacent
skill groups and thus the two skill premiums are by construction correlatedwith each
other. ￿ird, premiums are serially correlated over time.￿￿ ￿us, the error terms of
the premium equations we are going to estimate are correlated contemporaneously
across equations as well as serially over time.￿￿ ￿e moving block bootstrap is a
￿￿Fitzenberger et al. (￿￿￿￿) follow a similar approach and use broadmeasures of skill supplies derived
from microcensus data to instrument labor supplies.
￿￿￿e overlapping block bootstrap for time series was ￿rst introduced byKunsch (￿￿￿￿). SeeHorowitz
(￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿) for an overview of di￿erent bootstrap methods for dependent data.
￿￿A simple Wooldridge (￿￿￿￿, ch. ￿￿) test for serial correlation in panel data detects serial correlation
in both premium equations.
￿￿￿ere is also sampling uncertainty related to the estimation of premiums and supplies. However,
given the very large number of observations and the corresponding extremely tight con￿dence
intervals, this uncertainty contributes very little to the overall uncertainty related to our estima-
tions and we will abstract from it in what follows. For similar reasons, we also decided to ignore
the uncertainty induced by imputing top coded wages. E￿ectively, we thus take premiums and
supplies as given.
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way to account for these various types of uncertainty.￿￿ It divides observations in
n − b + ￿ blocks or clusters, where b indicates block length. ￿us, the ￿rst block
jointly contains all premiums and supplies of low,medium, and high-skilledworkers
of both age groups from year ￿ through b, the next all observations from year ￿
through b + ￿, and so on. Each bootstrap sample is constructed by drawing (with
replacement) k blocks such that the number of observations contained in these k
blocks is less than or equal to the number of observations in the corresponding full
sample.￿￿ ￿is bootstrapping procedure is supposed to resemble the underlying
data generating process and allows error terms in a given block to be arbitrarily
correlated with each other across and over time. ￿e choice of b should mimic the
serial correlation of the error terms. Following the suggestions of Hall et al. (￿￿￿￿)
we choose b = ￿.￿￿ Hence, when using the full sample period ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿, each
bootstrap sample consists of k = ￿ randomly drawn blocks of length b = ￿ resulting
in nbs = ￿￿ observations, ￿ less than when using the full data where n = ￿￿.
Since our parameters of interest (e.g. − ￿σa ) are non-smooth functions of esti-
mated parameters (discontinuous at zero), they cannot be bootstrapped directly.
￿erefore, the standard errors of the parameters of interest are calculated using the
delta method. We use ￿￿￿ repetitions for all bootstraps. Whenever we estimate two
premium equations jointly, we use a seemingly unrelated regression framework to
account for error correlations across equations and to impose parameter constraints
across equations.
Previous related work did not consider the various sources of uncertainty in
computing standard errors. For instance, Card and Lemieux (￿￿￿￿) and Goldin
and Katz (￿￿￿￿) estimate similar frameworks as ours but only report conventional
standard errors. D’Amuri et al. (￿￿￿￿) also estimate a similar framework to study
the impact of immigration to West Germany over the period ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿. ￿ey
￿￿Lahiri (￿￿￿￿) compares di￿erent block bootstrap methods and ￿nds that in terms of asymptotic
e￿ciency, the block bootstrap (￿xed block length) performs better than the stationary bootstrap
(random block length). Furthermore, Hall et al. (￿￿￿￿) show that overlapping blocks (as we use
here) provide somewhat higher e￿ciency than non-overlapping ones (but that the e￿ciency
di￿erence in likely to be small in practical applications).
￿￿Formally, choose k = ￿(tend − t￿ + ￿)￿b￿ such that nbs = ￿(k × b) ≤ n and where the ￿ is coming
from the two groups (young, old).
￿￿We also used a more conservative block length of ￿ and all results remained signi￿cant at least at
the ￿￿%-level.
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cluster standard errors at the education-experience level even when estimating the
elasticity of substitution between di￿erent skill groups and thus ignore the potential
correlation between education and experience groups. A comparison between
di￿erent standard errors in our setting shows that standard errors obtained from a
moving block bootstrap are up to ￿ve times larger than conventional standard errors
obtained from a seemingly unrelated regression using a small sample adjustment.
￿us, using block bootstrapped standard errors is crucial for correct inference in
our setting.
￿.￿.￿ Estimating σa
We apply our simple model setting j = {young ≤ ￿￿, old > ￿￿ years} for the period
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ using composition constant skill premiums and e￿ciency skill supplies
as described above. To estimate the elasticity of substitution between young and
old workers, σa, we absorb the ￿rst two terms of equation ￿.￿ and the ￿rst three of
equation ￿.￿ with a linear time trend or time ￿xed e￿ects, and the terms containing
the α’s by age group ￿xed e￿ects. ￿is yields the following estimation equations
which allow us to recover the σa ’s as βa = − ￿σa :
ωMjt = timeMLt + ageMLj + βa ln￿MjtL jt ￿ + εMLjt (￿.￿)
ωHjt = timeHMt + ageHMj + βa ln￿HjtMjt ￿ + εHMjt (￿.￿￿)
As mentioned above, we estimate the two premium equations jointly in a
seemingly unrelated regression framework to account for possible correlation of the
error terms εMLjt and ε
HM
jt across equations. In Table ￿.￿, we present three di￿erent
models where in each model we restrict the elasticity of substitution between the
two age groups to be the same across the three skill groups. Model ￿ assumes linear
time trends for timest .￿is relatively simplemodel already ￿ts the data verywell with
an R￿ above ￿.￿￿ for both premium equations. Model ￿ allows for more ￿exibility
by including time dummies for each year. ￿e parameter of interest βa increases
slightly (in absolute terms) compared to the simple linear trend model. In model
￿, we only use the years ￿￿￿￿-￿￿ with a linear time trend as a kind of pseudo out-
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of-sample exercise. Reassuringly, the parameter of interest changes very little. Our
preferred estimate of model ￿ corresponds to an elasticity of substitution between
young and old workers of ￿.￿, which is somewhat higher than the comparable
estimates by Card and Lemieux (￿￿￿￿) of around ￿ for the US and ￿ for Canada.￿￿
In section B.￿ in the Appendix, we allow σa to di￿er across skill groups. Ac-
cording to this more ￿exible approach young and old workers are found to be closer
substitutes within the group of low skill workers (σal = ￿￿.￿) than in the groups of
medium and high skill workers (in both σa is about ￿). For the sake of simplicity and
since equality of σal , σam, and σah cannot be rejected statistically, we will continue
to assume a common σa across all skill groups in the following sections.
To estimate σml in the next step, we also need to estimate the e￿ciency param-
eters αs. Section B.￿ in the appendix contains the details related to this step. ￿e
estimated αs do not di￿er by much whether we assume σa’s to be constant across
skill groups or not and suggest that one unit of young low skilled labor is about ￿￿-
￿￿% as e￿cient as one unit of old low-skilled labor while the corresponding ratios
are ￿￿-￿￿% for medium-skilled and ￿￿-￿￿% for high-skilled labor. ￿e di￿erent
e￿ciency ratios are consistent with the di￿erent age earnings pro￿les of the three
skill groups that are much steeper for high-skilled workers than for medium- or
low-skilled workers.
￿.￿.￿ Estimating σml
To estimate the elasticity of substitution between the aggregate amounts of low- and
medium-skilled labor corresponding to equation ￿.￿, we construct the aggregate
amounts of Lt , Mt (and Ht for later) using a model where we restrict the elasticity
of substitution between age groups to be the same across skill groups and which
includes time ￿xed e￿ects.￿￿ We then estimate variants of the following equation
(note that ω is not indexed by j and thus refers to the aggregate medium skill
￿￿Card and Lemieux (￿￿￿￿) use ￿ di￿erent age groups in ￿-year intervals instead of only ￿ as in our
models. Estimates are similar to the ones presented in table ￿.￿ (yielding a slightly higher σa) if
we use ￿ di￿erent ￿-year interval age groups or if we re-de￿ne young as ￿￿ years and younger.
￿￿￿at is, we use σa from model ￿ of Table ￿.￿ and the αs from model ￿ of Table B.￿. All subsequent
estimates remain virtually identical when we use alternative parameters from models including a
linear time trend only or when allowing the σa ’s to vary ￿exibly across skill groups.
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Table ￿.￿: Estimating the Elasticity between Young and Old Workers σa
(Constant Across Skill Groups)
(￿) (￿) (￿)
Linear Trend
(￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿)
Time FEs
(￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿)
Linear Trend
(￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿)
ωMjt ωHjt ωMjt ωHjt ωMjt ωHjt
Age Group Speci￿c
Relative Supply
-￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿** -￿.￿￿￿**
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Young -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿** -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Time ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿* ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Constant ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿**
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Time FEs ✓ ✓
σa ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿
(￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿)
Observations ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: ￿e coe￿cients of the age group speci￿c relative supplies, ln(Mjt￿L jt) and ln (H jt￿Mjt), are restricted to
be the same in each model’s pair of equations, i.e. by assumption σal = σam = σah . Estimates are obtained
using a two-step seemingly unrelated regression framework. ￿e number of observations refers to the full
sample, n. Young is an indicator for age ≤ ￿￿ years. Moving block bootstrap standard errors with block
length ￿ and ￿￿￿ replications in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
premium):
ωMt = ln θ t − ￿σml ln￿
Mt
Lt
￿ .
In column ￿ of Table ￿.￿, we regress the medium- to low-skilled premium on the
aggregate relative supply of medium- to low-skilled labor ln MtLt and a linear time
trend. ￿is model has a comparatively poor ￿t and the coe￿cient of the relative
medium to low supply is imprecisely estimated. In column ￿, we exclude all years
a￿er ￿￿￿￿ and do a pseudo-out-of-sample prediction which is visualized in Figure
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Table ￿.￿: Estimating the Elasticity between Medium- and Low-skilled Labor σml
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
Simple
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿
ωMt
Simple
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿
ωMt
Simple
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿
ωMt
Trend
Break ￿￿￿￿
ωMt
Full Trend
Break ￿￿￿￿
ωMt
Aggr. Medium/ Low
Rel. Supply
-￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Aggr. Medium/ Low
Rel. Supply × Post ￿￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
Time ￿.￿￿￿* ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Time × Post ￿￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Constant ￿.￿￿￿** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
σml ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿
(￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿)
Observations ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: ￿is table presents regressions results of the aggregate medium skill premium ωMt on the aggregate
relative supply of medium- to low-skilled workers ln (Mt￿Lt). Mt and Lt are constructed using the σa obtained
from a corresponding estimation sample in step ￿ where the elasticity of substitution between young and
old workers is restricted to be the same across all three skill groups using time FEs (model ￿ of Table ￿.￿.
￿e number of observations refers to the full sample, n. Young is an indicator for age ≤ ￿￿ years. Moving
block bootstrap standard errors with block length ￿ and ￿￿￿ replications in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate
signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
B.￿. ￿is model predicts the medium skill premium for the years ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿ very
well, but does a poor job from ￿￿￿￿ onwards. Actual premiums in ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿ are
much lower than predicted. In column ￿, we exclude the years ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿. ￿e
estimates become highly signi￿cant and are very similar in magnitude to those in
column ￿. To account for the di￿erent regimes, in column ￿ we allow for a trend
break in the demand for medium- relative to low-skilled labor in ￿￿￿￿.￿￿ ￿is
￿￿A formal structural break test (Quandt-LR) con￿rms ￿￿￿￿ as the break year.
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improves the model ￿t signi￿cantly and yields a highly signi￿cant point estimate
for the relative supply of -￿.￿￿￿, very similar to the point estimates in columns ￿
and ￿. ￿e estimates in column ￿ imply a substantially decelerated growth in the
medium to low premium a￿er ￿￿￿￿ (the combined demand trend is ￿￿% lower
than before ￿￿￿￿). Finally, in column ￿, we also allow the substitution elasticity to
change in ￿￿￿￿ but ￿nd no evidence that this parameter has changed a￿er ￿￿￿￿.
￿e observed pattern of a decreased relative demand for medium workers
a￿er ￿￿￿￿ are consistent with increasing polarization at the beginning of the ￿￿￿￿s
along the lines of Autor and Dorn (￿￿￿￿) implying a decreasing medium to low
premium due to increasing computerization of medium-skilled tasks and a relative
increase in low-skilled wages. It could also be related to the implementation of
the Hartz reforms in ￿￿￿￿ (coupled with some anticipation e￿ects). For instance,
Launov and Wälde (￿￿￿￿) ￿nd that the Hartz reforms had a more adverse e￿ect on
medium-skilled workers: while increasing bene￿ts and thus reservation wages for
most low-skilled workers, the reforms decreased reservations wages for medium-
skilled workers. Furthermore, Hirsch and Schnabel (￿￿￿￿) ￿nd a marked drop in
union power at the beginning of the ￿￿￿￿s which could further explain decreasing
wages of medium-skilled workers as coverage rates were particularly high among
this group of workers (Kohaut and Schnabel ￿￿￿￿).￿￿
Our preferred speci￿cation ￿ implies a σml of ￿.￿ which is somewhat lower
than the elasticity of substitution between high school graduates and high school
dropouts in the US of about ￿.￿ (for the post ￿￿￿￿-period) estimated by Goldin and
Katz (￿￿￿￿, Table ￿.￿). Arguably, high school graduates and high school dropouts
are closer substitutes than those with a completed vocational training specialized in
a speci￿c occupation and those without such a training holding at most a general
schooling degree (at most Realschule). Our estimate of σml is also lower than the
estimate of around ￿ obtained by Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿, Table V) for Germany
who, however, only consider men during the period ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿.
￿￿Burda and Seele (￿￿￿￿) ￿nd a pronounced positive e￿ect of the Hartz reforms on labor supply.
Our labor supply measures, however, do not show a signi￿cant change in relative labor supplies
during this period (compare Figure ￿.￿). One reason is that our supply measures also include the
unemployed and much of the change in labor supplies due to the Hartz reforms occurred as a
shi￿ from unemployment to part-time employment (Burda and Seele ￿￿￿￿).
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￿.￿.￿ Estimating σhu and the Full Model
Using the estimates of the previous step, we can now construct Ut , the aggregate
amount of non-high skilled (or non-college) labor.￿￿ Using equations ￿.￿ and ￿.￿,
we can then estimate σhu, the elasticity of substitution between college and non-
college workers and, at the same time, assess the ability of the overall model to
explain the di￿erential evolution of the skill premiums of the di￿erent skill and age
groups – the primary interest of this paper.
In Table ￿.￿, we jointly estimate the medium to low and high to medium skill
premiums for each age group in a seemingly unrelated regression framework as
before, this time using equations ￿.￿ and ￿.￿. ￿ese equations state that the age-
speci￿c skill premiums do not only depend on the corresponding age-speci￿c
relative labor supplies (ln MjtL jt for the medium to low premium and ln
Hjt
Mjt
for the
high to medium premium) but also on the aggregate relative supplies (ln MtLt and
ln HtMt , respectively). Equation ￿.￿ also implies that the age-speci￿c high to medium
premium depends on the aggregate relative supplies of high to non-high and non-
high to medium labor. ￿e coe￿cients on these aggregate supplies yield an estimate
for the elasticity of substitution between high and non-high (σhu) and medium- to
low-skilled (σml ) labor, respectively. In the following, we impose equality of the
coe￿cients on the age-speci￿c supplies of medium to high and high to medium
labor (implying the same elasticity of substitution between young and old workers
across all three skill groups, σa) and of the aggregate medium to low and non-high
to medium supply (thus yielding the same σml in both equations) as implied by
equations ￿.￿ and ￿.￿.
For the medium to low premium we allow for a trend break in ￿￿￿￿ as before.
￿e technology-related parameter corresponding to the high to medium premium
in model ￿ of Table ￿.￿ is assumed to follow a linear trend throughout the whole
sample period representing a linear shi￿ in the demand for high-skilled workers.
￿e estimates of model ￿ yield a coe￿cient of -￿.￿￿￿ for the age group speci￿c
￿￿To construct the aggregate amount of non-college labor Ut we use the estimates of model ￿ of
Table ￿.￿. Apart from σml we also need an estimate for the demand shi￿er θ t which is recovered
from the estimated coe￿cients as θ̂ t = exp(B)￿+exp(B) where B = β̂t ime × time + βpost t ime × posttime,
where posttime is ￿ in the years before the break year, ￿ in the break year and increasing by one
in each subsequent year a￿er the break year.
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Table ￿.￿: Estimating the Elasticity between High- and Non-High-Skilled Labor
σhu and the Full Model
(￿) (￿) (￿)
Baseline High YoungIntercepts
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿
only
ωMjt ωHjt ωMjt ωHjt ωMjt ωHjt
Aggr. Medium/ Low
Rel. Supply
-￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Aggr. High/ Non-High
Rel. Supply
-￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿** -￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Age Group Speci￿c
Rel. Supplies
-￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Young -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Time ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿* ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Time × Post ￿￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Constant ￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Young ×I(￿￿￿￿ − ￿￿￿￿) ✓ ✓
Young ×I(￿￿￿￿ − ￿￿￿￿) ✓
σml ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿
(￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿)
σhu ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿
(￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿)
σa ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
(￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿)
Observations ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: ￿e coe￿cients on the aggregate relative supply of medium- to low-skilled workers ln (Mt￿Lt) and
the aggregate relative supply of non-high to medium-skilled workers ln (Ut￿Mt), i.e. σml , as well as the
coe￿cients on the age group speci￿c supplies (i.e. σa) are restricted to be the same in each model’s pair
of equations. ￿e number of observations refers to the full sample, n. Young is an indicator for age ≤ ￿￿
years. Moving block bootstrap standard errors with block length ￿ and ￿￿￿ replications in parentheses.
***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
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relative supply which is almost identical to the corresponding estimate for the
elasticity of substitution between young and old workers obtained in column ￿ of
Table ￿.￿ (-￿.￿￿￿). ￿us, concerning σa the estimates based on equations ￿.￿ and ￿.￿
are consistent. However, model ￿ yields a coe￿cient of the aggregate medium to
low supply of -￿.￿￿￿ which is somewhat di￿erent than the corresponding estimate
of Table ￿.￿ of -￿.￿￿￿. According to the model, these two estimates should be the
same. ￿e point estimate of the aggregate high to non-high supply is -￿.￿￿￿ but is
imprecisely estimated.￿ese discrepancies suggest that themodel – in particular the
speci￿cation for the high tomediumpremium–might bemisspeci￿ed. In particular
the high to medium premium of young workers exhibits “bumps” that are unrelated
to supply changes.￿￿ As it turns out, the wages and thus the premium of young high-
skilled workers show a strong co-movement with the business cycle (see Figure B.￿) –
something that to this extent cannot be observed for the remaining three premiums.
In particular, the premium of young high-skilled workers is ampli￿ed and detached
from its underlying supply during the pre-uni￿cation boom (￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿) and the
boom and bust of the dot-com bubble (￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿, Burda and Seele ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿).
￿erefore, in model ￿, we include two separate intercepts for these two periods
interacted with the young indicator to account for the two biggest “bumps” in
the high to medium premium of young workers. ￿e coe￿cient on the aggregate
medium to low supply now changes to -￿.￿￿￿ and is thus very close to the corre-
sponding estimate in Table ￿.￿ as it should be. ￿e coe￿cient on the aggregate
amount of high to non-high labor changes to -￿.￿￿￿ and becomes signi￿cant.￿￿
￿e estimates of our preferred speci￿cation (model ￿) imply an elasticity of
substitution between college and non-college labor of ￿.￿. ￿is happens to be
identical to the elasticity of substitution between college and high school labor in
the US estimated both by Goldin and Katz (￿￿￿￿, their Table ￿.￿) and Card and
Lemieux (￿￿￿￿, Table VI). D’Amuri et al. (￿￿￿￿) and Fitzenberger et al. (￿￿￿￿) both
do not estimate σml and σhu separately but impose equality of these two parameters
in their estimations (i.e. they assume that the elasticity of substitution is the same
between, say, high- and low-skilled labor and high- and medium-skilled labor).
￿￿As shown in the appendix, these bumps are not a peculiarity of the SIAB data (e.g. due to censoring)
as similar patterns can be observed in the (virtually uncensored) microcensus (see Figure B.￿)
￿￿Including other sets of interacted intercepts or dummies in the high to medium speci￿cation leads
to no major changes of the estimates.
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Figure ￿.￿: Predicted vs. Observed Medium Premiums
(a) Pseudo-out-of-Sample Prediction a￿er ￿￿￿￿ (Model ￿ of Table ￿.￿)
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(b) Prediction based on Full Sample ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (Model ￿ of Table ￿.￿)
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￿is simplifying assumption is not supported by our estimation results, i.e. σml and
σhu are signi￿cantly di￿erent from each other. Bearing that in mind, D’Amuri et al.
(￿￿￿￿, Table ￿ column ￿ and ￿) estimate an elasticity of substitution between any
two skill groups of ￿.￿ which is right between our corresponding elasticities of ￿.￿
(σml ) and ￿.￿ (σhu). Fitzenberger et al. (￿￿￿￿, Table ￿) estimate a σs between ￿.￿ and
￿.￿ (their preferred IV estimates) and note that their estimates “imply a rather high
degree of substitutability compared to ￿ndings in the related literature”.
To get an impression of the model’s out-of-sample predictive power, we plot the
observed and the predicted medium to low premium separately for young and old
workers in Figure ￿.￿. ￿e prediction in panel a) is based on the estimates of model
￿ in Table ￿.￿ where we exclude all years a￿er ￿￿￿￿. Although we lose statistical
power due to the smaller sample size, the coe￿cients related to the medium to
low and the age group speci￿c supply measures remain comparable in magnitude.
￿e ￿gure shows that the model based on only the observations from ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿ is
able to predict the di￿erential evolution of the medium to low premium of young
and old workers during the ￿￿￿￿s up until the early ￿￿￿￿s. In panel b), we use the
estimates of model ￿ and the prediction is very close to the observed premium. ￿e
model is also able to predict the high skill premium reasonably well – even without
accounting for the peculiarities in the premium of young college graduates (Figure
B.￿).
￿.￿.￿ Robustness Checks
How robust are our estimates regarding the construction of premiums and supplies?
We compare alternative premium and supply measures to our preferred estimates
from above which are restated in model ￿ of Table ￿.￿.
Premiums do not only depend on supplies but are likely also in￿uenced by the
business cycle. To capture ￿uctuations around the underlying longer-term trends,
we include GDP growth in model ￿ (and also in step ￿). ￿is leaves our estimates
basically unchanged and GDP growth turns out insigni￿cant in both premium
equations.
So far, we used composition constant skill premiums that included both men
and women. In model ￿, we compute wage premiums of men only (holding their
age composition constant as before) and re-do our previous estimation steps. Using
premiums of men only yields similar results with a somewhat lower degree of
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substitutability between medium- and low-skilled workers and a slightly higher
one between college and non-college labor.
A possible concern is that our results depend on the speci￿c weighting scheme
used to construct the e￿ciency supplies. In particular, we assigned a “spell type
weight” of ￿/￿ to vocational training and unemployment spells which we think is a
reasonable assumption. One could argue, however, that these two groups of workers
are (in their great majority) willing to work full-time and thus should be assigned
a spell type weight of ￿. ￿is is what we do in model ￿. Re-weighting of this kind
makes the estimates slightly more pronounced but the di￿erences to the estimates
in model ￿ are small. ￿us, our results are not driven by the particular weighting
scheme (we experimented with other weighting schemes as well and results remain
robust). ￿e same is true when we completely exclude vocational training and
unemployment spells from our e￿ciency supply measures (model ￿). σml and σhu
increase slightly likely because the degree of substitutability in the group of those
working full- or part-time is higher than in the group that also includes those in
vocational training and currently unemployed.
When constructing supplies not based on e￿ciency units, i.e. not taking pro-
ductivity di￿erences into account, but rather do a simple head count (model ￿,
but still weighted by spell duration) similar to the approach followed by D’Amuri
et al. (￿￿￿￿) the estimates are more attenuated towards zero but the overall patterns
continue to hold.
￿.￿ Determinants of Supply Changes
A￿er having demonstrated that the heterogeneous evolution of age-speci￿c skill
premiums depicted in Figure ￿.￿ can be readily explained by a relatively simple
supply and demand framework, we now turn to the potential reasons for the under-
lying age and education speci￿c changes in labor supply. We assess the importance
of two main potential explanations. First, we look at the role of immigration. ￿e
relative decrease in the supply of medium-skilled workers, in particular among
young workers, could be driven by a large in￿ow of mainly low-skilled migrants
a￿er the fall of the Berlin Wall as hypothesized, for instance, by Dustmann et al.
(￿￿￿￿). To evaluate the e￿ect of migration, we compute supply measures excluding
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migrants and simulate the counterfactual evolution of skill premiums under this “no-
immigration” scenario. Second, we investigate the role of more fundamental shi￿s
in the educational attainment of native Germans. To assess this alternative channel,
we perform a cohort analysis based on the German microcensus to understand the
dynamics of educational attainment of the native West German population.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e Role of Migration
A￿er the fall of the Berlin wall in ￿￿￿￿, West Germany experienced large migration
in￿ows from essentially three groups: (i) East-Germans, (ii) ethnic Germans from
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and (iii) foreigners immigrating from
other European countries or parts of the world. Within ￿￿ years a￿er the fall of the
Berlin wall, about ￿.￿million East Germans, ￿.￿million ethnic Germans and ￿.￿
foreigners migrated to (West) Germany which had an initial population of about
￿￿million in ￿￿￿￿.￿￿
In Figure ￿.￿, we plot the share of di￿erent migrant groups in the total e￿ciency
supply of each age-skill group.￿￿ Foreign workers can directly be identi￿ed at the
individual level in the IAB-labormarket data.￿is is not the case for East- and ethnic
Germans. ￿eir aggregate shares are derived using data from the Quali￿cation and
Career Survey (East Germans) and the microcensus (ethnic Germans). For more
details on the construction of these migrant shares see section B.￿ in the appendix.
As the ￿gure suggests, the migration in￿ows a￿er the fall of the Berlin wall into the
West German labor market were substantial. During its peak in the mid ￿￿￿￿s and
￿￿￿ese ￿gures are calculated by summing up the corresponding ￿ows over ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ as follows: (i)
East Germans: net migration from East to West Germany (in￿ows minus out￿ows) taken from
Statistisches Bundesamt (￿￿￿￿); (ii) ethnic Germans: in￿ows from Bundesverwaltungsamt (￿￿￿￿);
(iii) foreigners: net in￿ows from Statistisches Bundesamt (￿￿￿￿) minus in￿ows of ethnic Germans.
Using gross in￿ows for ethnic Germans seems justi￿ed as “only a negligible number of [ethnic
Germans] have later le￿ Germany, rendering the selection on return migration a non-issue” as
Hirsch et al. (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿) point out.
￿￿Note that the o￿cial in￿ows do not necessarily translate into corresponding shares in labor supplies
due to di￿erent participation rates of the di￿erent migrant groups. Children, students, pensioners,
and other non-working migrants are included in the o￿cial ￿gures but do not contribute to the
migrant labor supply. Furthermore, some shares might seem high at ￿rst glance, but they occur
in subgroups (low-skilled and/or young workers) that make up only a smaller share of total labor
supply which is why the corresponding shares in total labor supply amount to only ￿.￿% (East
Germans), ￿.￿% (ethnic Germans), ￿￿.￿% (foreigners), and ￿￿.￿% (all migrants) in ￿￿￿￿.
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Figure ￿.￿: Share of Di￿erent Migrant Groups in Total West Germany Supplies
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots for each education group and separately for young (≤ ￿￿ years) and old
workers (>￿￿ years) the share of di￿erent migrants groups in e￿ciency supplies.
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Figure ￿.￿: Relative E￿ciency Supplies with and without Immigrants
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early ￿￿￿￿s, more than half of the e￿ciency supply of young low-skilled workers
was supplied by migrant workers with foreigners making up the largest part. ￿e
share of East Germans is similar across the di￿erent age-skill groups at about ￿-
￿%.￿￿ Ethnic Germans and foreign migrants are mostly concentrated in low-skilled
labor. All in all, migration a￿ects low-skilled labor supplies the most, but are still
sizable in the groups of medium- and high-skilled supplies.
How did these migration ￿ows a￿ect relative labor supplies - the quantity our
model links to skill premiums of natives? Figure ￿.￿ depicts relative supplies with
(baseline) and without migration. Migration of the three groups le￿ the relative
supply of high-skilled labor basically unchanged (panels c and d), which is why we
will focus on the medium- to low-skilled supplies and premiums in what follows.
Without migration, medium-skilled labor would be more abundant both for young
￿￿In line with this, Prantl and Spitz-Oener (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿) note that “[t]he German-German migra-
tion wave [..] does not include workers of any education class over-proportionally. Hence, the
educational distribution of German workers in West Germany remained stable”.
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and old workers as less low-skilled labor would be available under this scenario
(panels a and b). However, migration would not have changed the general patterns
in the evolution of relative medium supplies - a reverse U-shape pattern for the
young and a continuous increase for the old.
Given these migration ￿ows and changes in the relative supplies - how would
skill premiums have developed in the absence of migration?￿￿ In particular, is
(low-skilled) migration responsible for the pronounced increase in the medium to
low premium of young workers? To answer these questions, we use our preferred
parameter estimates (model ￿ of Table ￿.￿) to simulate the counterfactual evolution
of skill premiums in the absence of migration. We feel comfortable doing this as
the underlying structural parameter estimates are very similar in magnitude when
using the full period or only data over ￿￿￿￿-￿￿, a period of no or only incipient
immigration ￿ows.
It should be noted that, given our analytical framework, we implicitly assume
perfect substitutability between migrants and natives within a given age-skill cell.
￿is assumption, if incorrect, would lead to an overestimation of the impact of
migration on native wage premiums. Since our results show that migration is not
themain driver of rising inequality at the lower end of theGermanwage distribution,
ignoring the issue of potentially imperfect substitutability is inconsequential for
the main qualitative ￿nding of the paper. Furthermore, remember that we account
for the di￿erent productivities of natives and migrants when constructing labor
supplies, thus natives andmigrants are not treated identically in this respect. Finally,
substitutability between migrants and natives is likely to be relatively high in the
German context given that East and ethnic Germans were more similar to natives
in terms of language and culture than the typical foreign immigrant. In line with
this, D’Amuri et al. (￿￿￿￿) estimate a rather high elasticity of substitution of around
￿￿ between migrants and natives in Germany.
Figure ￿.￿ shows the results of our counterfactual exercise. Without migration,
the young medium to low premium would have ￿rst declined slightly into the mid
￿￿￿￿s to then strongly increase to the same level as the actual premium in ￿￿￿￿.
￿us, migration seems to have advanced the divergence in wages between young
￿￿Of course, this is a static counterfactual exercise, native labor supplies could have developed
di￿erently had the Berlin wall not come down.
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Figure ￿.￿:Observed vs. Predicted Medium to Low Premiums
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medium- and low-skilled workers by around ￿ years. Its strong increase, however,
would have occurred even without the large migration ￿ows of the ￿￿￿￿s. ￿e
conclusion is somewhat di￿erent for the medium to low premium of older workers.
Here, migration seems to have kept that premium at a rather stable or slightly
increasing path which in the absence of migration would have decreased by some
￿ve percentage points compared to its ￿￿￿￿ level. All in all, migration did have a
considerable impact on wage premiums of medium-skilled workers, but cannot
explain the strong increase in the skill premium of young workers that eventually
occurred over the ￿￿￿￿s and ￿￿￿￿s. In the next section, we will therefore turn to the
educational attainment of native workers as an alternative source of supply changes.
￿.￿.￿ Cohort Analysis of Skill Acquisition
To proceed in understanding the drivers of the observed supply changes, we use
data from the German microcensus, an o￿cially conducted yearly survey based on
a ￿% random cross-section of the German population similar to the US Current
Population Survey (CPS). Participation in the microcensus is compulsory and
non-compliance can be ￿ned or even punished. Most o￿cial German population
and labor market statistics are based on the microcensus. We pool microcensus
waves ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ and restrict the sample to individuals residing in West-Germany
at the time of the interview. In the following, we focus on native West-Germans by
excluding individuals who were born or migrated from outside Germany, who have
a non-German nationality, have been naturalized, or obtained a school degree from
former East Germany. We furthermore consider only individuals who are at least
￿￿ years old to make sure they have ￿nished their formal education.￿￿ We group
individuals in the same three education groups as de￿ned in our SIAB sample.
Using this sample of native West Germans with completed education, we plot
for each birth cohort the share of low-, medium- and high-skilled individuals in
Figure ￿.￿a. We focus on cohorts born between ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ as these are the rele-
￿￿Unlike in some previous years, answering the question about the highest formal occupational
degree is mandatory for all age groups from microcensus wave ￿￿￿￿ onwards. See Fitzenberger
et al. (￿￿￿￿) for an imputation method of the education information in case the related questions
are voluntary for some age groups and thus su￿er from potential selection bias.
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Figure ￿.￿: Educational Attainment by Cohorts
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vant cohorts determining the in￿ows of young workers over our study period.￿￿
￿e ￿gure reveals a striking pattern which, to the best of our knowledge, has not
been documented in the literature so far. ￿e share of individuals with completed
vocational training, i.e. the medium-skilled, shows a reversed U-shaped pattern
with the turning point occurring at the peak baby boomer cohort around ￿￿￿￿.
In the ￿￿ years up to that point, this share was increasing from ￿￿% to ￿￿% but
then started to decrease quite rapidly reaching only ￿￿% in the ￿￿￿￿ cohort, a share
comparable to that of the ￿￿￿￿ cohort (not shown). At the same time, the share of
low-skilled stopped its continuous decrease over the previous decades to stabilize
at around ￿￿%. Finally, the share of individuals holding a university degree started
to increase strongly a￿er it had stayed virtually ￿at throughout for most of the
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ cohorts. ￿e break in educational attainment of native West Germans
around the ￿￿￿￿ cohort becomes evenmore salient in Figure ￿.￿b where we estimate
a linear trend for the cohorts ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ and plot the deviation from this trend.￿￿
￿is plot reinforces the impression from the previous ￿gure. ￿e evolution of the
educational attainment of natives is characterized by a sort of “polarization”, i.e. a
marked drop in the share of those acquiring vocational training on the one hand,
and an accelerated increase in tertiary education and a relative increase in the
share of the low-skilled on the other. ￿e ￿gures also show that while low-skilled
immigration played some role, the major force behind the overall decrease in the
relative supply of young medium-skilled workers in the ￿￿￿￿s and ￿￿￿￿s was due to
a strong reversal in the trend towards medium-skilled education of natives around
the ￿￿￿￿ cohort.
More research is needed to understand the reasons behind the break in edu-
cational attainment that decisively in￿uenced labor supplies and thus, via wage
premiums, inequality of labor incomes in Germany. Here we can only o￿er some
speculative explanations. One potential reason could be the so-called “educational
expansion” (Bildungsexpansion), a series of educational reforms implemented in
￿￿￿ese time series are smoothed using a moving average including one lag, the current value and
one lead for illustrative purposes. Non-smoothed series look very similar and are available from
the authors.
￿￿A structural break test (maximum F-value) picks ￿￿￿￿ (low-skilled), ￿￿￿￿ (medium), and ￿￿￿￿
(high) as the break points. We also estimated a linear trend using the cohorts ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ or allowed
for a quadratic pre-trend with similar results.
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West Germany during the ￿￿￿￿s and ￿￿￿￿s with the primary objective of increasing
university access.￿￿ However, the ￿￿￿￿ cohort took the decision of whether to do
a vocational training or go to university in the early ￿￿￿￿s, some ten years a￿er
the educational expansion started to take e￿ect. ￿us, these reforms should have
already a￿ected cohorts born before ￿￿￿￿ and are therefore unlikely to serve as the
primary explanation for the documented trend break in the educational attainment
of the West-German native population.
Another potential explanation could be related to cohort sizes. Cohort sizes
increased gradually in Germany in the post-war period, reaching their peak in ￿￿￿￿
with ￿.￿￿million individuals. A￿er that, cohort sizes decreased rapidly to ￿.￿million
in the mid ￿￿￿￿s. While cohorts became smaller, university capacity continued to
increase. ￿us, for the post baby boomers, it might have been easier to get into
college and university. Other possible reasons may include societal changes in the
￿￿￿￿s that shi￿ed parents’ preferences away from traditional vocational careers for
their children towards more academic university education, or a signaling story
along the lines of Bedard (￿￿￿￿) in which wider access to universities reduced the
incentive for individuals to “pool” in themedium education group to take advantage
of high-ability individuals who are constrained from entering university. Finally, it
could also be that due to the smaller cohort sizes and, consequently, smaller families,
parents had more resources to invest in the education of each of their children
(quality-quantity trade-o￿), pushing them increasingly into the tertiary education
track.
￿.￿ Conclusion
￿e rise in inequality in many OECD countries over the last decades has triggered
a rich body of academic work. Scholars agree in general that recent changes in
inequality are mainly driven by inequality of labor incomes which in turn are closely
related to skill premiums. ￿is is certainly true in Germany, where the medium
to low skill premium closely tracks the evolution of inequality at the lower end of
the wage distribution (measured as the ￿￿th to ￿￿th percentile gap). In this paper,
￿￿￿ese reforms included, for instance, the foundation of newuniversities such asAugsburg, Bamberg,
Bochum, Bielefeld, or Passau and the introduction of a federal student loans and grants program
(BAföG).
C￿. ￿: S￿￿￿￿ P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ Y￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
we ask whether skill-biased technological change and, in particular, shi￿s in the
supply of di￿erent skill groups – both along the age and the education dimension
– can explain the observed evolution of skill premiums in Germany over the last
three decades.
Our estimations based on a model comprising three skill and two age groups
show that linear technological progress (up to ￿￿￿￿) and observed changes in skill
supplies go a long way in explaining the peculiar patterns of skill premiums in
Germany. In particular, our model is able to explain the pronounced increase in the
wage premium of young medium-skilled worker from ￿￿% in the ￿￿￿￿s to ￿￿% in
the ￿￿￿￿s very well. Premiums for both young and old high-skilled workers show
no systematic upward or downward trend despite a pronounced increase in their
relative demands. Our framework suggests that this was because the corresponding
supply of high-skilled workers has kept pace with increased demand. ￿e share
of high-skilled workers among all full-time workers has tripled from ￿% at the
beginning of the ￿￿￿￿s to ￿￿% at the end of the ￿￿￿￿s and continues to increase.
Our cohort analysis suggests that the rapid increase in the skill premium for
youngmedium-skilled workers is rooted in a pronounced change in the educational
attainment of the native (West-) German population that occurred for cohorts born
a￿er ￿￿￿￿ and which reversed previous trends in the acquisition of di￿erent types of
education. ￿e share of individuals with completed vocational training decreased
strongly and was as large for the ￿￿￿￿s cohorts as it was for the ￿￿￿￿s cohorts while
the share of individuals with tertiary education increased to unprecedented levels
and the long-term decline in the share of low-skilled individuals came to a hold.
All in all, our study suggests that a considerable part of recent changes in earnings
inequality between di￿erent skill groups in Germany are the result of longer term
educational choices of the population and hence, ultimately, driven by labor supply.
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Appendix B
B.￿ Additional Figures
Figure B.￿:Mean Real Daily Wage By Disaggregated Education Groups
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the mean real daily wage aggregated by six di￿erent educational attainment
categories. Realschule denotes an secondary degree a￿er ten years of schooling (ISCED level ￿), Abitur
denotes an advanced secondary degree a￿er ￿￿ or ￿￿ years of schooling (ISCED level ￿), an applied
university degree corresponds to a degree from a Fachhochschule (ISCED level ￿a).
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Figure B.￿: Raw and Composition Adjusted Skill Premiums
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots adjusted skill premiums holding the age and gender composition of workers
constant as described in the main text along with “raw”, i.e. unadjusted skill premiums, for young
and old workers.
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Figure B.￿: Skill Premiums by Eight Di￿erent Age Groups
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Figure B.￿:Medium to Low Skill Premiums Separately for Men and Women
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Figure B.￿:Observed vs. Fitted Aggregated Medium- to Low-Skilled Premium
(Corresponding to Model ￿ of Table ￿.￿)
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Figure B.￿: Comparison of Young High to Medium Premiums
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Figure B.￿: Co-Movement of the High-Skill Premium of Young Workers
and GDP Growth
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Figure B.￿: Predicted vs. Observed High-Skilled Premiums
(a)High vs. Medium: all years ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (model ￿ of Table ￿.￿)
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B.￿ Data Preparation and Sample Restrictions
• Imputation of Missing Values Using the universe of spells in the Sample of
Integrated Labour Market Biographies, we impute missing education informa-
tion following Fitzenberger et al. (￿￿￿￿). For each individual we also impute
missing location with the last non-missing location information. We impute
missing German nationality and gender information by ￿rst computing the
minimum and maximum of these dummy variables by each individual. If
these two values are the same, then all missing values of a given individual
are replaced by his/her unambiguous value of the variable. If the two do not
agree, no imputation is performed.
• Correction of Structural Break ￿￿￿￿ From ￿￿￿￿ onward the IAB wage mea-
sure also includes bonuses and other one-time payments. We correct for
this structural break following the non-parametric method proposed by
Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿) (which builds on Fitzenberger ￿￿￿￿).
• Imputation of CensoredWagesWe impute censored wages above the upper
earnings threshold for compulsory social insurance (￿￿,￿￿￿ euros per year
in ￿￿￿￿) using the “no heteroskedasticity” approach by Gartner (￿￿￿￿) and
Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿). Speci￿cally, we consider wages as censored that were
up to two euros below the maximum wage value observed in each year and
then estimate for each year and for males and females separately a censored
regression of log wages on indicators of eight age groups, three skill groups
and all their possible interactions, assuming that the error term is normally
distributed and has the same variance across age and skill groups. We also
imputed wages assuming di￿erent censoring limits and assumptions on the
variance of the error term but found the “no heteroskedastity” approach
to be more robust with respect to di￿erent censoring limits and the share
of censored observations (con￿rming Dustmann et al. ￿￿￿￿, who imputed
wages over ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ using the “no heterogeneity” approach to calculate and
analyze skill premiums). Both imputation methods, however, yielded implau-
sibly high wages (e.g. compared to series derived from the Mikrozensus) for
high-skilled workers between ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (as also noted by Dustmann et al.
￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿). ￿is is likely because of the high share of censored wages in
these years (up to ￿￿% a￿er the structural break correction as compared to
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around ￿￿% from ￿￿￿￿ onwards). ￿is is why we exclude observations from
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿.
• Sample RestrictionsWe then drop all individuals living in East Germany
and those younger than ￿￿ and older than ￿￿ years. Following common
practice, we also exclude spells that start and end on the same day (￿.￿% of all
initial spells in West Germany), spells that overlap with one or more parallel
full-time spells (∼￿.￿%), spells of doctors and pharmacists (∼￿.￿%) as their
records are corrupted and missing between ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (see vom Berge et al.
￿￿￿￿, for further details), and spells of individuals who are registered as “not
unemployed, but registered as a job seeker with the BA”, “without status”, or
“seeking advice”.
• Exclusion of Crisis Years ￿￿￿￿/￿￿A closer examination of the data suggests
that the years ￿￿￿￿-￿￿ are unusual, in particular for old medium-skilled
workers who see an abnormal depression in their wages. ￿is is likely to
be related to the global ￿nancial crisis that started in ￿￿￿￿/￿￿. Although
unemployment in Germany did not increase during the ￿nancial crisis, many
workers – in particular medium-skilled worker in manufacturing – had
to go on short-term work which was associated with temporary wage cuts
(supplemented by public transfers). We therefore exclude observations from
￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿. Estimates including these crisis years are slightly lower but
all main conclusions continue to hold.
B.￿ Skill Premiums
Our skill premiums are based on a sample restricted to native West-Germans
(i.e. excluding those ever reported to be non-German or have missing nationality
information and those ￿rst registered in East Germany). To compute the price of
skills not confounded by changes in the age and gender composition within skill
groups, we proceed as follows. First, we calculate the mean log real wage in each
skill-age-gender-year cell (cell-speci￿c wages) weighted by the share of days worked
per year. Second, in each year we calculate the share of each cell in the total supply
of a corresponding skill group measured as days worked and then average these
shares for each cell over all years (￿xed cell weights). ￿e composition constant log
real wage of a given skill-age group is then calculated as the weighted average of
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all corresponding cell-speci￿c wages using the ￿xed cell weights as weights. For
instance, the composition constant log wage of low-skilled workers at time t is
calculated as lowt = ∑￿a=￿∑￿g=￿ lnwages=low ,a,g ,t ⋅weights=low ,a,g where a denotes
one of eight di￿erent age group (the young comprise age groups ￿ and ￿, the old
￿ to ￿) and g gender. Note that the weights are not indexed by time meaning that
they are constant over time. Finally, the medium to low (high to medium) skill
premium are calculated as the di￿erence between the composition constant log real
wage of medium- and low-skilled (high- and medium-skilled) workers. ￿us, skill
premiums can be interpreted as the percentage di￿erence in wages between two
skill groups. Age group speci￿c premiums are calculated by restricting the above
calculations to the corresponding age groups of young (age groups ￿ and ￿) and old
workers (age groups ￿ to ￿).
B.￿ E￿ciency Labor Supplies
￿e e￿ciency labor supply of a speci￿c skill-age group is calculated as the number
of spells in that group weighted by the spell length, the approximate hours of work,
and the e￿ciency weight. ￿e e￿ciency weight is time-constant and calculated
based on full-time spells as the normalized wage of a skill-age-gender-nativity group
relative to a baseline wage averaged over all years. Speci￿cally, the e￿ciency weights
are computed by ￿rst aggregating full-time wages by year, skill, age, West German
nativity and gender. Analogously to our wage sample, we classify all individuals who
ever report to be non-German or havemissing nationality information and/or those
who started their ￿rst spell in East Germany as non West German natives. ￿ese
cell averages are then divided in each year by the corresponding baseline wage of
West German native male medium-skilled workers aged ￿￿-￿￿. ￿us, women and
men as well as West German natives and non-natives in the same skill-age group
are assigned di￿erent e￿ciency weights. ￿en, we average these weights over the
entire sample period for each group. Table B.￿ lists the full set of e￿ciency weights
used to construct our baseline e￿ciency supplies. In an alternative approach, we
allowed the productivity of women and non-natives to be time-varying relative
to native men. ￿is, however, has only a minor e￿ect on our estimates. Spells are
further weighted by their approximate hours of work (or spell type speci￿c weights)
which are listed in Table B.￿. Expressed more formally, the supply of skill group
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s in age group a in year t is computed as the weighted sum of all spells i in that
cell where h denotes spell-type (full-time, part-time, vocational, unemployed), g
gender and m West German nativity:
Supplysat = ￿
i∈Cel ls ,a ,t
spell-lengthi ⋅ spell-type-weighth ⋅ e￿ciency-weightsagm .
For instance, medium-skilled native men aged ￿￿-￿￿ working full-time all year
long supply exactly one unit of e￿ciency labor in each year, while a high-skilled
native female aged ￿￿-￿￿ working long part-time for half of the year supplies ￿.￿￿
units (= ￿.￿ (half a year) × ￿/￿ (spell type weight long part-time) × ￿.￿￿ (e￿ciency
weight high-skilled females aged ￿￿-￿￿)) and a low-skilled non-native men aged
￿￿-￿￿ who is unemployed half of the year and full-time employed the other half
supplies ￿.￿￿ (= ￿.￿ (half of the year) × [￿/￿ (spell type weight unemployed) + ￿
(spell-type weight full-time)] × ￿.￿￿ (e￿ciency weight non-native low-skilled men
aged ￿￿-￿￿)) units of e￿ciency labor.
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Table B.￿: E￿ciency Weights for Baseline Supplies
Low Medium High
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
Native Foreign/East German Native
Foreign/
East German Native
Foreign/
East German
Panel A: Men
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Panel B: Women
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Age ￿￿-￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Notes: ￿is table shows the full set of e￿ciency weights for each of the ￿￿ gender ×West German
nativity × skill group × age group cells. Each entry corresponds to full-time year-round spells. ￿e
baseline group with an e￿ciency weight of ￿ are medium-skilled native men between ￿￿-￿￿ years.
￿￿￿ E￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿, W￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿
Table B.￿: Spell Type Speci￿c Weights
Spell Type Weight
Spell Type Baseline Alternative
Full-Time ￿ ￿
Long Part-Time ￿/￿ ￿/￿
Short Part-Time ￿/￿ ￿/￿
Trainees & Unemployed ￿/￿ ￿
Notes: ￿is table shows the di￿erent spell type speci￿c
weights to construct e￿ciency supplies.
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B.￿ Imputation of Missing Unemployment Spells
In our baseline e￿ciency supplies, we also include unemployment spells. ￿ese
include ALG, ALH, and ALG II spells. ALG II spells are missing in ￿￿￿￿/￿￿. We
therefore linearly interpolate aggregated unemployment spells in these two years
separately for each skill and age groups. Also note that the number of unemployed
drops between ￿￿￿￿/￿￿ which leads to the bump in the medium to low-skilled
supply of young workers visible in the top right part of Figure ￿.￿. ￿is is likely due
to a change in the data collection procedure of the IAB (compare vom Berge et al.
￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿).
B.￿ Robustness of High to Medium Premium
We present two di￿erent pieces of evidence that corroborate the robustness of the
high to medium premium derived from SIAB data. First, Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿)
perform an extensive evaluation of various imputation methods. ￿ey take an
uncensored distribution of wages available for ￿￿￿￿￿￿, arti￿cially censor it at the
same thresholds as in the SIAB data and compare several statistics of the imputed
distribution with the true counterparts from the uncensored distribution. ￿eir
comparisons show that the “no heterogeneity” imputation approach (which we also
use here) matches the standard deviation and in particular the high to medium skill
premium of the uncensored distribution very well (true ￿.￿￿￿, no heterogeneity
￿.￿￿￿). ￿is shows that the imputation method works well in a particular year
(￿￿￿￿).
Second, we compare the evolution of the ￿￿th percentile (of gross earnings)
observed in the SIAB which is always uncensored in ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿with the top fractiles
(of labor incomes) from the WTID.￿￿ If the top ￿￿% of the income distribution
systematically diverged from the bottom ￿￿% and assuming that most individuals in
the top ￿￿% are high-skilled, we would underestimate the high to medium premium.
￿￿￿is uncensored wage distribution comes from the GSES a survey of ￿￿,￿￿￿ establishments with
compulsory participation conducted by the German Federal Statistical O￿ce. For more details
see Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿, section ￿, pp. ￿f).
￿￿￿e WTID data is based on the incomes of all individuals who ￿le an income tax report and thus
also includes self-employed, civil servants, members of the armed forces, and other who are not
observed in the SIAB.
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Figure B.￿￿: Log Di￿erence Between the ￿￿th Percentile (SIAB) and the Average
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Figure B.￿￿ shows that this is not the case. It depicts the log di￿erence between
the average incomes of the ￿ve top fractiles observed in the WTID and the ￿￿th
percentile observed in the SIAB. Although there is considerable variation in these
gaps, there is no clear upward trend in neither of them. All gaps stayed roughly the
same or even decreased somewhat (or even considerably in case of the di￿erence
to the top ￿￿-￿ fractile, see panel a of Figure B.￿￿).
B.￿ Flexibly Estimating σa
In our main analysis, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between age
groups, σa , is identical for low-, medium- and high-skilled labor. We can relax this
assumption and allow σa to di￿er within each skill group. By substituting in for the
di￿erent σ ’s, premium equations ￿.￿ and ￿.￿ can be expressed as
ωMjt = ln θ t + ρ ln￿MtLt ￿ − ηm lnMt + η l ln Lt + ln￿
αm j
α l j
￿ − ￿ ￿
σam
￿ lnMjt − ￿ ￿σal ￿ (− ln L jt)
(￿.￿￿)
ωHjt = ln λt − ln θ t + γ ￿HtMt ￿ + ρ ￿
Ut
Mt
￿ − ηh lnHt + ηm lnMt + ln￿ αh jαm j ￿ − ￿
￿
σah
￿ lnHjt
− ￿ ￿
σam
￿ (− lnMjt). (￿.￿￿)
In Table B.￿, we estimate this system of equations, again using a seemingly unrelated
regression framework. Similar to above, we replace the two last terms with the skill
and age group speci￿c labor supplies in each year, ln￿ αm jα l j ￿ with an indicator for
the young age group and absorb the remaining terms using time dummies.￿￿
￿e model implies that the coe￿cients on Mjt should be the same. To see
if this is also implied by the data, in model ￿ of Table B.￿, we do not restrict the
coe￿cients on Mjt in the two premium equations to be identical and test for the
equality of the two coe￿cients. It turns out that the two coe￿cient on the age
speci￿c supply of medium-skilled workers are indeed similar and insigni￿cantly
￿￿Note that the coe￿cients on lnMjt in equations (￿.￿￿) and (￿.￿￿) should be the same except for the
minus sign. ￿is is why we use − lnMjt as a regressor in equation (￿.￿￿) and − ln L jt in equation
(￿.￿￿) to make coe￿cients comparable across equations. ￿e minus sign is omitted for simplicity.
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Table B.￿: Estimating the Elasticity between Young and Old Workers σas
(Flexible Across Skill Groups)
(￿) (￿)
Unrestricted Restricted
ωMjt ωHjt ωMjt ωHjt
ln L jt -￿.￿￿￿** -￿.￿￿￿**
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
lnMjt -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
lnHjt -￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Young -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Constant ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Time FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
H￿ ∶ σal = σam (p-value) ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
H￿ ∶ σal = σah (p-value) ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
H￿ ∶ σam￿ = σam￿ (p-value) ￿.￿￿
H￿ ∶ σam = σah (p-value) ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
σal ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
(￿.￿) (￿.￿)
σam ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿
(￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿) (￿.￿)
σah ￿.￿ ￿.￿
(￿.￿) (￿.￿)
Observations ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: ￿e coe￿cients on the age group speci￿c supply of medium-skilled
workers, lnMjt , are restricted to be the same in model ￿’s pair of equations,
i.e. by assumption σam￿ = σam￿. ￿e number of observations refers to the full
sample, n. Young is an indicator for age ≤ ￿￿ years. Moving block bootstrap
standard errors with block length ￿ and ￿￿￿ replications in parentheses. ***/**/*
indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
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di￿erent from each other (p-value of equality is ￿.￿￿). ￿erefore, in model ￿, we
constrain this coe￿cient to be the same across the two premium equations. Our
estimates remain stable and the coe￿cients of the age-speci￿c relative supply of high-
to medium-skilled workers (lnHjt) becomes highly signi￿cant.￿￿ ￿e magnitude
of the coe￿cients are in line with expectations. Within the group of low-skilled
workers, the young and old are close substitutes with an estimated σal of nearly
￿￿. Medium- and high-skilled workers of the two age groups are estimated to be
imperfect but relatively close substitutes with an elasticity of around ￿ in both
groups.
Our estimates on the medium- and high-skilled age speci￿c relative labor
supplies of about -￿.￿￿ are close to -￿.￿￿ which Card and Lemieux (￿￿￿￿) obtain for
both for Canada (their Table III columns ￿-￿) and the US (their Table V column
￿) when using a broader measure of college labor similar to ours￿￿ or when they
allow the elasticities to be di￿erent for college and high-school labor (-￿.￿￿, their
Table VII, column ￿). D’Amuri et al. (￿￿￿￿) also use German IAB data to estimate
the impact of immigration on native wages and employment. Instead of age groups
they use potential experience along with the same three skill groups as we do
here. ￿eir comparable estimate of the education-experience speci￿c labor supply
is about -￿.￿￿ (their Table ￿, columns ￿-￿) implying an elasticity of substitution
between di￿erent experience groups of about ￿.￿, somewhat lower than our estimates.
Fitzenberger et al. (￿￿￿￿) estimate σal between ￿.￿-￿￿.￿, σam ￿.￿-￿.￿, and σah ￿.￿-
￿￿.￿. Our elasticities are thus slightly higher for low- and medium-skilled workers
and somewhat lower for high-skilled workers.
￿￿￿e large standard errors of the coe￿cients of the high to medium premium equation in model ￿
are due to some extreme (and positive) estimates in some of the bootstrap samples.
￿￿In their broadmeasure, Card and Lemieux (￿￿￿￿) include those with ￿￿ andmore years of education
opposed to only those with exactly ￿￿ years which is similar to our measure of high-skilled labor
that includes all individuals with a tertiary degree (college, university, or PhD) and not just those
with say a university degree.
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B.￿ Estimating αs
Using the estimates for σa , we can back out the age group speci￿c e￿ciency param-
eters αst by rewriting equations ￿.￿-￿.￿ as follows:
w̃Ljt = lnwLjt + ￿σal ln Ljt = ln αl j + ln ￿Y
￿−γ
t (￿ − λt)Uγ−ρt (￿ − θ t)Lρ−η lt ￿
w̃Mjt = lnwMjt + ￿σam lnMjt = ln αmj + ln ￿Y
￿−γ
t (￿ − λt)Uγ−ρt θ tMρ−ηmt ￿
w̃Hjt = lnwHjt + ￿σah lnHjt = ln αh j + ln ￿Y
￿−γ
t λtH
γ−ηh
t ￿ .
￿e terms on the le￿ hand sides can be computed using the estimated σas either
assuming that they are constant (Table ￿.￿) or allowing them to di￿er across skill
groups (Table B.￿). ￿e αst ’s can be recovered from regressions of the above equa-
tions where the ￿rst terms on the le￿ hand side are captured by a dummy for being
young and the second terms by a set of time dummies. ￿is is done in Table B.￿.
Our moving block bootstrap takes account of the uncertainty due to the generated
regressors. We interpret the results in the main text.
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Table B.￿: Estimating the E￿ciency Parameters αs j
(￿) (￿)
Constant σa Unrestricted σas
w̃Ljt w̃Mjt w̃Hjt w̃Ljt w̃Mjt w̃Hjt
Young -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Constant ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Time FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
αs ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
(￿.￿￿) (￿.￿￿) (￿.￿￿) (￿.￿￿) (￿.￿￿) (￿.￿￿)
Observations ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: w̃Sjt = lnwSjt + ￿￿σas ln S jt . ￿e αs ’s are the exponentiated coe￿cients of the young indicator. ￿e
standard errors of the αs are put in parentheses below. ￿e number of observations refers to the full
sample, n. Young is an indicator for age ≤ ￿￿ years. Moving block bootstrap standard errors with block
length ￿ and ￿￿￿ replications in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
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B.￿ Construction of Migrants’ Age-Skill Shares in Labor Supplies
• Foreign Workers In the IAB-data, German nationality can be directly ob-
served. We de￿ne as foreigners all individuals who are at least once either
classi￿ed as non-German or havemissing nationality information. ￿e shares
of foreigners in each age-skill group are then directly computed from the
IAB-data.
• East Germans In previous work (e.g. D’Amuri et al. ￿￿￿￿), East Germans
have been identi￿ed in the IAB-data by classifying all individuals who are
￿rst registered in East Germany. ￿e problemwith this approach is that spells
in East Germany are only reliably recorded from ￿￿￿￿ onwards (vom Berge
et al. ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿), but substantial in￿ows of East Germans already occurred
in ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (see Figure B.￿￿). To construct the stock of East Germans in the
West German labor supply, we therefore rely on external data, namely the
￿￿￿￿/￿￿, ￿￿￿￿/￿￿, ￿￿￿￿/￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ waves of the BIBB/IAB- and BIBB/BAuA-
Surveys of the Working Population, which are representative cross-sectional
surveys of the working population in Germany covering about ￿￿,￿￿￿-￿￿,￿￿￿
individuals per year. We identify East Germans using the place of birth
(wave ￿￿￿￿/￿￿), the region where an individual grew up (wave ￿￿￿￿/￿￿),
or information on whether an individual obtained any kind of school or
tertiary degree from East Germany (waves ￿￿￿￿/￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿).￿￿ We can then
calculate the share of East Germans in each age-skill cell of the West German
labor force. We set the share of East Germans to zero in ￿￿￿￿ and then use the
o￿cial net-in￿ow rates in Figure B.￿￿ to interpolate between waves, i.e. we
assume that x% of the di￿erence in shares between two BIBB years is closed
in the years in which x% of the overall in￿ow between those years occurred.
• Ethnic Germans Ethnic Germans cannot be identi￿ed in the IAB-data since,
upon arrival, they were given German citizenship and are thus indistinguish-
able in the data from native West Germans. We therefore use Microcensus
waves ￿￿￿￿-￿￿ to calculate the necessary age-skill shares. To identify ethnic
Germans, we focus on private households at their main place of residence in
￿￿In waves ￿￿￿￿/￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ we are thus not able to identify individuals who ￿nished their high
school degree a￿er German uni￿cation and then directly moved to West Germany to work or
obtain further quali￿cation.
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West Germany who are born outside today’s Germany (including East Ger-
many) who have the German citizenship and who have migrated to Germany
since ￿￿￿￿. Reassuringly, a comparison of ethnic Germans identi￿ed in this
way in theMicrocensus by year of arrival and o￿cial in￿ow ￿gures from Bun-
desverwaltungsamt (￿￿￿￿) shows a close correspondence of the two (compare
Figure B.￿￿). To then calculate, for instance, the share of young low-skilled
ethnic Germans in a given year between ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿, we calculate the number
of ethnic Germans who were ￿￿ or younger in that year, had immigrated
to Germany between ￿￿￿￿ and the year of interest and are low-skilled, and
divide it by the total number of individuals of that same age-skill cell in that
year. ￿us, migration rates and age-skill shares are obtained retrospectively
from individuals living in West-Germany sometime between ￿￿￿￿-￿￿. Since
out-migration of ethnic Germans was basically a “non-issue” as pointed out
by Hirsch et al. (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿), and to the extent that labor force participation
and mortality of ethnic and native Germans are comparable, this approach
yields reliable estimates of the necessary quantities.
• Native E￿ciency SuppliesOncewe obtain the complete time series of all age-
skill shares for each of the threemigrant groups, we deduct the corresponding
portions in each age-skill cell from our total migrant-including e￿ciency
supplies to obtain the native e￿ciency supplies used in the counterfactual
simulations of the no-migration scenario.
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Figure B.￿￿:Net O￿cial East-West Migration (Statistisches Bundesamt ￿￿￿￿)
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Figure B.￿￿: Yearly In￿ows of ￿￿-￿￿ Year Old Ethnic Germans (West Germany w/o
Berlin)
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C￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
Compensating Di￿erentials and the Introduction of
Smoking Bans in Germany∗
“￿e whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the di￿erent em-
ployments of labour and stock must, in the same neighborhood, be
either perfectly equal or continually tending to equality. If in the same
neighborhood, there was any employment evidently either more or less
advantageous than the rest, so many people would desert it in the other,
that its advantages would soon return to the level of other employments.”
Adam A. Smith (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿)
￿.￿ Introduction
How do workers’ wages react to a sudden improvement in working conditions? ￿e
theory of compensating wage di￿erentials (A. Smith ￿￿￿￿; Rosen ￿￿￿￿) suggests that
in a competitive labor market workers must be o￿ered a wage premium to o￿set
any disutility associated with unpleasant attributes of a given job relative to another
otherwise comparable one. ￿ese negative attributes may comprise non-standard
working hours, unpleasant tasks, or health related hazards such as being exposed
to second hand smoke. ￿is idea also becomes important when understanding
inequality: Earnings inequality might signi￿cantly overstate utility inequality pre-
cisely because some jobs need to pay compensating di￿erentials to compensate for
∗I would like to thank Sebastian Bauho￿, Davide Cantoni, David Card, Florian Englmaier, Gabrielle
Fack, ￿omas Geelen, Raphel Guber, Matthew Gudgeon, Hilary Hoynes, Pat Kline, Magne
Mogstad, Cathrin Mohr, Enrico Moretti, Jesse Rothstein, Alexandra Spitz-Oener, Andreas Stein-
mayer, Uwe Sunde, Jose Vasquez, Mark Westcott, JoachimWinter, Amelie Wuppermann, as well
as seminar participants at various seminars at LMU Munich, the Evidence Based Economics
SummerMeeting ￿￿￿￿ in Freising, the Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitk ￿￿￿￿ in Augsburg,
and the VSR Conference at UC Berkeley ￿￿￿￿ for very helpful and valuable comments.
￿￿￿ E￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿, W￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿
certain disamenities. In line with this reasoning, Sorkin (￿￿￿￿) estimates that about
￿￿% of the variation in US earnings can be explained by compensating di￿erentials.
However, despite their importance as a classic concept in economics, establish-
ing empirical evidence for compensating di￿erentials has proven to be challenging.
Existing studies are mostly plagued by confounding selection e￿ects that cannot
be separated from the e￿ect of interest and the lack of appropriate identifying
variation. ￿us, it seems as true today as some thirty years ago when Duncan and
Holmlund (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿) noted that “[Adam Smith’s] intuitive statement has [...]
shown surprising resistance to empirical con￿rmation”.
In this paper, I exploit a natural experiment that can help to overcome some
of the previous challenges in estimating compensating di￿erentials. Guided by a
simple compensating di￿erentials framework, I use the introduction of smoking
bans in restaurants, bars and clubs in the German federal states in ￿￿￿￿/￿￿ to study
their e￿ect on the wages and other labor market outcomes of workers in these
businesses. I argue that this setting has several appealing features that facilitate
identi￿cation. First, smoking bans were highly e￿ective at reducing the amount
of harmful airborne particles, a claim backed by representative indoor air quality
measurements taken before and a￿er the implementation of smoking bans by the
German Cancer Research Center. Second, smoking bans were rolled out over a
thirteen-month period across all German states with the introduction dates of indi-
vidual states being uncorrelated to a host of potential predictors and thus creating
arguably exogenous variation in treatment status across time and space. ￿ird,
smoking bans also varied in their intensities thereby creating additional variation
that I exploit by constructing an index capturing the strictness of di￿erent smoking
bans. What is more, the intensities of smoking bans in some states were altered
from one day to another due to a rather unexpected ruling by the Constitutional
Court, thus creating additional, arguably exogenous variation along the intensity
dimension. Fourth, the smoking bans of ￿￿￿￿/￿￿ were targeted at restaurants,
bars, and dancing clubs while leaving smoking regulations for other occupation
groups una￿ected. ￿is adds yet another layer of variation which enables me to not
only rely on variation across time, space and intensity but also across occupations
strengthening the credibility of my ￿ndings.
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To estimate the e￿ect of smoking bans on the wages of hospitality workers, I
use high-quality, large sample administrative labor market data. In most of my
analysis, I will focus on workers in so-calledmini jobs – a ￿exible part-time contract
ubiquitous in the German low wage sector exempted from most social security
and tax payments – as I argue that in this less rigid segment of the labor market
a new equilibrium can emerge more quickly. Employing either a conventional
di￿erence-in-di￿erences (DD) strategy across states and time or a triple di￿erence-
in-di￿erences (DDD) approach using una￿ected occupations as an additional
control group, I ￿nd that the most comprehensive smoking ban in the sample led
to a ￿.￿% decline in wages of these workers.
In the following, I address several concerns that could potentially cast doubt on
a causal interpretation of my ￿ndings. Performing a battery of robustness checks
including several placebo and permutation exercises, I ￿nd no violation of the
parallel trends assumption or any evidence that the e￿ect would be confounded
by seasonal e￿ects, a speci￿c choice of the time period, the weights used in the
index de￿nition, outliers, foreign or domestic tourist demand, election cycles, or
coincidental variation in weather variables. ￿ese results suggest that the e￿ect can
indeed be interpreted as causal.
I then set out to study potential mechanisms behind the decline in the wages of
waiters. One commonly proposed channel is that smoking bans resulted in lower
revenues of bars and restaurants which consequently led to lower wages. Using
o￿cial revenue data from the German Statistical O￿ce, however, I ￿nd no evidence
for that claim once properly accounting for seasonal variation in the data. ￿e
e￿ect also remains virtually unchanged when I control for revenues directly in my
wage regressions. Nevertheless, the revenue data might be too noisy or – since
only available at the state level – too coarse to accurately re￿ect changes in demand.
￿erefore, I test the revenue channel from two di￿erent angles. First, a decline in
revenues would plausibly also a￿ect the wages of other workers in the hospitality
industry. ￿e robustness of the smoking ban coe￿cient on waiters’ wages in my
DDD strategy thus provides further evidence against a revenue decline acting as
the main channel. Second, if demand a￿er the implementation of smoking bans
indeed went down because patronage by smokers went down, we should see a larger
decline in states with an initially higher share of smokers. However, including
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the initial share of smokers in a state interacted with time e￿ects leaves the e￿ect
of interest basically unchanged. Further evidence also suggests that there is no
increased closure or start-up activity of hospitality establishments associated with
the introduction of smoking bans. Taken together, it thus seems unlikely that the
e￿ect is driven by a decline in revenues or a change in the business landscape.
Another potential explanation for the decline in wages is a decrease in the hours
worked. Since wages in the administrative labor market data are only reported
as daily wages (i.e. the product of the hourly wage times hours worked) and the
hours worked are not observable, I draw on a compulsory labor market survey
(Microcensus) in which the hours worked are reported to study the validity of
the hours channel. Using either a synthetic control group approach with other
occupation de￿ning the donor pool of potential control units or a triple di￿erence-
in-di￿erences approach exploiting variation between states and occupation groups I
￿nd no support for a decline in the hours worked of workers in bars and restaurants.
If anything, the DDD estimates indicate a positive though insigni￿cant increase in
hours worked by waiters.
I argue that my ￿ndings are consistent with a simple compensating di￿erentials
model. If the marginal worker – all other amenities remaining equal – positively
values a smoke-free environment, economic theory suggest that she should be
willing to give up part of her wage in exchange. Additionally, individuals who
previously were not willing to work in smoke-allowed restaurants or barsmight now
be induced to look for a job in the hospitality sector. Both e￿ects will unambiguously
result in lower wages. ￿e e￿ect on equilibrium employment, however, depends on
the elasticity of labor demand.
My setting provides an ideal testing ground for these predictions. Due to many
non-unionized workers and low quali￿cation requirements on the supply side
and many small ￿rms and low entry barriers on the demand side coupled with
the absence of a minimum wage, relatively high turnover rates and rather ￿exible
employment regulations, the labor market for waiters in Germany comes close to
the textbook case of perfect competition and thus the new equilibrium is expected
to emerge quickly. In line with the prediction of such a simple compensating
di￿erentials model, I ￿nd some evidence for positive selection of workers induced
by the introduction of smoking bans. Further analyses suggest that the main bulk
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of selection is driven by unobservable rather than observable characteristics. Also
consistent with the theory of compensating di￿erentials, I ￿nd some suggestive
evidence for higher turnover and a moderate increase in employment.
￿is paper contributes to at least two strands of the literature. First and most
importantly, I contribute to the literature related to the empirical measurement
of compensating di￿erentials. Evidence for compensating di￿erentials have been
found in some (speci￿c) cases including shi￿-work (Kostiuk ￿￿￿￿; Lanfranchi et al.
￿￿￿￿), employer-sponsored health insurance (Kolstad and Kowalski ￿￿￿￿), and fatal
and non fatal injury risks (Leeth and Ruser ￿￿￿￿; Galick ￿￿￿￿). However, many
studies ￿nd insigni￿cant or wrong-signed estimates such that Sorkin (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿)
concludes that the “conventional view is that... it is hard to ￿nd robust evidence that
non-pay characteristics are priced in the labor market”. In a similar vein, Lavetti
(￿￿￿￿) describes the estimation of compensating wage di￿erentials “a classic topic
in labor economics that has long been considered notoriously di￿cult to solve”.￿
￿e most prominent issue noted e.g. by Duncan and Holmlund (￿￿￿￿) and Galick
(￿￿￿￿) is self-selection of workers into di￿erent jobs.￿ In this paper, I exploit a panel
of workers which enables me to control for unobserved ￿xed worker characteristics,
a feature I share with a few other papers (e.g. Duncan and Holmlund ￿￿￿￿; Galick
￿￿￿￿). Identi￿cation in these panel studies relies on within-worker job changes.
However, as Lavetti (￿￿￿￿) shows, job changes themselves and amenities o￿ered
by ￿rms are endogenous which can exacerbate bias in panel studies.￿ In contrast
to these papers, I can rely on an arguably exogenous variation in amenities within
jobs (smoking bans “shocked” existing ￿rm-worker pairs) while still controlling for
￿For similar assessments see R. S. Smith (￿￿￿￿), Brown (￿￿￿￿), Bonhomme and Jolivet (￿￿￿￿), and
Hornstein et al. (￿￿￿￿)
￿Another important issue are (non-classical) measurement errors of disamenities, e.g. resulting
from survey data or low probability events (Black and Kniesner ￿￿￿￿). ￿is issue does not arise
in my setting, however, since treatment status is perfectly observable and applies to a large group
of workers.
￿Workers who change jobs in (frictional) labor markets tend to move to jobs that both pay more
and o￿er better non-wage amenities (compare Lavetti ￿￿￿￿). In this context, one might wonder
whether the decision to stay at a certain job is also endogenous. However, as Lavetti (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿f)
argues, using within-job variation holds latent ￿xed ￿rm wage e￿ects (the potentially omitted
variable) constant thus – mechanically – ￿xed ￿rm wage e￿ects cannot be correlated with within-
job variation in amenities. ￿e decision to leave a job thus a￿ects the representativeness of the
sample but not identi￿cation.
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worker ￿xed e￿ects.￿ To the best of my knowledge, Lavetti (￿￿￿￿) is the only other
paper to apply a similar research design. Relative to Lavetti (￿￿￿￿) who studies
compensating di￿erentials related to fatal risks of commercial ￿shing deckhands in
the Alaskan Bering Sea based on survey data, I can rely on a large administrative
data set to exploit a relatively broad, economy wide natural experiment studying
the compensating di￿erential of a non-fatal health amenity.
A second issue that complicates the empirical establishment of compensating
di￿erentials noted by Bonhomme and Jolivet (￿￿￿￿) is the existence of labor market
frictions. In particular if job search is costly and plagued by incomplete information
related to job-speci￿c (dis-)amenities, compensating di￿erentials might be small or
non-existent even when workers exhibit a non-zero marginal willingness to pay for
these amenities. In my setting, these concerns are likely to be of less importance.
First, as I focus on workers in mini jobs, regulatory frictions and wage rigidities
should be less prevalent than in the case of full-time jobs which most previous
studies are based on. Second, the existence of smoking bans in bars and restaurants
are a very salient and commonly known job feature for any existing or potential
worker and thus incomplete information does not constitute a major impediment
in the estimation.
Second, my study also relates to a series of papers that evaluate the impacts of
smoking bans on various health and economic outcomes. Most epidemiological
studies largely agree on the positive impact of smoking bans on air quality and
health outcomes of hospitality workers. For instance, Repace et al. (￿￿￿￿) ￿nd
that Boston’s ￿￿￿￿ smoke-free workplace law (granting no exceptions) led to a
￿￿% reduction in respirable particle pollution in bars and pubs while in case of
Germany’s smoking bans implemented over ￿￿￿￿/￿￿ (granting some exceptions),
the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ ￿￿￿￿) ￿nds a reduction by up to
￿￿% (I will discuss these results in more detail in section ￿.￿). Goodman et al.
(￿￿￿￿), studying Ireland’s ￿￿￿￿ complete smoking ban, ￿nd that the air quality
improvements associatedwith smoking bans also translate into large and sustainable
health improvements of nonsmoking bar sta￿ in terms of the pulmonary function
and respiratory and irritant symptoms in the short and longer run. Carton et al.
(￿￿￿￿) and Anger et al. (￿￿￿￿) ￿nd that smoking bans in the US and Germany,
￿As a robustness check, I also include worker-￿rm ￿xed e￿ects and my results still hold.
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respectively, signi￿cantly reduced smoking prevalence among speci￿c subgroups
of the population such as young or low-income individuals. Kuehnle and Wunder
(￿￿￿￿) also ￿nd signi￿cant health externalities for young non-smokers while Adda
and Cornaglia (￿￿￿￿) highlight that public smoking bans may increase children’s
and other non-smokers’ exposure to tobacco smoke as smokers shi￿ cigarette
consumption to their private homes. Finally, Adams and Cotti (￿￿￿￿) exploit
geographic variation in local and state smoke-free bar laws in the US ￿nding that
alcohol-related fatal accidents increased as smokers drive longer distances to bars
that still allow smoking.
￿e evidence related to the e￿ect of smoking bans on revenues of bars and
restaurants is mixed (Adda et al. ￿￿￿￿; Pakko ￿￿￿￿; Adda et al. ￿￿￿￿; Ahlfeldt
and Maennig ￿￿￿￿; Kvasnicka and Tauchmann ￿￿￿￿), with some studies ￿nding
negative and some ￿nding insigni￿cant or positive impacts on revenues.￿ More
o￿en than not, however, these studies are based on research designs that render a
causal interpretation of the ￿ndings di￿cult, for instance by relying on self-reported
data by business owners, pure time-series before-a￿er comparisons, or inadequate
accounting for seasonal variation in sales data. Finally, Adams and Cotti (￿￿￿￿)
￿nd a signi￿cant decrease in employment related to the introduction of smoking
bans in the US while￿ompson et al. (￿￿￿￿) ￿nd a signi￿cant short-term decrease
in employee turnover. To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the ￿rst to look at
the e￿ect of smoking bans on wages of hospitality workers.
￿e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section ￿.￿ presents a simple
compensating di￿erentials framework in the context of introducing a smoking ban.
Section ￿.￿ then provides the institutional and medical background regarding the
implementation of smoking bans in the German hospitality industry. Section ￿.￿
describes the data, explains the identi￿cation strategies, and presents the estimation
results regarding the e￿ect of smoking bans on waiters’ wages along with a set of
robustness checks. Section ￿.￿ discusses several potential channels before section
￿.￿ concludes.
￿See Scollo and Lal (￿￿￿￿) for a survey. I will review the related evidence for Germany in more
detail in section ￿.￿.￿.
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￿.￿ A Simple Model
In this section, I study the e￿ects of introducing a smoking ban in a simple labor
market model characterized by compensating di￿erentials. ￿e aim is to ￿x intu-
ition, discuss the underlying assumptions, and derive predictions that will inform
my empirical analysis. To start, consider a labor market that satis￿es the following
assumptions:
A.￿ Markets are competitive.
A.￿ ￿e marginal worker values working in a smoke-free environment.
A.￿ ￿e labor demand schedule is ￿xed.
A.￿ Labor supply is not completely inelastic.
A.￿ Individual productivities are held constant.
Given these assumptions, Figure ￿.￿ illustrates how the introduction of a smok-
ing ban a￿ects a stylized labormarket for jobs in hospitality establishments in which
smoking is allowed. Initially, there is no smoking ban and the equilibrium wage
and employment are denoted by w∗￿ and L∗￿ , respectively. Given that the marginal
workers dislike being exposed to second-hand smoke, the introduction of a smok-
ing ban shi￿s aggregate labor supply from S￿ to Sban to the right. Working in a bar
or restaurant is now less unpleasant and therefore wages are lower than before. ￿is
is because with a smoking ban in e￿ect a ￿rm needs to pay the marginal workers a
smaller compensation to convince her to work for the ￿rm. ￿e new equilibrium
depends on the elasticity of labor demand. Given an elastic labor demand curve
D￿,elastic , wages will decrease to wban,￿ and employment will increase to Lban,￿. If
labor demand is inelastic and ￿xed as D￿,inelastic – e.g. in the short run or when
product demand remains unchanged￿ – then wages decrease to wban,￿ while em-
ployment stays constant.￿ Summarizing, given A.￿-A.￿ the simple model yields two
predictions regarding the change in wages and employment:
￿And given a production function in bars and restaurants that allows for only a limited substitutabil-
ity between capital and labor.
￿￿e assumption of an inelastic labor demand in the short run seems to be in line with the consensus
of the minimum wage literature where the elasticity of restaurant employment with respect to
the (minimum) wage is small and mostly insigni￿cant (compare Neumark et al. ￿￿￿￿; Neumark
￿￿￿￿).
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Figure ￿.￿: Compensating Di￿erential when Introducing a Smoking Ban
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Notes:￿is ￿gure illustrates a compensating di￿erential as part of waiters’ wages and the corresponding
wage change when a smoking ban is introduced at their workplace. See main text for a more detailed
explanation of the ￿gure.
P.￿ Wages will unambiguously decrease.
P.￿ ￿e change in employment is non-negative. Whether it remains unchanged
or increases depends on the elasticity of labor demand.
How sensible are assumptions A.￿ - A.￿? I argue that they are a reasonable
approximation to the context of the German labor market for workers in the hospi-
tality industry. First, the hospitality industry in Germany consist of a large number
of mostly small ￿rms. According to calculations from the Federal Statistical O￿ce
(Statistisches Bundesamt ￿￿￿￿), competition between restaurants, cafés, bars, and
dancing clubs – the types of establishments I expect most treated workers to work
in – is ￿erce with one of the lowest Her￿ndahl-indices (a measure for market con-
centration) of all sectors in the German economy. On the supply side, quali￿cation
requirements for hospitality workers are generally low and ￿rms can draw on a
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large pool of suitable workers such as students or second-income earners. Most
of these jobs are mini jobs that allow for a ￿exible allocation of hours and o￿er
some exemptions from social security contributions and other regulations (see
Section ￿.￿.￿ for more details). Furthermore, during the period studied, there was
no minimum wage in Germany and unionization rates among hospitality workers
were low.￿ ￿us, assumption A.￿ seems plausible.
Assumption A.￿ requires that the marginal worker prefers working in a smoke-
free environment over a non smoke-free one. Note that the equilibrium is deter-
mined by themarginal worker, i.e. the last worker hired, not the average worker.
Figure C.￿ shows that depending on the state, about ￿￿-￿￿% of the population
between ￿￿ and ￿￿ years were regular or occasional smokers in Germany in ￿￿￿￿.￿
Table ￿.￿ shows smoking behavior in the population and among waiters. Although
the share of regular smokers is higher among waiters (￿￿.￿% of waiters compared
to ￿￿.￿% in the general population in ￿￿￿￿), at least about half of all waiters are
non-smokers (Panel A). Conditional on smoking, waiters do not di￿er much in the
amount of cigarettes consumed (Panel B). In Table ￿.￿, I estimate linear probability
models of the e￿ect of working as a waiter in ￿￿￿￿ (base category) and ￿￿￿￿ on being
a smoker, i.e. being a regular or occasional smoker. I estimate models separately for
all individuals (whether employed or not, columns ￿ and ￿) and for the group of
mini job workers (in all occupations, columns ￿ and ￿). ￿e table shows that the
di￿erences in smoking behavior between waiters and the general population do not
seem to be driven by compositional di￿erences as the estimates when controlling
for a broad set of socio-economic characteristics or not do not di￿er by much. ￿e
table also shows that – if anything – waiters have decreased their gap in smoking
propensity relative to non-waiters over the ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿ period although this e￿ect
is estimated imprecisely. ￿e bottom line is that even though waiters do have a
higher likelihood of smoking, still about half of them are non-smokers. If one is
willing to assume that smoking behavior is negatively related to the willingness
￿According to Jacqueline Vogt (￿￿￿￿), the unionization rate in ￿￿￿￿ in the entire hospitality sector
was below ￿￿% which includes full-time employees in hotels and catering ￿rms. Focusing on
the employees working as waiters, the percentage is likely to be (much) lower, as most of the
employees are mini job workers working in small ￿rms (Frese ￿￿￿￿).
￿For comparison smoking prevalence among males (smoking rates only available by gender) in
￿￿￿￿ was ￿￿% in Germany, ￿￿% in France, ￿￿% in Greece, and ￿￿% in the US according to WHO
data (World Health Organisation ￿￿￿￿).
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Table ￿.￿: Smoking Behavior among the Population and Waiters)
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
Population Waiters Waiters(Mini Jobs) Population Waiters
Waiters
(Mini Jobs)
Panel A: How O￿en do you Smoke (%)?
Regularly ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
Sometimes ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿
Never ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
Observations ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Panel B: How many Cigarettes do you Smoke per Day (%)?
(if Smoking)
￿ to ￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
￿ to ￿￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
￿￿ to ￿￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿.￿
￿￿ and more ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿ ￿.￿
Observations ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Notes: ￿is table shows descriptive statics regarding the smoking behavior of the general population,
waiters, and waiters in mini jobs in ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿. ￿e sample is based on Microcensus waves
￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ and is restricted to individuals aged ￿￿-￿￿ not in civil service (Beamte) and with
non-missing values the control variable values used in Table ￿.￿. Waiters are de￿ned as those working
in occupation groups ￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿. Mini job holders are those indicating that their main current job
is a mini job. ￿e questions regarding smoking behavior are not compulsory in the Microcensus.
Statistics are weighted by survey weights.
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to pay for a decrease in second hand smoke exposure then it seems plausible that
the marginal hospitality workers has a positive valuation for a smoke-free work
environment as stipulated by assumption A.￿.
In the empirical analysis I will provide evidence that support the hypothesis
of a constant demand curve (assumption A.￿) by looking at revenues of bars and
restaurants as a proxy for labor demand.￿￿
Although I have no direct evidence to back up assumption A.￿ – that labor
supply is not completely inelastic – it seems fair to assume that – given the low train-
ing requirements and ￿exible schedules of students or other individuals typically
working as (part-time) waiters – labor supply could relatively easily vary along the
extensive and intensive margins.
Finally, A.￿ requires that individual productivities are held constant. In the
empirical estimations, I try to achieve this by including individual ￿xed e￿ects to
hold all time invariant characteristics constant, in particular unobserved traits such
as motivation, friendliness, or sales talent that are likely to in￿uence individual
wages (apart from tips) and hours worked. Including individual ￿xed e￿ects thus
helps to control for unobserved selection ofmore able or productive individuals into
waiter jobs as a consequence of smoking bans. I will explore the issue of selection
in more detail in Section ￿.￿. It could also be the case that the same individual
becomes more productive a￿er the introduction of smoking bans. Although I have
no way to control for such a time-varying unobserved e￿ect, this e￿ect should lead
to higher wages and would thus work against me by biasing my estimates upwards.
￿.￿ Background
According to the American Cancer Society, second hand smoke contains at least
seventy substances that can cause cancer and that carry the risk of heart attacks,
strokes, and chronic lung diseases. Harmful particles from tobacco smoke stay in
rooms and remain a hazard even without anyone present and smoking. Employees
working in hospitality establishments not covered by smoking bans are among
the most exposed occupation groups and are estimated to have a ￿￿% higher risk
￿￿Note that this assumption does not require that the labor demand schedule remains ￿xed at a
certain amount but rather that labor demand does not shi￿ inward or outward. ￿us, shi￿s of the
labor supply curve along the labor demand curve are possible.
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Table ￿.￿: Linear Probability Models of Being a Smoker
Dependent Variable: Smoker Yes/No
All Mini Jobs
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
No Controls Controls No Controls Controls
Waiters ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Waiters × ￿￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿** -￿.￿￿￿* -￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
State FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓
Observations ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
Clusters ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: ￿is table presents linear probability (OLS) models with the dependent
variable being a binary indicator that is one if the individual responds to be a regular
or occasional smoker and zero otherwise. ￿e sample is based on Microcensus
waves ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ and is restricted to individuals aged ￿￿-￿￿ not in civil service
(not Beamte) and with non-missing values of the control variable values. Waiter is
a dummy indicating that the individual is in occupation groups ￿￿￿ or ￿￿￿. Controls
include dummies for the year ￿￿￿￿, female, having a partner, children under ￿￿ in
the household, German, being born in Germany, holding a mini job; indicators
for each of three education categories, eight age categories and eight city size
categories; the amount of weekly hours, log net income and the state level monthly
unemployment rate. Mini job holders are those indicating that their main current
job is a mini job. ￿e questions regarding smoking behavior are not compulsory
in the Microcensus. Statistics are weighted by survey weights. Standard errors
clustered at the census region. ***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
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of dying from lung cancer even if they are non-smokers themselves (Siegel ￿￿￿￿).
According to Jamrozik (￿￿￿￿), ￿.￿% of all British non-smoking hospitality workers
are estimated to die in the long run due to their exposure to second hand smoke.
In ￿￿￿￿, the European Cancer League published a report reviewing tobacco
control activities in Europe taking into account the price of tobacco products, the
protection from second hand smoke via smoking bans, the regulation of advertising,
and other indicators. In this report, Germany ranked ￿￿ out of ￿￿ countries and was
described as “the biggest problem for tobacco control in Europe [due to its] well
established connections with the tobacco industry” (Luk Joossens and Raw ￿￿￿￿,
p. ￿￿). In the wake of such reports and a growing number of Western countries
implementing smoking bans, anti-smoking sentiment in the general population
was growing in Germany. According to a survey conducted by the German Cancer
Research Center (DKFZ ￿￿￿￿), in ￿￿￿￿ a majority of ￿￿% was in favor of smoking
bans in bars and restaurants. Against this backdrop, in early ￿￿￿￿ the federal
states decided to implement smoking bans in public places including bars and
restaurants “within the next months” (Bundesrat ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿).￿￿ In doing so, the
states had some leeway in decidingwhen and how strict a ban they would implement.
Subsequently, between August ￿￿￿￿ and August ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿ di￿erent smoking bans
became e￿ective.￿￿ Figure ￿.￿ shows the implementation dates of the di￿erent
smoking bans.
￿e smoking bans di￿ered along four components: whether or not (i) restau-
rants and bars could install a separate smoking room, (ii) dancings clubs could
install a separate smoking room, (iii) small pubs could choose to be smoke free or
not, and (iv) smoking was allowed in party tents. All states but Bavaria granted
larger bars and restaurants the possibility to install a separate smoking room. ￿￿
out of ￿￿ states allowed dancing clubs to install a separate smoking room. Only
Rhineland-Palatinate gave small single-room pubs the opportunity to opt out of
implementing a smoking ban. A complete overview of the initial regulations in
￿￿Anti-smoking regulation in public places is a matter of the states except for regulations concerning
public transportation, the workplace and federal buildings which are at the discretion of the
federal government.
￿￿￿roughout, I rely on the e￿ective introduction of smoking bans, i.e. the date when a ban was
o￿cially enforced by sanctions. In a robustness check, I show that my results remain robust when
using the legal start of a ban (see Table C.￿.
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Figure ￿.￿: Introduction Dates of Smoking Bans in the German States
BW HE NI
SH, HH, BY
RP, SN
SL
HB, NW, BE, BB, ST, TH
MV
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
N
u
m
b
er
of
St
at
es
2007 Aug 2007 Nov 2008 Feb 2008May 2008 Aug
Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots when and how many states introduced a smoking ban between August ￿￿￿￿
and August ￿￿￿￿ in Germany. ￿e ￿gure shows the e￿ective introduction dates, i.e. when violations
of a smoking ban started to be sanctioned by law.
the di￿erent states along with the introduction dates is given in Table C.￿ in the
Appendix.
Owners of small bars and dancing clubs challenged some of these regulations
claiming they were treated unequally compared to owners of larger bars and restau-
rants who had the possibility to install separate smoking rooms. In line with their
argumentation, on July ￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court revoked
the respective parts of the smoking ban laws. Minutes a￿er the ruling was made
public, restaurants and bars in ten states￿￿ could return to be smoke-allowed and
￿￿￿e remaining were either not a￿ected (Bavaria and Rhineland-Palatinate) or waited for pending
rulings of their respective state courts.
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many did so, creating an arguably exogenous variation in the intensity of smoking
bans.￿￿
To exploit the bans’ variation in both time and intensity, I construct an intensity-
index that aggregates the strictness of the di￿erent regulations at di￿erent points in
time. Speci￿cally, the index is constructed as follows:
intensityst = ￿banst ￿￿ − ωLRLRst − ωDCDCst − ωSBSBst − ωPTPTst￿ ￿ ∈ [￿, ￿] (￿.￿)
where s refers to state, t to time, and ￿banst is an indicator that is one if a smoking ban
is in operation and zero otherwise. LRst ,DCst , SBst , PTst are dummies indicating
whether or not state s at time t allowed for a separate smoking room in large bars
and restaurants (LRst), in dancing clubs (DCst), an opt-out possibility for small
pubs (SBst), and party tents (PTst). ￿e ω’s denote the corresponding index weights
which are derived from the employee shares in the respective establishments in the
base year ￿￿￿￿.￿￿ ￿ese index weights are listed in Table C.￿. ￿e bulk of workers
are employed in large (￿￿% in ￿￿￿￿) and small (￿￿%) bars and restaurants while
the share of employees in dancing clubs (￿%) and party tents (￿%, estimated) is
small. ￿us, the index will put most weight on the indicators referring to separate
smoking rooms and exemptions for small bars. In a robustness check I show that
my results are not driven by the speci￿c set of weights but also hold up to using
alternative weighting schemes (see Table C.￿). By construction, this index is zero if
no smoking ban is in operation, ￿.￿ if a state grants exception in all four categories
(Rhineland-Palatinate, weakest ban), and ￿ if no exceptions are granted (Bavaria,
strictest ban). ￿e intensities of each state’s initial smoking ban are tabulated in the
last column of Table C.￿ and are visualized in a map in Figure C.￿. Note that the
intensity index is time-varying, i.e. it re￿ects any changes that occur due to court
rulings or the amendments of laws.￿￿
￿￿See, for instance, a newspaper article by Der Spiegel (￿￿￿￿) which describes how the owner of a
pub in Berlin called his employee shortly a￿er the Constitutional Court’s decision and told her to
put out a “smoking allowed” sign at the pub’s door.
￿￿For instance, ωLR corresponds to the share of employees in food and beverage serving establish-
ments with ￿ or more employees in all employees in food and beverage serving establishments
and dancing clubs, see Table C.￿.
￿￿For instance, Bavaria introduced a strict smoking ban in January ￿￿￿￿ and was not a￿ected by the
Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling in July ￿￿￿￿. However, on October ￿, ￿￿￿￿ the Bavarian
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Figure ￿.￿: Illustration of Variation in Smoking Ban Intensities
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the smoking ban intensity index for Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria and
Northrhine-Westphalia over the period January ￿￿￿￿ - July ￿￿￿￿. For details on the construction of
the intensity index see Section ￿.￿.
Figure ￿.￿ illustrates the two dimensions of identifying variation across states
for three cases: Baden-Wuerttemberg introduced a moderate smoking ban already
in August ￿￿￿￿ and due to the Constitutional Court’s ruling had to weaken it in
August ￿￿￿￿. Bavaria implemented its strict smoking ban in January ￿￿￿￿, ￿ve
months a￿er Baden-Wuerttemberg, and its ban remained una￿ected by the Court’s
ruling in July ￿￿￿￿. Finally, North Rhine-Westphalia’s ban had to be weakened just
a month a￿er its implementation in July ￿￿￿￿.
government weakened parts of the initial ban allowing for separate smoking rooms in restaurants
and exempting small pubs altogether as was the case in most other states at that time. ￿is,
however, triggered a referendum in favor of an even stricter ban than the initial one which was
approved by a ￿￿:￿￿majority and came into e￿ect August ￿, ￿￿￿￿.
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As Adams and Cotti (￿￿￿￿) point out, the introduction of smoking bans might
be endogenous in the sense that states with a stronger anti-smoking sentiment
and a lower prevalence of smokers pass smoking bans earlier in time and choose
bans that are stricter. I argue, however, that in my setting these arguments are less
of a concern. First, in terms of timing all states agreed to pass a ban within the
next months and actually did so over the course of twelve months between August
￿￿￿￿ and August ￿￿￿￿. In fact, as Table C.￿ shows, the introduction date is not
systematically related to the ban’s intensity, the initial share of smokers, the trend in
hospitality revenues or hospitality wages, or other potential determinants. Second,
as Table C.￿ suggests, the intensity of a state’s smoking ban, too, does not seem
to be signi￿cantly correlated with the same set of potential determinants, i.e. in
particular states with a higher share of smokers in ￿￿￿￿ did not implement stricter
bans. ￿us, it seems that the timing as well as the strictness of a smoking ban was
rather determined by idiosyncratic factors such as the patterns of parliamentary
sessions, administrative concerns, or personal preferences of state legislators.
Were smoking bans in Germany e￿ective, i.e. did they indeed improve air
quality in bars, restaurants, and dancing clubs? ￿e German Cancer Research
Center measured air quality in a representative sample of hospitality establishments
in Germany before and a￿er smoking bans were implemented. ￿e measurements
were carried out using an inconspicuous small aerosol monitor during times when
clients would typically visit the respective type of establishment. A total of ￿￿
(￿￿￿￿) and ￿￿ (￿￿￿￿) establishments surveyed in ￿￿ cities in ￿ states. As Figure ￿.￿
shows, the amount of harmful particles was reduced dramatically by some ￿￿-￿￿%
a￿er the introduction of smoking bans. As smoking was still allowed in (parts
of) some establishments, there is still a positive amount of harmful particles le￿
on average. Figure C.￿ in the Appendix compares the particle concentration in
selected establishments that implemented comprehensive smoking bans granting
no exceptions (like Bavaria). In these cases, the amount of harmful particles was
virtually completely eliminated. Summarizing, smoking bans in Germany in fact
led to a very substantial improvement in the indoor air quality of hospitality es-
tablishments and thus e￿ectively reduced the exposure of hospitality workers to
harmful particles from second hand tobacco smoke.
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Figure ￿.￿: Air Quality Measurements Before and A￿er the Introduction of
Smoking Bans
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure compares the average concentration of particle matter (PM) up to ￿.￿ µm per m￿
measured in the indoor air of ￿ve di￿erent types of hospitality establishments in Germany before
(￿￿￿￿) and a￿er (￿￿￿￿) the introduction of smoking bans. ￿e post measurement for train bars was
taken in ￿￿￿￿. Source and more details: DKFZ (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿).
￿.￿ ￿e E￿ect of Smoking Bans onWaiters’ Wages
￿.￿.￿ Data
My prime data source to study the e￿ect of smoking bans on waiters’ wages is
the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies provided by the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB).￿e IAB wage sample is a ￿% random sample of the
o￿cial records of all employees subject to social security and provides data on
daily wages and employment status (full-time, part-time, mini job, unemployed, in
vocational training) as well as a number of individual characteristics such as age,
gender, skill, German nationality, region, occupation, and industry. My baseline
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samples comprise between ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ person-month spells of about ￿￿,￿￿￿-
￿￿,￿￿￿ di￿erent employees aged ￿￿-￿￿ years in East and West Germany between
August ￿￿￿￿ and February ￿￿￿￿. Appendix C.￿ contains more details on the applied
sample restrictions and the construction of variables.
When it comes to studying the wages of hospitality workers it is important
to understand the role of tipping. Unlike in the US, where the wage of a typical
waiter almost exclusively depends on tips, they are less important in Germany.
Customers would typically round up their bill resulting in tips of about ￿-￿￿%.
Whether waiters can keep these tips or share (parts of) them with their colleagues
(e.g. the cooks) varies from establishment to establishment. A common rule seems
to be that waiters keep ￿￿% of their tips and share the rest with their non-tipped
colleagues. No precise estimate of the share of tips relative to the baseline wage
exists, but about ￿￿-￿￿% seems reasonable.￿￿ In any case, tips are not subject to
taxation or social security contributions and thus are thus not recorded in the IAB
wage data.￿￿
Ideally, I would only select workers who work inside establishments in which
smoking is or was formerly allowed (typically these are bars, restaurants, and
dancing clubs). However, the data resolution is not ￿ne enough for such an exercise.
￿erefore, I identify as “waiters” those workers who are employed in the hospitality
industry and work in “guest attending” occupations. However, this subsample
contains some workers such as guest attending workers in youth hostels, ice cream
parlors, open-air beer gardens, caterers, or canteens who were likely not exposed to
second hand smoke even before the introduction of smoking bans. Similarly, the
data does not allow to separately identify hotel and restaurant owners andmanagers,
receptionists, or sta￿ in charge of housekeeping or back o￿ce related tasks who are
all part of the guest attending occupation group but are unlikely to be a￿ected by
the introduction of smoking bans.￿￿ ￿is will likely result in the attenuation of the
estimated treatment e￿ects and thus my coe￿cients are to be understood as lower
￿￿Here, I mainly rely on personal conversations with waiters and restaurant managers, and on
information found on the web such as https://gehaltsreporter.de/gehaelter-von-a-
bis-z/hotellerie-gastronomie/Kellner.html (in German).
￿￿Compare Art. ￿ Nr. ￿￿ Gesetz zur Steuerfreistellung von Arbeitnehmertrinkgeldern as of ￿￿/￿￿/￿￿￿￿.
￿￿For instance, the German occupation “Hotelfachmann/ -frau” contained in occupation group ￿￿￿
(waiters) is related to a wide range of guest attending tasks in hotels including book keeping and
other presumably non-second-hand-smoke-exposed tasks.
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Table ￿.￿: Summary Statistics of Individual Wage Data
(August ￿￿￿￿ - February ￿￿￿￿)
(￿)
All Spells
(￿)
Regular Jobs
(￿)
Mini Jobs
Real Monthly Wage
(in ￿￿￿￿ euros) ￿￿￿.￿ [￿￿￿.￿] ￿￿￿￿.￿ [￿￿￿.￿] ￿￿￿.￿ [￿￿￿.￿]
Real Wage Growth
￿￿￿￿-￿￿ (in %)a -￿.￿￿￿ [￿.￿￿￿￿] -￿.￿￿￿ - -￿.￿￿￿ -
Real Wage Growth
￿￿￿￿-￿￿ (in %)a -￿.￿￿￿ [￿.￿￿￿￿] -￿.￿￿￿ - -￿.￿￿￿ -
Low-Skilled
(share) ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿]
Medium-Skilled
(share) ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿]
High-Skilled
(share) ￿.￿￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿￿ [￿.￿￿]
Age (in years) ￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿] ￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿] ￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿]
Female (share) ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿]
German (share) ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿]
East Germany
(share) ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿]
Tenure (months) ￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿] ￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿] ￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿]
Hospitality Sector
Exper. (months) ￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿] ￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿] ￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿]
Regular Job (share) ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿ - ￿ -
Mini Job (share) ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿ - ￿ -
Persons ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
Observations ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Notes: Summary statistics of individual wage data. Standard deviation in brackets. Sample
restricted to individuals aged ￿￿-￿￿ years, employed in the hospitality sector and working
in guest attending occupations between August ￿￿￿￿ and February ￿￿￿￿. Real euro
values are de￿ated to ￿￿￿￿ using the consumer price index of the German Bundesbank.
Censored wages are imputed following Gartner (￿￿￿￿). aAggregated by contract types
(regular and mini job).
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bounds. However, many of the untreated workers such as hotel managers or back
o￿ce sta￿ are more likely to work full-time and thus excluding workers in full-time
or regular jobs (as opposed to mini jobs) should mitigate the problem of including
many untreated workers. Consistent with this line of reasoning, I ￿nd much larger
and more signi￿cant e￿ects when focusing on mini job employees only, the typical
contract for waiters in Germany (as Table ￿.￿ suggests, about ￿￿% of all employees
in guest attending occupations in the hospitality sector are employed in mini jobs.)
Employees in mini jobs are exempted from regular social security contributions
and income taxation while employers only pay a lump sum contribution to social
security. During the time of my analysis, workers in mini jobs were allowed to earn
up to ￿￿￿ euros per month on a regular basis.￿￿ In most of the empirical analyses I
will therefore restrict my attention to this group of workers, also because I expect
the equilibrium to emerge much faster in this more ￿exible segment of the labor
market.
As mentioned above, I only observe daily wages, which are derived from total
payments to an employee in a given period divided by the number of days in that
period. ￿erefore, my wage variable is the product of the hourly wage times hours
worked. In Section ￿.￿ when discussing potential channels, I will come back to
this point and – using Microcensus data – try to shed more light on whether the
observed e￿ect could also be explained by a change in the hours worked.
￿e individual wage data are summarized in Table ￿.￿. Employees in the hos-
pitality industry are among the lowest-paid occupations in Germany. Employees
in regular jobs receive a gross monthly real wage of about ￿,￿￿￿ euros.￿￿ Mini job
workers, who make up nearly ￿￿% of all hospitality workers, make some ￿￿￿ euros
￿￿Some exceptions from this rule are possible, e.g. for employee in short-term contracts or when
smoothing seasonal peaks obeying an annual earnings cap. Only about ￿% of mini job employees
in my baseline sample earn more than ￿￿￿ euros per month. All my results are robust to excluding
these observations. During the time of analysis, no changes in the income threshold occurred
(fromApril ￿￿￿￿ to January ￿￿￿￿ the threshold remained at ￿￿￿ euros. On July ￿, ￿￿￿￿ the employer
contribution to the health and pension insurance was increased to ￿￿% and ￿￿%, respectively. I
thus choose to start my baseline analysis in August ￿￿￿￿ which is also ￿￿months before the start
of the ￿rst smoking ban.
￿￿In the following, regular jobs include full-time and regular part-time part-time (more than half but
less than ￿/￿ of the work hours of a comparable full-time worker) workers. ￿e average monthly
real wage for full-time employees is ￿,￿￿￿ euros.
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Table ￿.￿: Summary Statistics of State Level Data
(August ￿￿￿￿ - February ￿￿￿￿)
Mean SD Min Max
Monthly
Unemployment Rate (in %) ￿￿.￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ ￿￿.￿
Revenue Index Restaurants (￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿)a ￿￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿] ￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿.￿
Revenue Index Bars (￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿)a ￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿] ￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿.￿
Share of Foreign Arrivals (in %)b ￿￿.￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ ￿￿.￿
Temperature (in Degrees Celsuis) ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] -￿.￿￿ ￿￿.￿
Rain Amount (in l/m￿) ￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿] ￿.￿￿ ￿￿￿.￿
Sunshine Hours ￿￿￿.￿ [￿￿.￿] ￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿.￿
Yearly
Population (in Millions) ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ ￿￿.￿
Share of Smokers in ￿￿￿￿ (in %) ￿￿.￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
With Election Cycles
Turnout in State-Level Elections (in %) ￿￿.￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
Conservative Index ￿.￿￿ [￿.￿￿] ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Notes: Summary statistics of state level data between August ￿￿￿￿ and February ￿￿￿￿.
Standard deviation in brackets. aData not available for Berlin and Brandenburg. bShare
of registrations of tourists of foreign nationality in all touristic registrations at accommo-
dation establishments. Sources: GENESIS, MZ ￿￿￿￿, DWD.
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a month.￿￿ ￿is corresponds to a typical student or second-earner part-time job of
about ￿￿ hours a month. Wages have substantially declined in the years around the
introduction of smoking bans. ￿ese mini job workers are relatively young (about
￿￿ years on average) and predominantly female (￿￿%).
To complement my analysis, I use waves ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ from the GermanMicrocen-
sus, an o￿cial yearly survey similar to the US Current Population Survey (CPS).￿e
GermanMicrocensus is based on a ￿% random cross-section of German households.
Participation is compulsory and non-compliance can be ￿ned. Most population
and many labor market statistics are based on the Microcensus. In this data set,
I observe the state, the occupation, sector, smoking behavior (only in ￿￿￿￿ and
￿￿￿￿), full- or part-time status and – unlike in the IAB wage data – the usual hours
worked per week.
Finally, I include several state level controls. ￿e data on monthly revenues
(separately for bars and restaurants) is based on a monthly compulsory survey
among an ￿% random sample of all establishments in the hospitality sector (about
￿￿,￿￿￿ businesses per month) with yearly revenues exceeding ￿￿,￿￿￿ euros and is
taken from Ahlfeldt and Maennig (￿￿￿￿).￿￿ Population, election, and unemploy-
ment rates at the state level are taken from Federal Statistical O￿ce (GENESIS).
Weather data, i.e. monthly state mean temperature, rain, and hours of sunshine,
are derived from the GermanWeather Service (DWD). Table ￿.￿ summarizes these
variables, all of which vary at the state and month level.
￿.￿.￿ Identi￿cation Strategies
In my main approach, I will exploit variation between states and over time in
a di￿erence-in-di￿erences (DD) fashion. Speci￿cally, to study the e￿ect of the
intensity of a smoking ban on the wages of workers in guest attending occupations
in the hospitality industry (“waiters” in the following), I estimate variants of the
￿￿As mentioned above, there was no minimum wage during the time of analysis and workers in mini
jobs were allowed to earn up to ￿￿￿ euros a month.
￿￿Revenue data is not available for Berlin and Brandenburg due to its underrepresentation in the
underlying survey (see Ahlfeldt and Maennig ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿).
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following OLS speci￿cation:
lnwageits = β￿intensityst + αi + αt + αs + αs,m(t) +  Xst + uits (￿.￿)
wherewits denotes thewage of individual i at time t in state s, intensityts refers to the
intensity measure as introduced above, and αi ,αt , αs , and αs,m(t) capture individual,
time, state, and state ×month ￿xed e￿ects, respectively. ￿e state ×month ￿xed
e￿ects (e.g. Bavaria × October) are supposed to account for the di￿erent seasonal
patterns of (tourism) demand in each state. Xts contains further controls that vary
at the state-month level such as the current or lags of the state unemployment rate
or state speci￿c linear (pre-)trends that project the trend in wages from the previous
￿￿months before treatment into the post-treatment period.￿￿ ￿e parameter of
interest is β￿. It indicates (approximately) by how much percent a waiters’ wage
changes when a strict smoking ban (equivalent to the intensity of Bavaria’s initial
smoking ban) is introduced. ￿e estimation period starts in August ￿￿￿￿, i.e. ￿￿
months before the ￿rst smoking ban became e￿ective in August ￿￿￿￿ in Baden-
Wuerttemberg and ends ￿months a￿er the last ban became e￿ective in August ￿￿￿￿
in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. In a robustness check (see Table ￿.￿), I show
thatmy results do not depend on this speci￿c time choice and are robust to choosing
a longer pre-period or a balanced time windows around the treatment. ￿roughout,
I cluster standard errors at the state level, the unit at which the treatment varies.
￿e identifying assumption underlying this di￿erence-in-di￿erence approach
is that wages of workers in restaurants, bars and dancing clubs in more or less
treated states would have evolved similarly in the absence of smoking bans, i.e.
I rely on a common trends assumption across states. A potential threat to this
identi￿cation strategy would be any kind of unobserved policy or demand change
unrelated to smoking bans that a￿ects a state’s hospitality sector post treatment. A
triple di￿erence-in-di￿erences (DDD) approach is able tackle such a concern by
controlling for two potentially confounding trends (and not just one as in a DD
￿￿Speci￿cally, I recover the coe￿cient ￿s for each state from a regression lnwagei ts = ∑￿￿s=￿(states ×
￿stimet) + ust and include ￿̂s × timet as a new control variable in the main speci￿cation thereby
projecting pre-treatment trends in the post-treatment period following Repetto (￿￿￿￿). Employing
quadratic pre-trends or choosing di￿erent lengths of the pre-period leaves my estimates virtually
unchanged.
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approach): changes in waiters’ wages across states (unrelated to the introduction
of smoking bans) and changes in the wages of other comparable employees in the
hospitality industry in the same state (possibly related to other state speci￿c changes
in tourism demand or the state economy in general). ￿is can be seen more easily
in the following regression equation:
lnwageitso =β￿intensityst + β￿intensityst ×waiterio+ αi + αto + αso + αs,m(t) +  Xst + uitso (￿.￿)
where o indexes di￿erent occupation groups, waitero is an indicator variable that is
one if individual i belongs to the occupation group of waiters, αso and αto denote
occupation speci￿c time and state ￿xed e￿ects, while αi , αs,m(t), and Xts refer to
individual and state ×month ￿xed e￿ects and further state-level controls as before.
β￿ corresponds to the e￿ect of smoking bans on wages of all occupations except for
the group of waiters. ￿e coe￿cient of interest is now β￿. It refers to the e￿ect of
smoking bans on wages of waiters net of secular changes in the hospitality industry
within the same state and secular changes in the wages of waiters in non-treated
states. In my setting I choose cooks and in another speci￿cation all other mini
job workers in the hospitality industry as additional control groups. In case cooks
are chosen as the additional control group, the DDD approach thus compares the
evolution of the di￿erence in wages betweenwaiters and cooks in a treated state with
the same di￿erence in an untreated state. ￿e underlying identifying assumption
states that the di￿erence in waiters’ and cooks’ wages in more or less treated states
would have developed similarly in the absence of smoking bans.
￿.￿.￿ Estimation Results
Table ￿.￿ reports estimates of equation ￿.￿ for workers with di￿erent types of work
schedules (columns) and using di￿erent treatment indicators (panels). In even
columns, I present estimation results using a reduced set of controls only (individual-
, state-, time, and state × month ￿xed e￿ects) while in odd columns I include
additional controls (linear pre-trends and the current and six lags of the monthly
state unemployment rate). ￿e e￿ect of smoking bans – either captured by an
indicator for whether a smoking ban is in e￿ect (Panel A) or using the smoking ban
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intensity as de￿ned above (Panel B) – on workers on all di￿erent work schedules
is mostly insigni￿cant. Looking separately at the di￿erent work schedules, the
impact of smoking bans on wages of full-time workers is close to zero (columns ￿
and ￿) and only slightly more pronounced but still insigni￿cant for waiters’ wages
working regular part-time (columns ￿ and ￿). In contrast, for the group of waiters
in mini jobs the e￿ect of smoking bans on wages is highly signi￿cant, robust in both
speci￿cations and sizable (columns ￿ and ￿). Not accounting for its strictness, the
average smoking ban is estimated to reduce wages of mini job waiters by about ￿.￿%
(Panel A), while taking into account the intensity of the di￿erent smoking bans
yields a decrease of ￿.￿% (Panel B).￿￿ ￿is is in line with the reasoning outlined
above, i.e. the group of waiters in mini jobs supposedly makes up the overwhelming
majority of treated individuals and that due to their ￿exible contracts are less a￿ected
by wage rigidities. Against the backdrop of the results presented in Table ￿.￿ and
the reasoning presented above, in the following I will focus on waiters in mini jobs.
Figure ￿.￿a plots an event study graph based on a dynamic version of the
speci￿cation in column ￿, Panel A of Table ￿.￿. Although I control for state ×month
￿xed e￿ects, there is still considerable volatility le￿ in the wage data. ￿e ￿gure
shows, however, that there are no trends and that on average, wages are signi￿cantly
lower a￿er the introduction of a smoking ban (the gray horizontal line and the
box indicate the corresponding point estimate of the ban indicator and the ￿￿%
con￿dence interval.) Figure ￿.￿b depicts the same event study graph for the group
of all mini job workers except for waiters in the hospitality industry. Wages of this
group (purged of the impact attributable to the set of baseline ￿xed e￿ects) are
similarly volatile (although to a somewhat lesser extent), but in contrast to waiters’
wage, are not signi￿cantly lower a￿er the introduction of smokings bans (indicated
as before with a gray box). ￿e two ￿gures also jointly illustrate the idea of the
DDD approach outlined above. ￿e evolution of the wages of all other mini job
workers constitute the counterfactual evolution of wages of waiters in the absence
of introducing smoking bans.￿￿
￿￿When jointly including the smoking ban indicator and the intensity index in a regression, both
coe￿cients remain signi￿cant thus indicating that it is important not only to account for the
existence of a ban by itself but also for its intensity.
￿￿Figure C.￿ in the Appendix overlay the two plots and shows that the two follow a similar pattern
previous to the introduction of smoking bans.
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Figure ￿.￿: Event Study Graphs Related to the Introduction of Smoking Bans
(a)Waiters in Mini Jobs in the Hospitality Sector)
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Months to/ since Smoking Ban
Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the regression coe￿cients of dummies indicating the months to or since the
introduction of a smoking for the period ￿￿months prior and up to ￿months a￿er the introduction of
a smoking ban. ￿e period one month prior to the introduction is the reference period. Regressions
are based on a dynamic version of the speci￿cation in column ￿ in Panel A of Table ￿.￿, i.e. include
individual-, time-, state-, and state ×month ￿xed e￿ects. ￿e point estimate and ￿￿% con￿dence
interval of a regression using a smoking ban indicator corresponding to this sample is shown in row ￿
of Table ￿.￿ and is marked in the ￿gure with a horizontal line and gray box, respectively. ￿e vertical
gray lines indicate the ￿￿% con￿dence intervals of each point estimate. Standard errors clustered at
the state level.
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￿.￿.￿ Robustness Checks
In Table ￿.￿, I test the robustness of the baseline intensity e￿ect for mini job workers.
Column ￿ reproduces the baseline result. In column ￿, the intensity measure turns
on already at the time of the legal introduction of a smoking ban which in some
states did not coincide with the time a smoking ban was enforced by sanctions.￿￿
￿e estimate – in line with expectations – is slightly lower but remains highly
signi￿cant and very similar in magnitude. ￿e intensity coe￿cient also remains
unchanged when I include a dummy that indicates whether establishments could
avoid imposing a smoking ban by declaring themselves as “smokers clubs” (column
￿).￿￿ Alternatively, in column ￿, I reduce the intensity measure by ￿.￿ for states
where smoking clubs could be installed (the same reduction in the index as if
smoking was allowed in small bars and restaurants) and again the results remain
robust. Furthermore, I show that my baseline results also do not depend on the
speci￿c choice of the index weights (Table C.￿) and and not driven by a speci￿c
state (Table C.￿ and Figure C.￿).
￿e baseline estimate also holds up to a battery of additional robustness checks
presented in Table ￿.￿ including using a longer pre-period (from January ￿￿￿￿), a
balanced time window equal for all states (including the ￿￿months before and ￿
months a￿er the introduction of a smoking ban in each state), excluding observa-
tions from states that introduced smoking bans ￿rst (in ￿￿￿￿) or in January or July,
i.e. months where the treatment might be particularly prone to be confounded by
seasonal e￿ects, relying on observations fromWest Germany only, excluding the
largest and smallest ￿% of wages; including weather controls (temperature, rain,
￿￿￿is was the case in Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower
Saxony, Saarland, and Saxony-Anhalt. I personally experienced that people still used to smoke in
bars in restaurants in Berlin during January and June ￿￿￿￿ when a smoking bans was legally in
place but violations did not carry any (￿nancial) consequences for establishment owners or guests.
￿is was also the case in Lower-Saxony where smoking was still prevalent in the transition period
as mentioned in this newspaper article (in German) http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/
berlin-bis-juli-2008-keine-bussgelder-beim-rauchverbot/1088506.html.
￿￿As Kvasnicka and Tauchmann (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿￿) point out, this kind of relabeling only developed
into a major loophole in Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia, consequently the dummy is one
for Bavaria between January ￿￿￿￿ and January ￿￿￿￿ and for North Rhine-Westphalia between
July ￿￿￿￿ and April ￿￿￿￿, the end dates marking the time when the loopholes were shut down by
courts.
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Table ￿.￿: Robustness of the Treatment E￿ect to Institutional
Features of Smoking Bans
Dependent Variable: Log Wage
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
Ban Intensity -￿.￿￿￿∗∗∗ -￿.￿￿￿∗∗∗
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Ban Intensity
(not enforced)
-￿.￿￿￿∗∗∗
(￿.￿￿￿)
Ban Intensity
(incl. Raucherclub)
-￿.￿￿￿∗∗∗
(￿.￿￿￿)
Smokers Club
Permitted
-￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
Baseline Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Start Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿
End Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿
Clusters ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Individuals ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
Observations ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes:￿is table shows regression results of the impact of smoking bans on individual
log daily wages of waiters in the hospitality sector working in mini jobs. Extended
controls include person-, time-, state-, and state×month ￿xed e￿ects, linear pre-
trends, and current and six lags of the monthly state-unemployment rate. Standard
errors clustered at the state level. ***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿%
level.
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and hours of sunshine), the monthly state level consumer price index, the months
to the next state-level elections, the pre-treatment party vote shares interacted with
time ￿xed e￿ects, proxies for the share of foreign visitors (controlling for a change
in the composition of tourists from countries like the US where tipping is more
common and generous) and tourism demand, or region and region ×month ￿xed
e￿ects to allow for more disaggregated patterns in demand. All of these alternative
speci￿cations leave my baseline results virtually unchanged.
Identi￿cation in the previous estimations depends on the common trends as-
sumption. A convenient way to test this assumption is a placebo test. If the common
trend assumption holds, then shi￿ing the treatment into the past when actually no
treatment occurred should yield an insigni￿cant estimate of the treatment coe￿-
cient. ￿is is what I do in Figure ￿.￿. Each point depicts the intensity coe￿cient
obtained from a regression that is identical to the speci￿cation using extended
controls except that the introduction date of a state’s smoking ban policy and the
start and end date of the sample are shi￿ed by the number of months indicated
on the x-axis into the past/ future. ￿e results of this exercise are in line with the
common trend assumption: Pretending that smoking bans were introduced earlier
or later than they actually were, yields mostly insigni￿cant coe￿cients while the
strongest and most signi￿cant e￿ect is found around the true introduction date.
Despite the robustness of the estimate so far, it could still be that the introduc-
tion of smoking bans coincided with other idiosyncratic ￿uctuations that decreased
wages at the same time. Furthermore, clustering standard errors at the state level
leaves me with ￿￿ clusters, a relatively small number to rely on asymptotic conver-
gence, and clustering at the state level might not capture more complex ways of
interdependencies between states. To address such concerns, I run a permutation
exercise in which I randomly shu￿e polices across states (without replacement) and
re-estimate the intensity coe￿cient for these placebo samples. For instance, in one
permutation sample, Bavaria might be assigned the smoking ban introduction date
and intensity of Berlin while Berlin is assigned the policy of Baden-Wuerttemberg,
and so on for each state. Note that by chance, one or more states might be assigned
their actual polices. In each round, I estimate the e￿ect of these placebo policies
and repeat this ￿￿,￿￿￿ times. By comparing the coe￿cient based on the actual
policies with the distribution of placebos estimates, one can compute the percentile
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Table ￿.￿: Additional Robustness Checks
Intensity
Coe￿cient Adj. R
￿
￿. Balanced Time Windows (￿￿months before, ￿ a￿er) -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Longer Pre-Period (￿￿￿￿ Jan - ￿￿￿￿ Feb) -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Excluding States with Bans Introduced in ￿￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Excluding States with Bans Introduced in January ￿￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Excluding States with Bans Introduced in July ￿￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Excluding Spells from East Germany -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Excluding Extremes (largest/smallest ￿% of wages) -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Weather Controls (Temperature, Rain, Sunshine Hours) -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Monthly state level CPI -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. Time to Next State-Level Elections -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. Initial Party Vote Shares × Time FEs -￿.￿￿￿** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. Monthly Share of Foreign Overnight Staysa -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. Monthly Index of Foreign and Domestic Overnight Staysa -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. County and County ×Month FEs -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
Notes: ￿is table shows additional robustness checks of the smoking ban intensity on individual
log daily wages of waiters in the hospitality sector working in mini jobs. Each row represents a
separate regression with the log daily wage as the dependent variable using extended controls in
addition to the indicated speci￿cation. ￿e time period covers August ￿￿￿￿ to February ￿￿￿￿ as in
the baseline if not indicated otherwise. a lags ￿-￿. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level.
***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
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Figure ￿.￿: Placebo Treatments
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Shifting Introduction Date of Smoking Ban by ... Months
Notes: ￿is ￿gures plots the smoking ban intensity coe￿cients using a speci￿cation with extended
controls when shi￿ing the policies by the number of months indicated on the x-axis in the past/
future. ￿e dashed lines indicate the ￿￿% con￿dence intervals.
in the distribution of outcomes and derive the according p-value. ￿e results of
this exercise is depicted in Figure ￿.￿. It turns out that the actual estimate falls in
the ￿.￿￿￿ percentile of placebo estimates, corresponding to a two sided p-value of
￿.￿￿￿.
As outlined in the identi￿cation strategy, the DD-approach maybe confounded
if states exhibit diverging unobserved trends such that the evolution of the outcome
in control states alone is not an appropriate counterfactual. A DDD-approach helps
to overcome this concern by adding a further control group. In table ￿.￿, I estimate
variants of equation ￿.￿ using cooks (columns ￿ and ￿) and then all other workers in
mini jobs in the hospitality sector (columns ￿ and ￿) as additional control groups.
When using the sample of all other mini job workers in the hospitality sector, I drop
occupations with less than ￿￿ observations in any given state. A list of the remaining
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Figure ￿.￿: Kernel Density Graph of Permutation Tests
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Notes: ￿is ￿gures plots the kernel density graph of intensity coe￿cients using a speci￿cation with
extended controls resulting from a permutation exercise where smoking ban policies are randomly
shu￿ed between states (without replacement) ￿￿,￿￿￿ times. For more details see section ￿.￿.￿.
occupations and their frequencies can be found in table C.￿. ￿ese are mainly other
guest attending occupations, salespersons, motor vehicle drivers, o￿ce workers, as
well as housekeeping and cleaning occupations.
￿e DDD estimation results presented in table ￿.￿ corroborate the ￿ndings
using the simpler DD approach from above. ￿e estimation results in column ￿
and ￿ – using cooks as the additional control group – yield a signi￿cant decline in
waiters’ wages related to the introduction of smoking bans. However, the baseline
ban and intensity coe￿cients are marginally signi￿cant and positive indicating that
smoking bans might have increased wages for cooks. ￿is might be caused by an
increase in food demand in now smoke-free restaurants leading to higher wages
for cooks. ￿us, a broader control group consisting of all other mini job workers in
the hospitality industry might be a better control group. Indeed, in columns ￿ and
￿ the causal impact of the smoking ban indicator or the intensity index on waiters’
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Table ￿.￿: Triple Di￿erence Estimates
Cooks All Other Occupations
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
Smoking Ban
Indicator
×Waiters -￿.￿￿￿∗∗∗ -￿.￿￿￿∗∗
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Smoking Ban
Indicator
￿.￿￿￿∗ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Ban Intensity ×Waiters -￿.￿￿￿∗∗∗ -￿.￿￿￿∗∗
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Ban Intensity ￿.￿￿￿∗ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Baseline Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Start ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug
End ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb
Clusters ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Individuals ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
Observations ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: ￿is table shows triple di￿erence regression results of the impact of smoking
bans on individual log daily wages of waiters using wages of cooks (columns ￿ and ￿)
and workers in all other occupations (columns ￿ and ￿) as additional control groups.
￿e sample is restricted to workers in mini jobs. Extended controls include person-,
time × occupation-, state × occupation-, and state×month ￿xed e￿ects, linear pre-trends
for each occupation, and current and six lags of the monthly state-unemployment rate.
Standard errors clustered at the state level. ***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿%
level.
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wages are virtually identical to the corresponding DD estimates presented above
(compare estimates in column ￿ of Table ￿.￿) while the baseline ban indicator and
intensity coe￿cient are practically zero indicating that smoking bans did not have
a signi￿cant impact on the wages of other mini job employees working in bars and
restaurants such as security personal, cleaning sta￿ and others. ￿at fact that the
DD and the DDD estimates coincide makes is unlikely that the DD estimates su￿er
from a confounding unobserved counterfactual trend. ￿us, taken together, the
DD and DDD estimates provide strong evidence in favor of a causal interpretation
of the ban intensity coe￿cient.
￿.￿ Channels
In the previous section, I established a negative impact of smoking bans on the
wages of waiters in mini jobs working in hospitality establishments. ￿e next step
is to ask what lies behind this decline, i.e. what the are the channels responsible for
this e￿ect? In this section I will check the validity of four potential channels: (i) a
decline in hospitality revenues, (ii) a decline in hours worked, (iii) selection, and
(iv) employment e￿ects.
￿.￿.￿ Revenues
Awidely held explanation for the negative impact of smoking bans onwaiters’ wages
is that the introduction of smoking bans led to a decline in revenues of bars and
restaurants as patronage by smokers decreased. ￿is concern was ￿ercely advocated
by the hospitality industry in their opposition to smoking bans. Even if true, this
reasoning seems to neglect that at least part of the supposed revenue decline might
be compensated for by an increased demand of non-smokers such as families with
children or clients that had a strong dislike for second-hand indoor smoke.
To evaluate the validity of such claims, I perform a di￿erence-in-di￿erences
analysis at the state level, separately for the revenues of restaurants (Panel A) and
bars (Panel B) in Table ￿.￿. Note that the revenue data vary at the state ×month
level and are only available for ￿￿ out of the ￿￿ German federal states (data for
Berlin and Brandenburg are not available for this period). Although the e￿ect
of smoking bans on revenues is always insigni￿cant, the results show that if one
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Table ￿.￿: Impact of Smoking Bans on Revenues of Restaurants and Bars
Dependent Variable: Log Revenues
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
Simple DD
+
Linear State
Trend
+
State ×Month
FEs
+
Weather
Controls
+
Tourism
Demand
Panel A: Restaurants
Ban Intensity -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Panel B: Bars
Ban Intensity -￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
State & Time FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Unemp. Rate & CPI ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Linear State Trends ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State ×Month FEs ✓ ✓ ✓
Weather Controls ✓ ✓
Index of Domestic and
Foreign Overnight Stays ✓
Start ￿￿￿￿ Jan ￿￿￿￿ Jan ￿￿￿￿ Jan ￿￿￿￿ Jan ￿￿￿￿ Jan
End ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb
Clusters ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Observations ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Notes: ￿is table presents regressions of the monthly state-level log revenues in restaurants (panel A)
and bars (panel B) on the smoking ban intensity index and further controls. All controls vary at the
state-month level. Weather controls include the monthly state mean temperature, rain amount, and
hours of sunshine. CPI refers to the monthly state consumer price index. ￿e index of domestic and
foreign overnights stays refers to the number of overnights stays by tourists of domestic or foreign origin.
Standard errors clustered at the state level. All regressions are weighted by population size. ***/**/*
indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
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does not properly account for the seasonal variation in the data (using state ×
month ￿xed e￿ects) – crucial when analyzing such seasonal and volatile data as
hospitality revenues – the estimations yield a spuriously negative point estimates.
Once controlling for seasonal e￿ects, the point estimates, if anything, suggest a
positive e￿ect of smoking bans on revenues although the coe￿cients are estimated
imprecisely – even though my preferred speci￿cations including state × month
e￿ect explain more than ￿￿% of the variation in the data. A power calculation based
on the change in R￿ for the models in column ￿ shows that this is not necessarily
due to a lack of statistical power. Given the estimated e￿ect sizes in column ￿, a
power analysis yields values of ￿.￿￿ (￿.￿￿) and ￿.￿￿ (￿.￿￿) at a signi￿cance level
of ￿% (￿￿%) for restaurants and bars, respectively. All in all, these results make
me reasonably con￿dent that smoking bans did not lead to a signi￿cant decrease
in revenues of bars and restaurants and that my setting is su￿ciently powered to
detect a potential decrease. My estimates are in line with a host of studies from the
US and other countries that do not ￿nd any robust evidence for a negative e￿ect of
smoking bans on hospitality revenues (see for instance the review articles by Scollo
et al. ￿￿￿￿; Scollo and Lal ￿￿￿￿). ￿ey are also in line with Ahlfeldt and Maennig
(￿￿￿￿) who perform a similar di￿erence-in-di￿erences analysis based on the same
o￿cial German revenue data as I do here covering January ￿￿￿￿ and December
￿￿￿￿ and who do not ￿nd any statistically signi￿cant decline in revenues neither
for bars nor restaurants. ￿ey suggest that their ￿ndings might be explained by
increased spending of non-smokers that compensated the reduced spending by
smokers or that smokers did not reduce their spending in the ￿rst place.￿￿
Another issue could be that the average e￿ect masks important heterogeneous
e￿ects between di￿erent sorts of establishments. For instance, old-school corner
￿￿In contrast, Kvasnicka and Tauchmann (￿￿￿￿) use revenue data for the entire hospitality industry
(thus also including revenues from accommodation businesses such as hotels or camping sites
likely una￿ected by smoking bans) and ￿nd a statistically signi￿cant decline in revenues of at
some ￿%. However, they use data only covering the period January ￿￿￿￿ to September ￿￿￿￿ and
thus use considerably less pre- and post-treatment observations than Ahlfeldt and Maennig ￿￿￿￿
and than I do here. ￿ey also do not include the monthly state-level consumer price index and do
not account for state ×month speci￿c seasonal e￿ects which I argue are particularly important in
the context of such volatile and seasonal data. For instance, ￿ out of ￿￿ states introduced smoking
bans in January or February, two months characterized by particularly low demand in some states
but not all (e.g. due to winter sports tourism).
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Table ￿.￿￿: Exploring the E￿ect of Revenues in Baseline E￿ect
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
Baseline Initial Shareof Smokers
Baseline
w/o
BE, BB
Revenues
(Lags ￿-￿)
Ban Intensity -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Baseline Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Share Smokers ￿￿￿￿× Time FEs ✓
Monthly State Bar and Restaurant
Revenues (Lags ￿-￿) ✓
Start Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿
End Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿
Clusters ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Individuals ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
Observations ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: ￿is table presents regression results of the impact of smoking bans on individual log
daily wages of waiters in the hospitality sector working in mini jobs exploring the role of
potential changes in the revenues of bars and restaurants. Extended controls include person-,
time-, state-, and state×month ￿xed e￿ects, linear pre-trends, and current and six lags of the
monthly state-unemployment rate. Standard errors clustered at the state level. ***/**/* indicate
signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
C￿. ￿: C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿ B￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
bars with a majority of their patronage being smokers might be hit harder and thus
are forced to go out of business while modern, more food oriented establishments
or trendy co￿ee shops might bene￿t from a shi￿ in demand due to smoking bans.￿￿
However, Kvasnicka and Tauchmann (￿￿￿￿) do not ￿nd any signi￿cant e￿ect of
smoking bans neither on the number of business closures nor business start ups
up until December ￿￿￿￿ (i.e. between ￿ and ￿￿months a￿er the introduction of
smoking bans).
In Table ￿.￿￿, I explore the role of declining demand for wages of mini job
employees in bars and restaurants. Column ￿ reproduces the baseline estimate. As
a ￿rst check, in column ￿, I interact the share of smokers in each state in ￿￿￿￿,
i.e. before any state introduced a smoking ban with time ￿xed e￿ects. ￿e idea of
this exercise is to capture the time-varying e￿ect of having a higher initial share
of smokers. If part of the decline in wages is caused by smokers reducing their
consumption, then including the time-interacted share of initial smokers in the
baseline regression should yield a smaller and/ or insigni￿cant intensity coe￿cient.
￿e results in column ￿ suggest that this is not the case. ￿e intensity coe￿cient
is reduced only slightly and stays highly signi￿cant. Next, I directly control for
the monthly revenues of bars and restaurants and their lagged values (up to the
sixth lag). As these data are not available for Berlin and Brandenburg, column ￿
reproduces the baseline estimate excluding these two states. ￿e point estimates
remains virtually unchanged. Column ￿ includes the revenue controls. Although
the revenue variables constitute a set of “bad controls”, including themallows to learn
something about the mechanism. If the e￿ect of smoking bans on wages worked
fully through reduced revenues, then – similar to including the time interacted
share of initial smokers – the intensity coe￿cient should become insigni￿cant and
close to zero. Column ￿ shows, however, that the role of revenues in explaining the
decline in wages is very limited as the intensity coe￿cient remains unchanged a￿er
including revenues as additional regressors.
In Table ￿.￿￿, I provide further support that declining revenues are unlikely to
serve as the main explanation for declining wages of waiters. In particular, if the
decline in waiters’ wages was caused by a general decline in revenues of bars and
￿￿Kvasnicka and Tauchmann (￿￿￿￿) note that in the sales data some of the very small bars with
revenues of less than ￿￿,￿￿￿ euros per year are excluded. In the IAB wage data, there is no such
lower limit censoring and employees of small bars are also sampled proportionally.
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Table ￿.￿￿: Triple Di￿erence Estimates Controlling for Revenues
Dependent Variable: Log Wage
(￿) (￿)
Cooks All OtherOccupations
Ban Intensity ×Waiters -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿**
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Ban Intensity ￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Baseline Controls ✓ ✓
Revenues (Lags ￿-￿) ✓ ✓
Start ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug
End ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb
Clusters ￿￿ ￿￿
Individuals ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
Observations ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: ￿is table presents triple-di￿erence regression results of the
impact of smoking bans on individual log daily wages of waiters in the
hospitality sector working in mini jobs. Extended controls include
person-, time × occupation-, state × occupation-, and state×month
￿xed e￿ects, linear pre-trends for each occupation, and current and
six lags of themonthly state-unemployment rate. Standard errors clus-
tered at the state level. ***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿%
level.
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restaurants, other occupations would likely also see their wages falling a￿er the
introduction of smoking bans. ￿e small and insigni￿cant baseline coe￿cients of
the smoking ban indicator or intensity index in Table ￿.￿ do not provide support
for this hypothesis. Also, explicitly controlling for revenues of restaurants and
bars as in Table ￿.￿￿ does not yield any di￿erent conclusion. ￿us, in light of the
results presented in Table ￿.￿￿ and ￿.￿￿ it seems unlikely that a major part of the
relative decrease in waiters’ wages caused by smoking bans was driven by a decline
in hospitality revenues.
￿.￿.￿ Hours Worked
￿e analyses so far showed that the introduction of smoking bans was associated
with lower daily wages. However, lower daily wages could either be the result of
lower hourly wages or fewer hours worked (or a combination of the two). Ideally,
I would like to decompose the total e￿ect into the part that is due to a change in
hours worked and the part that is due to a change in the hourly wage. Unfortunately,
in the IAB administrative labor market data I do not observe the hours worked
(apart from the distinction between di￿erent forms of full- or part-time jobs).
￿erefore, I use data from the Microcensus where individuals report their usual
hours worked per week.￿￿ and construct a sample as similar to the IAB wage sample
as possible by selecting all individuals with a mini-job between ￿￿-￿￿ years in East
and West Germany. ￿e key drawback using Microcensus data for the purpose at
hand is that it comes in yearly and not in monthly intervals.￿￿ Another caveat of the
Microcensus data is that – although participation is compulsory – most variables
and in particular the hours worked are self-reported and – given the o￿cial nature
of the survey – it is unlikely that individuals will report informal hours (compare
Boockmann et al. ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿f). Bearing these limitations in mind, the Microcensus
is still the best available data set to analyze the e￿ect of smoking bans on hours
worked by waiters in mini jobs in Germany.
￿￿Ideally, I would also re-estimate the e￿ect of smoking bans on wages based on Microcensus data,
however, one can only observe the net income of a person (or household) including transfers and
other income sources but not the wage associated with a speci￿c job.
￿￿￿e German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) would be another data set where the hours of work
can be observed. ￿is data set, however, su￿ers from too small sample sizes to conduct analyses
at the level of waiters in mini-jobs.
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￿e yearly data structure and the distinction of a treatment and control groups
lends itself to a synthetic control approach pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal
(￿￿￿￿) and Abadie et al. (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e advantage of this approach compared to a
conventional di￿erence-in-di￿erences design is that instead of giving each control
unit (implicitly) the same weight, the synthetic control approach assigns data driven
weights to construct a control group that optimally matches the evolution of the
pre-treatment outcome of the treated unit without relying on post-treatment data.
Speci￿cally, I use a synthetic control approach to estimate the e￿ect of smoking bans
on hours worked of mini job workers using waiters as the treatment group and all
remaining occupations with at least ￿￿ observations per state as the donor pool over
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿, a three-year window around treatment. As pre-treatment predictors I
use mean age, the share of females, the share of workers located in East Germany
and the hours worked averaged over the pre-treatment period. Including more or
less predictors or choosing values of these predictors only in speci￿c pre-treatment
periods has little in￿uence on the results.￿￿
Figure ￿.￿ shows the results of this exercise. In Figure ￿.￿a, I use all ￿￿ states and
de￿ne ￿￿￿￿ as the treatment date since three out of the ￿￿ states introduced smoking
bans already in ￿￿￿￿. ￿e synthetic control group in this setting is composed of
cashiers (￿￿%) and auxiliary (geriatric) nurses (￿￿%). A full set of donor occupa-
tions and corresponding synthetic control group weights is given in Table C.￿. A
comparison of the usual hours worked per week between the treatment group (wait-
ers) and its synthetic control group shows that the two moved practically in parallel
and continue to do so post treatment. ￿ere is no evidence that waiters would have
signi￿cantly reduced their hours compared to their synthetic control group, i.e.
there is no evidence that smoking bans led to a decline in hours worked. ￿e same
conclusion holds when I restrict attention to only those thirteen out of sixteen states
which introduced smoking bans in ￿￿￿￿ (Figure ￿.￿b).￿￿ ￿e co-evolution between
the treatment and control group is even more evident in this case and again there
￿￿Furthermore, I run the fully nested and fully robust (global) optimization procedure that searches
among all (diagonal) positive semide￿nite V-matrices and sets of W-weights for the best ￿tting
convex combination of the control units (options nested and allopt of Hainmueller, Abadie,
and Diamond’s synth package for Stata).
￿￿When focusing on only those states which introduced smoking bans in ￿￿￿￿, the synthetic control
approach does not converge likely due to smaller sample sizes resulting in an inadequate donor
pool.
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Figure ￿.￿: Evolution of Hours Worked (Synthetic Control Group Approach)
(a) All States (￿￿/￿￿)
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(b)Only States with Smoking Bans Introduced in ￿￿￿￿ (￿￿/￿￿)
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure compares the evolution of the usual hours worked per week of mini job workers
employed as waiters to a synthetic control group constructed from a pool of all other mini job workers
in occupations with at least ￿￿ observations per state. Data is taken from the Microcensus. ￿e
predictor variables are averaged over the entire pre-treatment period and include age, the share of
females, and the share of workers in East Germany along with the hours worked.
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is no indication for a decline in the hours worked related to the introduction of
smoking bans. For completeness, in Figures C.￿ and C.￿ in the Appendix, I show
for each of the two samples two graphs commonly used for inference in a synthetic
control setting. ￿ese graphs show in two di￿erent ways the results of a placebo
exercise in which treatment is iteratively re-assigned to each control state in the
donor pool and compared to the e￿ect corresponding to the actual treatment. In
line with Figures ￿.￿a and b, these permutation exercises do not show any signi￿cant
e￿ect of smoking bans on the hours worked by waiters.
Although the synthetic control group approach is well suited in the given set-
ting, I also run a triple di￿erence-in-di￿erences approach at the individual level
applying the same sample restrictions as I used in the synthetic control group ap-
proach. ￿e two approaches implicitly rely on two di￿erent identifying assumptions:
While the synthetic control approach requires that in the absence of treatment, the
post-treatment outcomes of the treatment and control group would be the same
conditional on past-outcomes and observed covariates (independence conditional
on past outcomes), the DDD estimation identi￿es the treatment e￿ect based on the
parallel trends assumption. A priori it is not clear which assumption is more tenable.
It is therefore reassuring that the results of this DDD exercise (see Table C.￿￿ in
the Appendix) yield a positive but insigni￿cant e￿ect of smoking bans on working
hours and thus con￿rm the ￿ndings of the synthetic control group approach.￿￿
Summarizing, based on the best data available and using two di￿erent method-
ologies, I ￿nd no evidence that smoking bans had a negative impact on the hours
worked by hospitality workers.
￿.￿.￿ Selection
If the decline in wages a￿er the introduction of smoking bans is not due to a decline
in revenues or hours worked, could it be driven by selection – both on observable
￿￿Standard diagnostics suggest to use log hours instead of hours in levels as the dependent variable.
￿￿In Table C.￿￿, I present DDD-results using three di￿erent treatment indicators: (i) a simple ban
dummy that switches on in the year a smoking ban was introduced in a state, (ii) the treatment
intensity measure used throughout in the previous analyses, and (iii) an adjusted treatment
intensity measured scaled by the share of the year a smoking ban is in place. Given that I only
have pooled cross-sections over time and thus cannot include individual ￿xed e￿ects, I add a rich
set of individual and state level (potentially time varying) controls.
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and unobservable characteristics? To explore the role of observables, in Table ￿.￿￿ I
check whether smoking bans led to a signi￿cant change in observable characteristics
of workers. For instance, it could be that a￿er the introduction of smoking bans
individuals who had previously not considered working in a bar take up a job in a
now smoke-free bar. Consequently, we should see a drop in tenure or the experience
in the hospitality industry. As these characteristics co-move with time, are ￿xed,
or slow moving, estimation is without individual ￿xed e￿ects. Table ￿.￿￿ shows
that there is little evidence for a change in observable characteristics associated
with smoking bans. In general, using extended controls only explains very little of
the overall variation in these variables. In line with this, a power analysis suggests
that the ability to detect a true e￿ect given a signi￿cance level of ￿% in the given
setting is far below ￿￿% and o￿en lower than ￿￿%. ￿e exceptions are months since
entry, being low-skilled, medium-skilled and whether an individual has previously
been unemployed with powers above ￿￿%. Taken at face value, Table ￿.￿￿ suggest
that a￿er the introduction of smoking bans, individuals tend to have worked less
time in jobs covered by social security (proxied by the months since ￿rst entry in
the IAB-records), are less o￿en low skilled and more o￿en medium-skilled (note
that students are recorded as being medium skill) and are less likely to come out of
unemployment. A story consistent with these results is that smoking bans changed
the composition of workers in bars and restaurants such that now more educated
and less experienced individuals work there.
Anotherway to explore the role of observable and (time-constant) unobservable
characteristics is presented Table ￿.￿￿. Column ￿ reproduces the baseline e￿ect.￿￿
In column ￿, I do not include individual ￿xed e￿ects. ￿e treatment e￿ect turns
insigni￿cant and positive. ￿is is an interesting ￿nding as it suggests that not
controlling for time-constant observable and unobservable characteristics, smoking
bans did not have a signi￿cant e￿ect on waiters’ wages. Together, columns ￿ and ￿
indicate that waiters a￿er the introduction of smoking bans are positively selected.
Not controlling for this selection, results in an upward biased treatment e￿ect, a bias
that plagued some of the previous literature. In column ￿ (again estimated without
individual ￿xed e￿ects), I include a host of observable individual characteristics
￿￿To increase power for the estimation without individual ￿xed e￿ects, I use a longer time span
starting from January ￿￿￿￿. All conclusions remain unchanged when I use a shorter time period.
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Table ￿.￿￿: Change in Observable Characteristics due to Smoking Bans
Dependent Variable IntensityCoe￿cient Adj. R
￿
￿. Experience in Hospitality Industry (in Months) -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Tenure -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Occupation Not Waiter (Previous Spell) ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Sector Not Hospitality Industry (Previous Spell) ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Months since First Entry -￿.￿￿￿* ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Age -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Female -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. German -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿. Low Skilled -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. Medium Skilled ￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. High Skilled -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. Secondary Job ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. Previous Spell: Full-Time -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. Previous Spell: Long Part-Time ￿.￿￿￿** ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. Previous Spell: Short Part-Time -￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. Previous Spell: Trainee ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿￿. Previous Spell: Unemployed -￿.￿￿￿* ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿)
Notes: ￿is table shows how observable characteristics among employed waiters change with the
intensity of a smoking ban. Each row represents a separate regression with the same right-hand
side variable speci￿cation using extended controls and a di￿erent dependent variable indicated
in the ￿rst column of each row. ￿e sample consists of all spells of waiters in the hospitality
sector. All speci￿cations include extended controls. ￿e sample covers January ￿￿￿￿ to February
￿￿￿￿. Standard errors clustered at the state level. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level.
***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
C￿. ￿: C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿ B￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Table ￿.￿￿: Exploring the Role of Selection
Dependent Variable: Log Wages
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
Baseline
No
Individual
FEs
+
Individual
Controls
Stayers
vs.
Changers
Worker× Firm
FEs
Ban Intensity -￿.￿￿￿*** ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿** -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Changed Firm A￿er Ban× Ban Intensity -￿.￿￿￿(￿.￿￿￿)
Baseline Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual FEs ✓ ✓
Individual Controls ✓
Worker × Firm FEs ✓
Start Jan ￿￿￿￿ Jan ￿￿￿￿ Jan ￿￿￿￿ Jan ￿￿￿￿ Jan ￿￿￿￿
End Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿
Clusters ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Individuals ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
Observations ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: ￿is table presents various speci￿cations exploring the role of selection. ￿e units of
observation are individuals working in guest attending occupations in the hospitality sector. ￿e
sample is restricted to employees in mini jobs only. ￿e dependent variable is the log individual
daily wage. Individual controls include dummies for being female, German, indicators for
each of ￿ age- and ￿ education categories, hospitality experience, tenure, a dummy for whether
the previous spell was not as a waiter, a dummy for whether the previous spell was outside
the hospitality industry, the months since the ￿rst entry in the IAB data, whether the spell
overlaps with another employment spell, and dummies for whether the previous spell was a
full-time, part-time, vocational training, or unemployed. Extended controls include person-,
time-, state-, and state×month ￿xed e￿ects, linear pre-trends, and current and six lags of the
monthly state-unemployment rate. Standard errors clustered at the state level. Standard errors
are clustered at the state-level. ***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
￿￿￿ E￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿, W￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿
such as age, gender, education, and previous labor market and hospitality industry
experience detailed in the table note. Surprisingly, the results barely change and
the increase in R￿ is marginal. Even with this extensive set of covariates, time and
state ￿xed e￿ects, I am only able to explain about ￿% of the variation in individual
wages. ￿is in turn, suggests, that the bulk of selection is due to unobservable time-
constant characteristics. ￿ese could potentially include productivity, friendliness,
or appearance for all of which the market is likely to o￿er higher wages. ￿is
reasoning is in line with the results of Table ￿.￿￿ where I found little evidence for
positive selection in terms of observables. In column ￿ I check whether the wage
decrease is di￿erent for those who stay for the subsequent six months at the same
￿rm they had worked at least one month before the introduction of a smoking
ban (“stayers”) and those who do not (“changers”). ￿e motivation behind this
exercise is that is might be easier to adjust wages for new contracts. Remember,
however, that since mini jobs are ￿exible contracts, hours and wages can potentially
be changed every month. ￿ere is some evidence that indeed, the e￿ect is larger
for “changers”, i.e. those changing employers a￿er the introduction of smoking
bans. ￿is di￿erence, however, is not signi￿cant and a priori it is not clear in which
direction the e￿ect would go as “changers” likely act rationally and would only
change a job if some kind of gain could be achieved. In line with this and the idea
of an unobserved worker-￿rm speci￿c match component, in column ￿ I include
worker-￿rm ￿xed e￿ects, a rather demanding speci￿cation since the treatment
e￿ect is now identi￿ed only from within spell variation, i.e. from changes in wages
of worker who remain at a given ￿rm pre- and post-treatment. ￿e treatment
coe￿cient decreases slightly but remains highly signi￿cant. ￿is piece of evidence
strongly supports the interpretation of the e￿ect as compensating di￿erentials
and overcomes many of the identi￿cation issues that plagued previous studies as
discussed above.
While not conclusive, the evidence suggests that smoking bans attract a di￿erent
sort of workers who are positively selected in terms of their unobservables. ￿ese
unobservables in turn are likely to be correlated with the degree of aversion to
second-hand-smoke. Put di￿erently, the new workers are both more productive
and likely to have a stronger dislike for second hand smoke. Another piece of
evidence consistent with this reasoning may be found in Table ￿.￿. ￿e regressions
C￿. ￿: C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿ B￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
presented there can also be interpreted as a di￿erence-in-di￿erence analysis of the
e￿ect of smoking bans on waiters’ propensity to smoke using individuals in all other
occupations as a control group. Although the DD coe￿cient (Waiters×￿￿￿￿) for the
group of mini job holders (columns ￿ and ￿ of Table ￿.￿) is estimated imprecisely,
the coe￿cient is sizable and negative implying a drop in the propensity to smoke
of about ￿ percentage points for the group of waiters in mini jobs relative to the
general trend of other workers in mini jobs.￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Employment
￿e reasoning presented in the previous section, i.e. that smoking bans led to a
positive selection of workers, implies that a￿er the introduction of smoking bans
new workers are either substituting existing workers or are added to the set of
existing waiters (or a combination of the two). Note that both possibilities are
consistent with the simple framework presented in Section ￿.￿.
To assess the extent of these channels, I ￿rst present an event study graph of
the probabilities to start and end a job in a given month relative to the introduction
of a smoking ban. ￿e regression does a good job at removing trends and obvious
seasonal patterns, but there still remains a substantial amount of variation. However,
there is no clear change or spike in neither the probability to start nor to end a job
around the introduction of a smoking ban. Columns ￿ to ￿ of Table ￿.￿￿ present the
corresponding intensity estimates also including turnover, i.e. the probability to
start or end a job in a given month based on individual level data.￿￿ Consistent with
the event study graphs, I ￿nd no signi￿cant e￿ect of smoking ban intensities on
turnover or the individual probabilities to start or end a job. ￿e R￿ suggests that I
am only able to explain a tiny fraction of the overall variation in turnover which
is highly volatile even a￿er controlling for time, and state ×month speci￿c ￿xed
e￿ects. A power calculation con￿rms that the setting is underpowered (<￿.￿￿).
A second approach presented in columns ￿ and ￿ of Table ￿.￿￿ relies on data
aggregated at the state level.￿e coe￿cients indicate a one percentage point increase
￿￿Adding a more extensive set of census region-, occupation-, and sector ￿xed e￿ects leaves the
estimates and standard errors virtually unchanged.
￿￿In accordance with the subsequent graph, I choose a bandwidth around treatment of ￿￿months
prior and ￿months a￿er the treatment, the ￿ndings do, however not depend on this.
￿￿￿ E￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿, W￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿
Figure ￿.￿: Event Study Graph Change in Probability to Start and End a Spell
(a) Probability of Starting a New Spell
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the regression coe￿cients of dummies indicating the months to or since the
introduction of a smoking for the period ￿￿months prior and up to ￿months a￿er the introduction
of a smoking ban on a dummy indicating whether a worker started (Panel A) or ended (Panel B) a
spell in a given month controlling for individual-, time-, state-, and state ×month ￿xed e￿ects. ￿e
period one month prior to the introduction is the reference period. ￿e vertical gray lines indicate
the ￿￿% con￿dence intervals of each point estimate. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
C￿. ￿: C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿ B￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Table ￿.￿￿: Turnover and Employment E￿ects of Smoking Bans
Probability to . . . a Job
(Individual Level Data)
Employment
(State Level Data)
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
Start or End Start End ln(Jobs) ln(Turnover)
Ban Intensity ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Extended Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Months included
before treatment ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Months included
a￿er treatment ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Clusters ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Individuals ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ - -
Observations ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: ￿is table shows results from linear regression models of the impact of the intensity of a
smoking ban on various employment indicators among the group of waiters in the hospitality
sector working in mini jobs. ￿e units of observation in columns ￿-￿ are individuals working in
guest attending occupations in the hospitality sector and in columns ￿-￿ these are aggregated at the
state-month level. ln(Jobs) is de￿ned as the natural logarithm of the number of (person-month)
spells in a given state-month cell +￿. ln(Turnover) is de￿ned as the total number of spells starting
and ending in a given state-month cell +￿. State level regressions are weighted by the number of
underlying observations from with the data was aggregated. Standard errors are clustered at the
state-level. ***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
￿￿￿ E￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿, W￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿
in the number of jobs and a ￿.￿ percentage point increase in turnover related to
smoking bans. Although these coe￿cients are estimated imprecisely – most likely
again due to a lack of statistical power – these results can at least be taken as
suggestive evidence indicating an increase in turnover and a slight increase in jobs
consistent with a compensating di￿erentials mechanism.
￿.￿ Conclusion
￿e topic of compensating di￿erentials has recently been re-emerging in the agenda
of the economics profession. ￿is is despite – or because – so far it has been hard
to ￿nd compelling empirical evidence for this intuitive concept ￿rst put forward by
Adam Smith.
Exploiting a particularly suited policy experiment, I ￿nd evidence that strongly
suggests that exposure to second hand smoke is priced in the labor market. ￿e
main idea of my setting is that in a competitive labor market employers in the
hospitality sector have to pay their workers a wage premium to compensate for
the exposure to second hand smoke. When a smoking ban is introduced, it is no
longer necessary to pay such a premium and we should ceteris paribus see a drop in
wages that exactly equals the compensating di￿erential of bearing the exposure to
second hand smoke. My setting o￿ers threemain advantages relative to the previous
literature: (i) an arguably exogenous, salient and e￿ective variation in amenities
(being exposed or not to second hand smoke) that overcomes the endogeneity of
amenities and jobs and their and opaqueness which plagued many of the previous
analyses; (ii) the use of panel data which allows holding individual productivities
constant; and (iii) a competitive and rather ￿exible segment of the labor market
(hospitality workers in mini-jobs and the absence of a minimum wage) that allows
the equilibrium to emerge more quickly and also makes an adjustment via prices
more likely than via quantities (in contrast to, e.g. aus dem Moore and Spitz-Oener
￿￿￿￿).
My baseline estimates indicate that introducing a complete smoking ban that
grants no exceptions (corresponding to Bavaria’s ￿rst smoking ban of ￿￿￿￿) leads
to a wage decrease of about ￿.￿%. Performing a battery of robustness checks, I
rule out several confounding factors such as seasonal, political or weather e￿ects
C￿. ￿: C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿ B￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
such that I can put faith in a causal interpretation of my treatment e￿ect. ￿is
evidence by itself, however, would not be enough to suggest that this e￿ect can
be interpreted as a compensating di￿erential. I present evidence that refutes two
main alternative channels, namely a decrease in revenues of bars and restaurants
and a reductions of hours worked. I also present suggestive evidence that indicates
that smoking bans changed the selection of workers who tend to be more educated
and less experienced a￿er their introduction. A major part of selection, however,
is occurring on unobservable individual characteristics captured by individual
￿xed e￿ects. Consistent with the view that the selection of workers has changed,
I ￿nd some evidence indicating a slightly increased turnover and an increase in
employment a￿er the introduction of smoking bans. Taken together, these results
are consistent with the predictions of a simple compensating di￿erentials model.

C￿. ￿: C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿ B￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Appendix C
C.￿ Additional Figures and Tables
Figure C.￿:Map of Share of Population Smoking (Microcensus ￿￿￿￿)
0.30-0.33
0.34-0.36
0.37-0.39
Notes: ￿is map shows the share of smokers in each state in ￿￿￿￿ based on Microcensus data. ￿e
sample is based on Microcensus waves ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ and is restricted to individuals aged ￿￿-￿￿ not
in civil service (Beamte) and with non-missing values the control variable values used in Table ￿.￿.
Statistics are weighted by survey weights.
￿￿￿ E￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿, W￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿
Figure C.￿:Map of Initial Smoking Ban Intensities in Germany
 
 
 
Less Strict
Strictest
Notes:￿ismap shows the initial intensity of smoking bans according to the index speci￿ed in equation
￿.￿. “Strictest” refers to the strictest ban (corresponding to Bavaria’s initial smoking ban, index value
￿) and “less strictest” to the less strict ban observed (corresponding to Rhineland-Palantinate, index
value ￿.￿).
C￿. ￿: C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿ B￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Figure C.￿: Air Quality Before and A￿er the Introduction of Smoking Bans in
German Hospitality Establishments with a Comprehensive Ban
#AFÀĺINĺ(ANNOVER






  


+
ON
ZE
NT
RA
TIO
Nĺ
0-

ĺ
IN
ĺ
G
M
Ė	
:EITĺMIN	
$ISKOĺINĺ&RANKFURT







  


:EITĺMIN	
2ESTAURANTĺINĺ-ÓNCHEN









  


:EITĺMIN	







  


:EITĺMIN	
"ARĺINĺ"REMEN
+
ON
ZE
NT
RA
TIO
Nĺ
0-

ĺ
IN
ĺ
G
M
Ė	
+
ON
ZE
NT
RA
TIO
Nĺ
0-

ĺ
IN
ĺ
G
M
Ė	
+
ON
ZE
NT
RA
TIO
Nĺ
0-

ĺ
IN
ĺ
G
M
Ė	
Abbildung 8: 
Zeitlicher Verlauf der 
Konzentration von lungen-
gängigen Partikeln einer 
Größe bis 2,5 µm vor (2005) 
und nach (2009) Einführung 
der Nichtraucherschutzge-
setze in der Raumluft 
ausgewählter deutscher 
Gastronomiebetriebe, die 
das Rauchen vollständig 
verboten haben. Angege-
ben ist die Konzentration in 
µg/m3. Quelle: Eigene 
Messungen. Darstellung: 
Deutsches Krebsfor-
schungszentrum, Stabsstel-
le Krebsprävention, 2010.
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Größe bis 2,5 µm vor (2005) 
und nach (2009) Einführung 
der Nichtraucherschutzge-
setze in der Raumluft 
ausgewählter deutscher 
Gastronomiebetriebe, die 
das Rauchen vollständig 
verboten haben. Angege-
ben ist die Konzentration in 
µg/m3. Quelle: Eigene 
Messungen. Darstellung: 
Deutsches Krebsfor-
schungszentrum, Stabsstel-
le Krebsprävention, 2010.
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure compares the times series of the average concentration of particles up to ￿.￿ µm
in the indoor air before (dark gray/ red) and a￿er (light gray/ orange) the introduction of smoking
bans in hospitality establishments in Germany with a comprehensive smoking ban. Source and more
details: DKFZ (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿).
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Figure C.￿: Illustration of DDD Approach
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Notes: See notes for Figure ￿.￿.
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Figure C.￿: Leave One State Out at a Time
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Notes: ￿is ￿gure plots the coe￿cients (￿lled black dots) and corresponding ￿￿% con￿dence intervals
(dashed lines) from regressions using extended controls of the smoking ban intensity on waiters’ log
wages where observations from the state indicated on the x-axis are le￿ out. ￿e solid thick gray line
(dashed gray lines) refers to the baseline estimate (￿￿% con￿dence interval) including observations
from all ￿￿ states.
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Figure C.￿: Synthetic Control Inference Graphs
(All States)
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Notes:￿is￿gure presents two approaches commonly used to inference in a synthetic control approach.
Figure C.￿a, shows the result of a placebo exercise in which all occupations in the donor pool are
iteratively assigned to be treated while waiters are moved into the control group. Figure C.￿b plots
the ratios of the pre- and post mean squared prediction errors (MSPE). In neither measure does the
occupation of waiters appear to be signi￿cantly di￿erent from other occupations. For two occupation
groups no synthetic control group could be constructed, they remain, however, in the donor pool.
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Figure C.￿: Synthetic Control Inference Graphs
(Only States with Ban Introduction in ￿￿￿￿)
(a) Treatment and Placebo Di￿erences in Hours Worked
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Notes:￿is￿gure presents two approaches commonly used to inference in a synthetic control approach.
Figure C.￿a shows the result of a placebo exercise in which all occupations in the donor pool are
iteratively assigned to be treated while waiters are moved into the control group. Figure C.￿b plots
the ratios of the pre- and post mean squared prediction errors (MSPE). In neither measure does the
occupation of waiters appear to be signi￿cantly di￿erent from other occupations. For two occupation
groups no synthetic control group could be constructed, they remain, however, in the donor pool.
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Table C.￿: Index Weights used to Construct the Intensity Index
Type Employees WZ ￿￿￿￿ Weight ω
Restaurants & Bars, large (LB)a ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿, ￿￿.￿￿￿, ￿￿.￿￿￿,
￿￿.￿￿￿, ￿￿.￿￿￿
￿.￿￿
Dancing Clubs (DC) ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿
Restaurants & Bars, small (SB)b ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿, ￿￿.￿￿￿, ￿￿.￿￿￿,
￿￿.￿￿￿, ￿￿.￿￿￿
￿.￿￿
Party Tents (PT)c ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿, ￿￿.￿￿￿, ￿￿.￿￿￿,
￿￿.￿￿￿, ￿￿.￿￿￿
￿.￿￿
Total ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿, ￿￿.￿ ￿.￿￿
Other Food Services ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿ –
Accomodation ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿ –
Total Hospitality Industry ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿, ￿￿ –
Note: a￿ ormore employees. bup to ￿ employees. cestimated as ￿%of employees in large restaurant
and bars.
Source: Data refer to the year ￿￿￿￿ and are taken from the Yearly Statistics in the Hospitality
Industry (Jahresstatistik im Gastgewerbe) published by the Federal Statistical O￿ce (Statistisches
Bundesamt ￿￿￿￿).
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Table C.￿: Alternative Index De￿nitions
(￿) (￿) (￿) (￿) (￿)
Baseline AlternativeIndex
Only
LR
Only
DC
Only
SB
Ban Intensity -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿*** -￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Baseline Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SR￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
SR￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
SB ￿.￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
PT ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Start Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿ Aug ￿￿￿￿
End Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿ Feb ￿￿￿￿
Clusters ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Individuals ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
Observations ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: Marginal part-time employees only. SR￿ = separate smoking room in restaurants and bars,
SR￿= smoking in dancing clubs, SB = smoking in small bars allowed, PT = smoking in party tents.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. ***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿%
level.
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Table C.￿: Leave one State out at a Time
Intensity
Schleswig-Holstein -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Hamburg -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Niedersachsen -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Bremen -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
NRW -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Hessen -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Rheinland-Pfalz -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Baden-Wuerttemberg -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Bayern -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Saarland -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Sachsen -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Sachsen-Anhalt -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
￿ueringen -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Berlin -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Brandenburg -￿.￿￿￿***
(￿.￿￿￿)
Notes: All regressions replicate the baseline
speci￿cation but leave out observations from
the state indicated in the corresponding row.
Marginal part-time employees only. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the state-level.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-
level. ***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the
￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
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Table C.￿: Control Groups for DDD-Estimations
Occupation Group (KldB ￿￿￿￿) Observations Percent
￿￿ Cooks until ready-to-serve meals, fruit, vegetable
preservers, preparers
￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿
￿￿ Unskilled laborer/ assistants (no further speci￿cation) ￿,￿￿￿ ￿.￿
￿￿ Salespersons ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿.￿
￿￿Motor vehicle drivers ￿,￿￿￿ ￿.￿
￿￿ Stowers, furniture packers until stores/transport
workers
￿,￿￿￿ ￿.￿
￿￿ O￿ce specialists ￿,￿￿￿ ￿.￿
￿￿ Doormen, caretakers until domestic and non-domestic
servants
￿,￿￿￿ ￿.￿
￿￿￿ Others attending on guests ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿.￿
￿￿￿Housekeeping managers until employees by household
cheque procedure
￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿.￿
￿￿￿Household cleaners until glass, buildings cleaners ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿.￿
￿￿￿ Restaurant, inn, bar keepers, hotel proprietors,
catering trade dealers until waiters, stewards
￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿
Total ￿￿￿,￿￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿.￿
Notes: Frequencies and percentage shares of groups used in the DDD-approach "All Marginal
Part-Time Workers". Occupation group identi￿ers refer to the classi￿cation of occupations (version
￿￿￿￿).
￿￿￿ E￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿, W￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿
Table C.￿:Weights in Synthetic Control Approach
(￿) (￿)
Occupation Group (KldB ￿￿￿￿) All Only ￿￿￿￿
￿ Gardening occupations (incl. ￿orists) ￿ ￿
￿￿ Cooks ￿ ￿
￿￿ Dispatchers and storekeepers ￿ ￿
￿￿ Unskilled laborer/ assistants (no further speci￿cation) ￿ ￿
￿￿ Salespersons ￿ ￿
￿￿ Service salespersons and corresponding occupations ￿ ￿
￿￿ Land transport occupations (incl. Taxi and truck drivers) ￿ ￿
￿￿ Communication services (incl. mailmen) ￿ ￿
￿￿ Stockmen and transport workers ￿ ￿
￿￿ Management and consulting ￿ ￿
￿￿ Cashiers ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
￿￿ O￿ce helpers, secretaries and similar ￿ ￿
￿￿ Guards, doormen, janitors, pool attendants ￿ ￿
￿￿ Other health occupations (doctor’s receptionists, massage
therapists,...)
￿.￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ Social occupations (geriatric nurse, social workers,...) ￿ ￿
￿￿ Teachers ￿ ￿
￿￿ Housekeeper and aids ￿ ￿
￿￿ Cleaning occupations ￿ ￿.￿￿￿
￿￿ Other worker without explicitly assigned tasks ￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Notes: ￿is table provides the weights attached to each occupation group in the donor pool used
in the synthetic controls approaches based on a sample that includes all stated (column ￿) or only
those which introduced smoking bans in ￿￿￿￿ (column ￿).
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Table C.￿￿: Impact of Smoking Bans on Usual Hours Worked
Dependent Variable: Log Hours per Week
(￿) (￿) (￿)
Panel A: Ban Indicator
Ban Indicator ×Waiters ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Ban Indicator -￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Panel B: Intensity Measure
Intensity ×Waiters ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Intensity -￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿ -￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
Panel C: Adjusted Intensity Measure
Adjusted Intensity ×Waiters ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Adjusted Intensity ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
(￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿) (￿.￿￿￿)
Adj. R￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿
State × Occup. FEs ✓ ✓ ✓
Year × Occup. FEs ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual Controls ✓ ✓
Linear Occupation× State Speci￿c Trends ✓
Start ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
End ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Clusters ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Observations ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
Notes: ￿is table shows regression results of the log usual hours worked per week on various
smoking bans treatment indicators. ￿e sample is restricted to individuals in mini-jobs. Indi-
vidual controls include dummies for being female, German, having a partner, children under
￿￿ in the household, and main income source being from own work (opposed to transfers,
pensions, interest, and other); indicators for each of three education categories, eight age cat-
egories, and eight city size categories; the state level monthly unemployment rate and tenure
and tenure￿ . Regressions weighted by survey weights. Standard errors clustered at the state
level. ***/**/* indicate signi￿cance at the ￿%/￿%/￿￿% level.
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C.￿ Sample Restrictions and Data Preparation
• Sample Restrictions: Following common practice when working with the
IAB wage data, I drop spells with missing location information (a￿er im-
putation, see below), spells of doctors and pharmacists (due to corrupted
and missing records, see vom Berge et al. ￿￿￿￿), spells that last only one
day, spells with statuses “seeking for employment but not registered unem-
ployed”, “without status”, and “seeking advice”, zero wage spells, spells with
missing employment type information, full-time spells with earnings below
the marginal earnings threshold, unemployment spells that overlap with
non-unemployment spells and unemployment spells that overlap with other
unemployment spells (and keep only one of them). ￿is leaves me with a
sample of ￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ observations of ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ individuals. From this “pre-
pared wage sample”, I then derive my three baseline samples used in the DD-
and DDD-analyses detailed in Tables C.￿￿, C.￿￿, and C.￿￿.
• Daily Wages: I impute censored wages above the upper earnings threshold
for compulsory social insurance (￿￿,￿￿￿ euros per year in ￿￿￿￿) using the “no
heteroskedasticity” approach by Gartner (￿￿￿￿) and Dustmann et al. (￿￿￿￿).
Speci￿cally, I consider wages as censored that were up to two euros below
the maximum wage value observed in each year and then estimate for each
year and for males and females separately a censored regression of log wages
on indicators of eight age groups, three skill groups and all their possible
interactions, assuming that the error term is normally distributed and has
the same variance across age and skill groups.
• Education: I imputemissing education information following Fitzenberger et
al. (￿￿￿￿) and group individuals in three categories (low, medium, and high).
Low comprises those with at most a Realschul degree, missing education,
and those who have not completed any vocational training, Abitur, or a
tertiary degree. Medium contains those with vocational training or Abitur.
High refers to all those with a completed tertiary degree (Fachhochschule or
Universität).
• Location: If missing, location information is imputed with the last non-
missing location.
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• Tenure: For each individual, the number of months at the same employer as
observed from his/ her IAB labor market biography are summed up (poten-
tially since ￿￿￿￿).
• Experience in Hospitality Industry: For each individual, the number of
months in the hospitality sector as observed from his/ her IAB labor market
biography are summed up (potentially since ￿￿￿￿).
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Table C.￿￿: Restrictions of Baseline DD-Sample
(Waiters only)
Step
Observations Individuals
Remaining Change Remaining Change
Prepared wage sample ￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ - ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -
Drop unemployment spells ￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿
Restrict to spells in hospitality sector ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Drop homeworkers ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿
Restrict to waiters (occupation group
￿￿￿)
￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿
Expand to monthly panel ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -
Drop shorter overlapping spells in the
same month and keep longest
￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -
Restrict to Aug ￿￿￿￿ - Feb ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿
Restrict to marginal part-time jobs ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿
Baseline DD-Sample
(Waiters Only) ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
C￿. ￿: C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿ B￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Table C.￿￿: Restrictions of Baseline DDD-Sample ￿
(Waiters and Cooks)
Step
Observations Individuals
Remaining Change Remaining Change
Prepared wage sample ￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ - ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -
Drop unemployment spells ￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿
Drop homeworkers ￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿
Restrict to marginal part-time jobs ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Restrict to spells in hospitality sector ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Restrict to waiters (occupation group
￿￿￿) and cooks (occupation group ￿￿)
￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿
Expand to monthly panel ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -
Drop shorter overlapping spells in the
same month and keep longest
￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -
Keep from August ￿￿￿￿ onwards (￿￿
months before start of ￿rst ban)
￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿
Restrict to Aug ￿￿￿￿ - Feb ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿
Baseline DDD-Sample ￿
(Waiters and Cooks) ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
￿￿￿ E￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿, W￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ G￿￿￿￿￿￿
Table C.￿￿: Restrictions of Baseline DDD-Sample ￿
(Waiters and all other Occupations)
Step
Observations Individuals
Remaining Change Remaining Change
Prepared wage sample ￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ - ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -
Drop unemployment spells ￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿
Drop homeworkers ￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿
Restrict to marginal part-time jobs ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Restrict to spells in hospitality sector ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Drop occupation groups with less than
￿￿ observations per state
￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿
Drop observations with missing
occupation information
￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿￿
Expand to monthly panel ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -
Drop shorter overlapping spells in the
same month and keep longest
￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -
Restrict to Aug ￿￿￿￿ - Feb ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿,￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ -￿￿,￿￿￿
Baseline DDD-Sample ￿
(Waiters and All Other Occupations) ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
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